

TOP SECRET/S.I. Covert Operations Source Book by John Prados



TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET/S.I., PRODUCTS OF YOUR IMAGINATION, and the TSR logo are trademarks owned by TSR, Inc.

Covert Operations Source Book

Preface

This *Covert Operations Source Book* is intended to accompany the *Top Secret/S.I.*™ role-playing game. It is designed for Administrators and players who wish to develop adventures based on real-life case materials. The information contained here can also be used for any adventure with any espionage game.

For this volume of the source book, I have elected to focus on the espionage competition between the superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. Two types of material are presented—profiles of the powers' foreign intelligence organizations, and case files of particular episodes of the secret war. The case files focus on the spy cases of recent years, except for certain earlier classic espionage cases, such as that of Philby and the Cambridge ring. This will provide adventuring background material that cannot yet be found in the espionage literature (a few of these cases have made it into books but most have not). Suggestions for further reading are given on page 64.

John Prados
Washington, DC
July 1987

Table of Contents

Introduction	4
Part I: Superpower Intelligence Organizations	
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	11
Committee for State Security (KGB)	21
Part II: Espionage Case Files	
John H. Bothwell	31
Christopher J. Boyce and Andrew D. Lee	32
Guy F. Burgess	33
Larry Wu-Tai Chin	35
Christopher M. Cooke	36
Fedora	37
Anatoli N. Filatov	38
Oleg G. Gordiyevsky	39
Edward L. Howard	40
Robert Lee Johnson	42
William P. Kampiles	44
Karl F. Koecher	45
Arthur Lindberg	46
Donald Maclean	47
Alexandr Dmitrevich Ogorodnik	49
Ronald W. Pelton	50
Harold A. R. Philby	51
Geoffrey A. Prime	53
Maria del Carmen y Ruiz	55
Nicolas G. Shadrin	56
Arkady N. Shevchenko	57
Adolf G. Tolkachev	58
Walker Family Ring	59
Vitaly S. Yurchenko	62
For Further Reading	64

Credits

Editing: *Mike Breault*
 Cover Art: *Les Dorscheid*
 Typography: *Kim Janke*
 Keylining: *Sue Myers*
 Reviewing: *Douglas Niles and Warren Spector*

The Fine Print

Distributed to the book trade in the United States by Random House, Inc., and in Canada by Random House of Canada Ltd.

Distributed to the toy and hobby trade by regional distributors.

This work is protected under the copyright laws of the United States of America. Any reproduction or other unauthorized use of the material or artwork contained herein is prohibited without the express written consent of TSR, Inc.

©1987 TSR, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Printed in U.S.A.

0-88038-479-4



TSR, Inc.
 PRODUCTS OF YOUR IMAGINATION™

TSR, Inc.
 POB 756
 Lake Geneva,
 WI 53147 USA

TSR UK Ltd
 The Mill, Rathmore Road
 Cambridge CB1 4AD
 United Kingdom

Introduction

The *Covert Operations Source Book* is a unique type of book. In a very real sense, this volume tries to bridge the gap between books and role-playing games. This introduction, fittingly, also tries to bridge a gap: the difference between fictional and real-life espionage.

This book, clearly, is about real-life espionage—the sort you read about in the papers, the sort that makes the Six O’Clock News. It is filled with names that have been common topics of conversation (sometimes only months ago) among people interested in spies and spying. Some of these names have connotations of glory and patriotism, while others, perhaps most of them, epitomize the dregs of treachery and betrayal. Many deaths have been caused, and many secrets have been betrayed, by the men and women discussed in this volume.

This is also a supplement for the *Top Secret/S.I.*™ espionage role-playing game. No, you won’t find game statistics for Ollie North and Fawn Hall in its pages. Nor will you learn how many points of damage a new hi-tech weapon inflicts with a successful hit, nor what kind of skill levels are needed to successfully challenge the latest perimeter security system. It won’t even provide movement scales for the real-life chases that are described within its pages.

So What Kind of a Game Supplement is This, Anyway?

It’s a supplement for the *Top Secret/S.I.* Administrator who wishes to run the most realistic campaign possible. It’s a supplement for players who wish to participate in such a campaign. And it’s a source of material for any gamers who are interested in espionage or who are looking for a little background to spice up or further develop their campaigns.

But it’s also a book for anyone who is interested in spying and wants to learn a little more about the way spies work. These readers might not even play the game—the book’s emphasis on case histories, and the downplaying of game mechanics, makes it a useful source for anyone who wants to learn more about this hottest of hot topics.

You’ll see how secrets are learned and traded, how double agents are made, used, and disposed of. You’ll read stories of incredible treachery, as well as tales of both brilliant and bungled investigations. In short, you’ll get a look at how the spy business works in the real world.

We think you’ll find that the reality of espionage is quite a bit different from the stories you see in movies or read about in spy thrillers. Where the spy business, in fiction, is generally shown as a dramatic collage of fast-paced exchanges of information, chases, and gun battles, you’ll see that the reality is much more likely to include nerve-straining patience over long periods of surveillance, a nitpicking need to sift through mountains of information in search of a single vital fact, and, more often than not, spies that come along peacefully when they are finally arrested.

Of course, fictional espionage has drawn its fundamental ingredients—far-reaching conspiracies, life-or-death missions into hostile territory, codes and code breakers, double agents, triple agents, traitors and patriots—from real-life events in the world around us. Most of the events postulated in fictional espionage are, if not likely, at least not impossible given the realities of the trade. But the authors and inventors of fictionalized espionage tales, whether in film, novel, or television, have added an element of drama that is necessary to the success of any fictionalized tale of adventure. Drama is achieved through the timing of events, the conflicts between characters (which often translate into the blazing gun battles or squealing chases without which a typical fictional spy story would be incomplete), and quite often, through the exaggeration of the virtue of the main characters and the evilness of the main characters’ opponents.

None of these methods are employed to embellish

the stories within the *Covert Operations Source Book*, but that is not to say that the stories in this book lack drama. Here, however, the drama arises from the magnitude of treachery involved in the betrayal of one's country or people, or from the true-life stakes involved in these, the highest of high-stakes games.

In order to cast these tales in an appropriate light, John Prados begins his book with an examination of the two most powerful espionage agencies in the world today: the CIA and the KGB. The case histories that follow deal primarily with the conflict between these two espionage giants. Not coincidentally, this conflict has been a favorite of fictional storytellers when creating spy thrillers for the consumption of their avid readership or viewership. Although the similarities between fact and fiction do not exactly end here, they start to get rather few and far between. What then, are the fundamental differences between fact and fiction, and how do they affect the creation and running of a role-playing game campaign?

The two forms of espionage may perhaps best be compared by breaking them into subcategories. These groupings will list elements of espionage common to both the fictional and non-fictional forms and will proceed to examine differences in the way these elements are handled. The groupings will include the following: the Agents—their characteristics, abilities, and motivations; the Adversaries—how the enemy is presented or regarded in both forms of espionage; the Organization—how the agency controlling the spies is organized and functions; the Objectives—what fictional spies are usually trying to accomplish, as compared to the real-life goals of secret agents; the Equipment—what types of gadgets are employed by fictional and real secret agents; and finally, the Situations—what types of tactical problems are faced by real spies, as opposed to the problems created for fictional spies by writers and film makers.

The Agents

The secret agent is the crux of any fictional spy story. Dashing, glamorous, athletic, skilled...the list of the agent's abilities and accomplishments goes on and on. While there are variations in this description, the bottom line is that the fictional secret agent has what it takes to get the job done.

The fictional agent is often a loner, a jack-of-all-trades capable of handling his own combat, communications, demolitions, gymnastics, and virtually any other challenge that might arise. Alternately (and especially effective for role-playing situations), the fictional agent is a part of a small and specialized team, where the above abilities are not shared by any single individual, but the members of the team include a bona fide expert in each essential area.

Our hero(es) is usually relatively fearless, or certainly capable of overcoming his fear in order to get the job done. Usually (in the name of drama) he is expected to perform some task that gives him only a slim chance of survival, but this little detail never seems to matter very much.

The fictional secret agent is, almost without exception, a man or woman of action. While the agent is intelligent, perhaps even brilliant, his problems are much more likely to be solved by sudden, dramatic, and often violent action than by a well-thought-out plan that minimalizes risk to the secret agent.

The real-life agent, on the other hand, is likely to be not very different from you or me. The pages of this source book are full of people with petty frustrations, anxieties, and flaws. The agents who perform their jobs effectively, and those who crack under the strain, are not supermen or superwomen. They might be a little more intelligent and physically fit than the average person, and they will certainly have received training in many areas. Some of these areas might even include combat. But the real secret agent is not a walking SWAT team. Chances are that his area of personal expertise could be in academics, such as foreign

language, political science, or law, instead of a list of weapons proficiencies longer than his arm.

The great majority of real-life secret agents spend their time thinking, analyzing, collating, translating, and reporting to someone else. The agent is likely to have a specialty, perhaps in a very narrow field, and his or her activities are almost exclusively tied to that specialty. If a problem moves out of an agent's area of specialization, it is likely to be turned over to another agent.

While many, probably most, real spies are brave, the dramatic suicide mission is almost exclusively the province of fiction. Any of the very few historical missions that might fall into this category have most likely occurred during wartime.

A real spy is likely to spend a great deal of time on a cover occupation—probably to the extent of performing that occupation as a full-time job. Common covers for these people include diplomatic posts, military assignments, or jobs as journalists or other professionals who might have legitimate reasons for traveling and having meetings with people from other countries.

The truly dramatic moments in non-fiction espionage are often situations where some analyst correctly relates two pieces of data that enable a larger puzzle to be solved. The drama of the moment might not be obvious until much later, if ever.

In summary, a real spy is a person with a job to do. The job most often involves sitting at a desk, reading, listening, or thinking. He has to report to someone else and is probably watched rather carefully to see that the job is done properly. And he knows very little of what goes on outside of his rather limited area of expertise.

The Antagonists

This is another area of clear-cut difference between the fictional and non-fictional spy genres. We have all encountered the supervillain, that essential ingredient of many a spy thriller, bent

upon world conquest, or even world destruction. This villain has tremendous amounts of wealth at his disposal, and his agents are everywhere.

The villain will concoct scheme after scheme to try to ensnare the heroic secret agent. The villain often has the proverbial nine lives of the cat, for each time his death seems assured, he escapes through some miraculous event, only to face our hero again at some future date.

Even if the antagonist's motivation is not so grand as to threaten the earth itself, his plots and plans are undeniably evil. He is portrayed as someone who must be stopped, and generally he can only be stopped by the decisive actions of an individual or small group of agents. This, after all, makes for a good story.

As in most points of comparison between real-life and fictional espionage, the real-life adversary of a secret agent is considerably more mundane, even to the point of generally not being identified as a single individual. In particular, concepts of good versus evil are generally not involved in real-life espionage.

The antagonist of a real spy is likely to be someone very much like the spy himself. The agent usually regards his foe as another professional. There are cases of personal feuds developing between operatives on both sides of a dispute; in most instances, however, these feuds are considered harmful to professionalism and are discouraged. If an agent became motivated by personal hatred instead of professionalism, he would most likely be pulled from the case, as his attitude would be perceived as dangerous to himself and his compatriots.

The motivations of the antagonist are also very different from those of his fictional portrayal. In many cases, the antagonist's motivations are indistinguishable from the secret agent's own motivations. No matter what side of a dispute a secret agent is on, he is almost always motivated by patriotism, or a sense of duty, or (occasionally) greed. Perhaps agents from both sides are even seeking the same piece of information, or one side is seeking a piece of information that the other side is attempting to conceal.

The Organizations

John Prados spends the first part of this source book discussing the histories and organizations of the KGB and the CIA. In a sense, this area might be the one of closest similarity between the real and the fictional worlds of espionage. Indeed, many authors use the CIA or the KGB as the background agencies for their stories.

It is obvious that these government organizations are very different from fictional spy agencies that have become popular over the years. Such fictional agencies include, of course, UNCLE, THRUSH, SPECTRE, and this game's own Orion Foundation and the Web. Differences in the organizational structures between these make-believe organizations and the real bureaucracies controlled by real governments are manifold.

Fictional spy agencies are generally created to fall into one of two simplistic molds: good agencies or evil agencies, natural opponents. Again, this makes for good and exciting drama, as well as telling the fans of the genre in no uncertain terms who to root for. Evil agencies seek to do the same things as the supervillains mentioned above: destroy the world's economy, enslave the masses, steal huge sums, endanger the lives of innocent people, and generally make nuisances of themselves. The good agencies, almost without exception, seek to thwart the activities of the evil agencies.

Fictional agencies generally seem to have few worries about funding, although they have the resources to accomplish unbelievable things. Nor do they concern themselves with the approval of any controlling agency or institution—if the agency sees a need to accomplish something, the agents go out and do it. Such agencies are usually headed by a patriarch who has been in charge of the place since the Crusades, or even longer. This person has no apparent superior, at least none who has any effect on the story.

Real spy agencies, almost without exception, are controlled by governments and serve as tools to

further their governments' aims. The motivation of the intelligence agency is, of course, dictated by the motivation of the government as a whole. Traditionally, this motivation is primarily concerned with gathering information about the controlling nation's enemies and, to a lesser extent, allies. The agency is very much controlled by the parent government. Of course, since government control can arise from a number of different sources, this is not to say that all spy agencies are accountable in the same fashion. It is difficult to imagine KGB operatives called up before an investigative committee of Soviet representatives, though this is (as recent experience has shown) not at all out of the ordinary when an intelligence agency in a democratic nation oversteps its bounds.

The Equipment

Perhaps the biggest myth about secret agents involves the fact that they are all experts with firearms who wouldn't think of embarking upon a mission unless they are armed to the teeth. Sadly (or perhaps, happily) this is not the case. The great majority of actual intelligence personnel do not carry weapons on the job. Yet no fictional spy worth his silencer would be caught unarmed.

True, some of the fancy gimmicks commonly used in spy literature have their basis in fact. The old cyanide capsule in the hollow tooth trick was used by Nazi agents in WWII as a last resort to avoid grueling interrogation. Agents of both sides employ cameras hidden in everything from belt buckles to briefcases. And there are some very deadly and specialized firearms that have actually been invented for and employed by real-life secret agents. (Yes, Virginia, there really was a ball-point pen with a single shot .22 pistol concealed within it.)

Cars, however, are another matter. Since the agent's primary objective, in real life, is to remain undetected, he is far more likely to drive a beige Ford Escort than a fire-engine-red Ferrari. And there are no reported cases to date of these cars suddenly sprouting wings and flying away, or



splashing into the ocean for a submersible escape. Even relatively simple techniques such as the smoke screen or oil slick spread behind the automobile, while perfectly feasible from a technological standpoint, are far more commonly found in spy literature than in actual fact.

Solutions and Situations

This catch-all category of comparison addresses the specific tasks that real and fictional agents are expected to perform, and the usual methods employed to deal with those tasks. As might be expected, it is one of the largest areas of difference between the two versions of spies.

An assortment of the typical situations facing real secret agents is presented in the pages of this book. The majority of the tasks of these agents, it will be noted, are related to surveillance: listening, watching, sorting, studying, and employing all forms of observation to gain information on the adversary.

This surveillance takes on many forms. Traffic analysis—the study of radio traffic, without even necessarily understanding the context of the messages—is a valuable means of learning about the activities and areas of interest of the adversary. Traffic analysis has many military intelligence applications, as it is a useful means of locating enemy headquarters. It can also help to identify enemy units that are receiving unusually large numbers of messages from higher commands. The latter case may often indicate the preparations prior to an attack.

Many employees of intelligence agencies spend most of their time reading newspapers and magazines, or listening to radio broadcasts, all from sources originating in the adversary nation. Such agents might spend days, weeks, or even more time looking through a mountain of mundane information, on the simple hope that they will come up with something useful. Such tasks are

tedious, but they are nevertheless an important aspect of real-life espionage work.


The cracking of codes and interception of enemy transmissions from satellites and important government centers, such as embassies and military bases, constitute another area of emphasis in the real-life espionage life. This electronic eavesdropping includes bugging offices and buildings as well as tapping phone lines to gain information that would not otherwise be available to an agency. Once again, a veritable mountain of data is generated and analysts have to spend thousands of hours sorting and collating it, again in the hopes of finding one or two items of value.

Satellite surveillance has become another major means of intelligence gathering, at least among the superpowers. Like the types of observation and surveillance mentioned above, satellite intelligence does not end with the transmission of camera images to earth. This information, the vast majority of which is repetitious or useless, must be examined by operators and analysts in order to sort out the single important piece of information that just might lie somewhere in the pile. Satellite intelligence requires an especially alert analyst, because very often useful information might not appear as such without the observer making several deductions and suppositions about the visual facts presented.

Those secret agents who are not involved in surveillance perform other sorts of tasks, but most of these jobs are not the stuff of great spy adventures.

For example, recruiters and contacts make up a sizeable proportion of most nations' security forces. These individuals contact members of the other side and attempt to turn them against their parent governments. Or they simply meet with and talk to agents of the adversary in an attempt to learn anything that they can. Such agents attend embassy dinner parties and elegant social functions in their quest for information.

Many real-life agents serve primarily as translators. These agents may also perform the functions of reading the adversary's newspapers, watching



broadcasts, listening to radio shows, etc. These functions are intertwined with the task of translating relevant information for their supervisors and controllers. Linguistic ability, and knowledge of multiple languages, is a highly sought-after skill among intelligence circles.

Even the famed double agent—the spy who has been convinced to betray his nation or employer—serves primarily as a source of information. His value is directly related to the amount of classified material (and the level of that classification) that he can pass to his new bosses. Cases of double agents performing sabotage or other action-oriented missions, while not unheard of, are exceptionally rare.

Another category of agents are the people who debrief defectors, double agents, and their own agents after a mission. This debriefing is an important part of espionage work because it is one of the focal points of intelligence analysis. The debriefers must be alert for inconsistencies, surprises, and facts that the individual being interviewed takes for granted, since all of these clues can provide subtle indications of whether a person is telling the truth or not, how significant the information being presented actually is, and what sorts of information the agency should be on the lookout for in the future.

Missing from this list of tasks, you have probably observed, are steadily employed teams of agents whose jobs include assassination, blowing up things, stealing top secret devices, and kidnapping enemy scientists from their laboratories. While these and other action-oriented tasks occasionally might be required by an intelligence agency, they are most often the province of wartime activities. In addition, an intelligence agency (especially, but not exclusively, those in democratic nations) may hire free-lance operatives to perform these sensitive services. For one thing, these missions are dangerous, and the agency does not want to risk its own personnel on them. Another, more important reason is that free-lance operatives can provide an agency with “deniability.” Thus, an intelligence agency does not have to dirty its hands with distasteful acts of violence, but can

still arrange for those acts to take place.

The fictional spy, however, seems to waste little time in mundane tasks of intelligence gathering. As already mentioned, he is a man of action. The situations he faces, more often than not, provide him with opportunities to employ his penchant for violent and dramatic solutions.

The fictional secret agent, as opposed to his real-life counterpart, is generally expected to do something, as opposed to learning something. Our hero’s task generally involves infiltration of some kind or another, penetrating an enemy stronghold where all the odds are against him. This, of course, makes for good drama.

Once he has made the penetration, the fictional secret agent encounters a number of surprising obstacles, overcoming them through a combination of luck, skill, and often the help of a newly gained ally or two. The agent’s final objective is usually something action oriented, such as demolitions or sabotage, stealing a key piece of equipment, aiding some important defector’s escape, or, occasionally, assassination. The latter objective is used but rarely, as there is a popular tendency to regard assassination as less than heroic, and the story is about a hero, after all.

Finally, the fictional secret agent’s escape is an amazing sequence of dramatic chases, hair-raising stunts, and final, almost inevitable, success.

Of course, this summary is forced into generalities to a great extent. Of the number of fine authors who have written spy thrillers, John LeCarre, Len Deighton, and Charles McCarry all emphasize realism. Their stories ring true, showing that the tasks of a real-life secret agent, when given pacing and drama by a skilled writer, contain all the ingredients of a good spy thriller. Other authors, most notably Ian Fleming—the creator of James Bond, undoubtedly the most famous spy in fiction—but also including Alistair Maclean, Tom Clancy, Robert Ludlum, Adam Hall, and a host of other talented writers have given us thrilling stories of espionage, using spies, agencies, and situations that can be regarded as more typical of the fictional espionage stereotypes employed above.

Part I: Superpower Intelligence Organizations



The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

The major United States organization for gathering foreign intelligence is the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), presently headquartered at Langley, Virginia. The CIA, frequently called "the Agency" or "the Company," was established along with the Department of Defense and the National Security Council by the National Security Act of 1947.

The origins of the Central Intelligence Agency lie in World War II, especially in the intelligence failures that preceded American entry into the war and led to the success of the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. There was a strong feeling that critical information that would have warned of the Japanese attack had been missed because there was no central intelligence unit that could integrate information from all sources and produce a comprehensive national intelligence.

During the war, the United States created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which maintained an uneasy relationship with the War Department and was eventually absorbed by that department. The OSS never truly became a national intelligence organization, and indeed some lampooned it, saying that the real meaning of the abbreviation was "Oh So Social!" In any case, the OSS was demobilized in September 1945, soon after the end of the war with Japan. Its analytical component was moved over to the State Department, where it languished, while the espionage and operations component became the Strategic Services Unit within the War Department.

Even before the abolition of the OSS, there were a number of competing plans for what should replace it. President Harry Truman sided with the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation that he form a supervisory unit called the National Intelligence Authority. Under the unit he created the post of

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), an official supposed to have authority over all United States intelligence operations and organizations. The DCI directly controlled only the small Central Intelligence Group (CIG), however, and initially worked out of a tiny suite of only three rooms next door to the White House.

The first chief of the CIG was Army Air Force General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, a wartime combat commander with limited intelligence experience, but a good organizer who began a sustained effort to build up the CIG. The organization was authorized less than 250 personnel when the National Intelligence Authority was established in January 1946, but Vandenberg soon created an office for research and evaluation plus an administrative service. The Strategic Services Unit moved back from the War Department and was reconstructed as the Office of Special Operations (OSO). By the end of 1946, Vandenberg had 800 in OSO alone out of a total of 1,816 in CIG. He also had plans for expansion to 3,000 within the next six months.

It was in early 1947 that the various plans for the postwar reorganization of the U.S. government came together in the National Security Act. The intelligence agency, retitled the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was incorporated in those plans. It was made directly answerable to the President through the National Security Council, to which the DCI was statutory intelligence advisor. President Truman signed the National Security Act on 26 July 1947. On 8 September, the CIG became the CIA. A new DCI was now in office, Rear-Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, a living reminder of the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor (where he had been executive officer of one of the battleships that was sunk). In its first year, the CIA added hundreds of additional personnel and increased its budget by 60 percent.

The Agency's organizational base grew substantially with U.S. government decisions in December 1947 and June 1948 to conduct a program of covert operations against the Soviet bloc. This resulted in the formation of a new CIA unit, first called the Office of Special Projects, then the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). By the begin-

ning of 1948, the unit already had seven field stations, 302 personnel, and a budget of \$4.7 million.

Thus the basic structure of the Central Intelligence Agency was in place by early 1948, the very beginning of the cold war. The Agency was then located in Washington at 2430 E Street, Northwest, mailing address for a complex of temporary office buildings around the Reflecting Pool. These buildings were built during the Depression by the Civilian Conservation Corps and housed the OSS during World War II. The CIA's analytical component was the Office of Research and Evaluation, retitled the Office of Reports and Estimates, its espionage branch was the OSO, and its covert action unit was the OPC.

Organizational development within the CIA during the early years was dominated by competition between OPC and OSO. With the intensifying cold war and the mandate for covert action, OPC grew and grew. By 1949 it had 584 officers, but in 1950 this had increased to 1,531, then to about 6,000 by 1952. Field stations increased from seven to 47 over the same period. Espionage and covert action were the major CIA activities, absorbing 60 percent of its personnel and 74 percent of its budget in 1952. The total CIA force at this time numbered between 10,000 and 12,000.

Some organizational reforms were put in place by General Walter Bedell Smith, the DCI from October 1950 to February 1953. Smith merged the OSO and OPC units into a unified Directorate of Plans, abbreviated DDP after the title of the deputy director for that unit. To improve intelligence analysis, DCI Smith also instituted the new series of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), which have become one of the most important products of the CIA. To create the NIEs, he formed an Office of National Estimates (ONE).

As he had done with the operations units and DDP, Smith consolidated the intelligence analysis units into a Directorate of Intelligence (DDI). The ONE office was retitled the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) and had 654 persons assigned by January 1952. An Office of Scientific Intelligence and an Office of Collection and Dissemination were also added to DDI. Smith initiated the use of

a board of academic consultants from outside the CIA who would comment on intelligence quality and bring to bear their special expertise.

In the covert action area, OPC adopted a style of operation that revolved around projects. Each project was a specific activity, such as a paramilitary operation or the funding of a political candidate. In terms of organization, OPC had functional staffs for political warfare, psychological warfare, paramilitary activities, and economic warfare, in addition to six geographical divisions. DCI Bedell Smith kept this style of organization and extended it to all of DDP when OSO and DDP were combined. Thereafter the project method of operation applied also to espionage activities formerly conducted by OSO. Indeed, projects have remained the CIA standard ever since, and successive generations of personnel have been indoctrinated in the use of this technique.

Finally, in addition to the DDI and the DDP, Walter Bedell Smith also created a Directorate for Administration (DDA). This basic structure has only been added to in the years since then.

January 1953 ushered in a new administration in Washington, the Eisenhower administration, which appointed a new DCI—Allen Welsh Dulles, whom some have called the “Great White Case Officer.”

Dulles presided over a Central Intelligence Agency that was and remained strong. Dulles had a background in intelligence, having served with OSS in Switzerland during the war, maintaining liaison with the British and running walk-in agents from Germany.

DCI Dulles accorded substantial autonomy to the Directorate of Plans. For example, the CIA had formed an Office of the Inspector General in 1951 to consider grievances and to survey Agency components, but prior to 1957 this unit had only restricted access to DDP. Similarly, CIA budgets were supposed to be monitored by the Comptroller on a project-by-project basis, but projects that required authorization at the level of the assistant DDP (Chief of Operations) or above were exempt from such review. These sensitive projects were

instead monitored by the Foreign Intelligence Staff, a functional unit within DDP itself.

Not only was DDP monitoring itself, but the Foreign Intelligence Staff was also responsible for determining the authenticity of sources and reports, screening clandestine collection requirements, and reviewing the projects, budgets, and operational cable traffic of the regional divisions. Clearly the Foreign Intelligence Staff had little capability for real internal investigations.

In this organizational climate, certain elements in DDP became virtual private empires. One of the most important such empires was the Counterintelligence (CI) staff under James J. Angleton. The CI staff had a formal brief only to advise the geographical divisions and coordinate their activities related to counterintelligence.

Working on personal relationships formed during and just after WWII (when he worked for OSO in Rome), Angleton became the CIA point of contact for all dealings with Israeli intelligence, controlling the so-called "Israeli account." He also forged close links with the CI units of friendly powers, particularly the British and Australians, leading to counterintelligence conferences, codenamed CAZAB, that began in the 1960s.

Lastly, CI began to conduct its own independent operations overseas, using a CI private code that differed from standard CIA codes. One version of how the CIA acquired the text of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th Party Congress (which began the process of destalinization) was that Angleton procured it through Israeli channels.

The Covert Action (CA) staff was also very prominent during the Eisenhower administration, conducting a long series of paramilitary operations. These started with successful coups in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954) and political actions in South Vietnam (1954-1956). But there were also a number of less successful operations ranging the globe from Europe to the Middle East and Asia. Many of these actions are described in detail in my book *Presidents' Secret Wars* (New York: William Morrow, 1986) and will not be reviewed here.

Espionage operations were conducted through the geographical divisions of the DDP, of which the most important were the Soviet Division, the European Division, and the Far East Division. The largest unit in the field was the complex of stations and bases in West Germany, combining elements of several regional and functional branches, which numbered about 1,200. During the Korean War period and thereafter, there was also a North Asia Command, initially in Japan and later in Taiwan, which included a similar complex of stations and bases. Later in the decade the Western Hemisphere Division also became increasingly prominent.

The Central Intelligence Agency derived a great deal of its agent intelligence during this period through liaison relationships with friendly services. This was often easier than developing agent assets, but maintaining liaisons can get in the way of independent operations since friendly services would be offended if CIA operations in their territory were exposed. The most important liaison relationships were in Western Europe. In Latin America, where indigenous intelligence services were less well developed, the Western Hemisphere Division worked with considerable independence and had great success penetrating Latin American communist parties and anti-communist governments.

The Directorate of Plans continued its organizational growth during the 1950s, adding perhaps another 1,000 positions. Another 1,000 personnel added elsewhere in the CIA, principally in the Directorate of Administration, worked to support DDP activities. This latter directorate absorbed 54 percent of the CIA budget in this period, excluding expenditures elsewhere in the CIA to support DDP.

With DDP's highly compartmented information flow, where access to everything was on a "need to know" basis, there was an inevitable impact on the production of reports by the Directorate of Intelligence. There was very little cross-fertilization and almost no desk-to-desk contact. Clandestine service information reports were rewritten to disguise their source before circula-

tion to DDI and the remainder of the U.S. government. DDI analysts thus had great difficulty judging the reliability and value of DDP reporting and therefore tended to resist using it in NIEs and intelligence memoranda, instead relying more on open source information and signals intelligence.

Regardless of DDP's reticence, the Directorate of Intelligence gained credibility with the quality of its efforts and increasingly became the national intelligence source envisioned by the creators of the CIA. A 1951 agreement between State and the CIA gave the Office of Research and Reports responsibility for Soviet bloc economic analysis, while a 1952 agreement with the military established a division of roles between the military and the CIA on scientific and military intelligence.

DDI added a new Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) and an Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI). By 1955 there were 466 analysts in ORR, which was divided into a coordination staff, the geographical research area, and the economic research area (in turn having analysis, industrial, materials, and service divisions). There were also 217 analysts with OCI and 207 in OSI, along with about 50 in ONE, and a small number in a Photographic Interpretation Center set up in 1953. Total DDI personnel were in the neighborhood of 1,000.

A special achievement of Allen Dulles during his period as DCI was the approval for and execution of the CIA headquarters building at Langley, Virginia. As early as 1950, Walter Bedell Smith had requested an appropriation of \$30 million for a new headquarters, but it was so cleverly hidden in the budget that Congress, not knowing what it was for, had cut it out. Dulles came up with a plan for a \$50.8 million building of 1,228,100 square feet in 1956, but the request was cut to \$50 million in the budget, of which Congress eventually approved \$46 million. The huge complex had cafeteria accommodations for 1,400 persons, split into special sections for secret clandestine services types and others, and parking space for 3,000 cars. Designed by the New York firm Harrison & Abramowitz, the building was dedicated in 1961 and the CIA's offices, formerly scattered all over Wash-

ington, were consolidated in the new building.

With the passage of time and CIA growth, the scattering of its offices reappeared as a problem by the 1980s, and a new major annex is currently under construction. In the future the clandestine and overt employees will be segregated into different buildings. In addition, Langley proved not quite as secure as initially thought. Security teams in the 1960s demonstrated that from isolated spots on the suburban Virginia roads, it was possible to see directly into the DCI's seventh floor office with high-powered telescopes. Adversaries with sophisticated infrared or other electronic mechanisms might also be able to bounce beams off the windows to record conversations within. Countermeasures have since been taken.

The Dulles era at the CIA came to an end early in the Kennedy administration, following the covert action debacle at the Bay of Pigs. Dulles was replaced as DCI by John McCone (1961-1965) who, in turn, was followed by Admiral William Raborn (1965-1966) and then by Richard M. Helms (1966-1973), the first professional CIA officer to rise to DCI.

During this period the Central Intelligence Agency continued on a steady-state path. The most notable developments occurred neither at DDP nor at DDI, but in the organization of a new unit created to cope with the burgeoning area of technical intelligence. This was a John McCone initiative, begun in 1962 with the formation of the Directorate for Research (DDR). The DDR proved ineffective, however, as both DDP and DDI resisted giving up components to the new unit.

Another try was made in 1963 with creation of the Directorate for Science and Technology (DDS&T). This unit incorporated an Office of Research and Development from DDP and the OSI from DDI. The directorate also soon included the CIA's Office of Computer Services, its Office of Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), and an Office of Special Activities. In 1964, a Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center was added. In the late 1960s, the development of reconnaissance satellites was further centralized in a new Office of Special Projects.

The Directorate of Plans increasingly focused on different areas in the 1960s as U.S. concerns changed. The Western Hemisphere Division increased in size by 40 percent, between 1960 and 1964. Similarly, between 1959 and 1963 the number of CIA stations in Africa grew by 55.5 percent. But the major increase came in Southeast Asia where the CIA became heavily involved in Vietnam and Laos, and remained so until 1975.

The other major development in DDP was a consequence of the activities of the CI staff under Angleton. CI was blessed, or cursed, depending on one's reading of this history, with a rash of defections from Soviet bloc intelligence services from 1959 to about 1964.


The defectors, some of whom may have been disinformation agents under KGB control, brought information that impugned the loyalty of various intelligence officers, especially in the allied services of the British. These reports sowed so much discord that DCI Helms decided in 1968 to completely disband the Soviet Division and start over with CIA officers who had not previously worked

in this area and could not be candidates for the notorious role of "mole," the alleged Soviet spy in the CIA that Angleton bent every effort to unmask. In fact no mole was found in the CIA. As for the British, while several top officials fell under suspicion, no mole was positively identified there either. Meanwhile the controversy over the bona fides of some of the defectors paralyzed much of the Western espionage effort.

For its part the Directorate of Intelligence made some positive advances in the 1960s. The advent of reconnaissance satellites greatly increased its available information while more cooperation was finally forthcoming from DDP, encouraged by a new unit on the DCI's staff called the National Intelligence Programs Evaluation. By 1970, a centralized reporting mechanism existed capable of providing consolidated information on all efforts being conducted anywhere in the U.S. intelligence community against any given target.

As economic intelligence gained in importance, DDI responded by creating an Office of Economic Intelligence (OER) in 1967. In its first year OER

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (about 1980)



SOURCE: Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1985.

published 47 long-range studies, 1,075 current intelligence articles, and responded to 800 specific requests from government departments. Meanwhile the military intelligence units in OCI and ORR were consolidated in 1966 into a new Office of Strategic Research (OSR). DDI also contributed through OCI to the information resources on Vietnam used by a new unit on the DCI's staff called the Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs (SAVA). DDI added an Office of Basic Intelligence and an Office of Operations.

Since 1961, DDI had operated the National Photographic Interpretation Center on behalf of the intelligence community as a whole. This was later considered inadequate to meet the CIA's needs, and by 1972 DDI had reorganized its Imagery Analysis Service. By that time it was also operating the CIA's Domestic Contact Service and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

Total CIA personnel rose to about 16,500, and peaked at about 18,000 during the Vietnam war period. Of this total, 9,000-10,000 worked either directly for DDP or in other CIA staff positions supporting DDP. The Directorate for Support (formerly Administration) had about 5,300 people, DDI some 3,500, and DDS&T about 1,300. The DDP averaged 52 percent of CIA's budget, excluding allocations elsewhere in support of DDP functions. The Far East Division of DDP was the largest in the Agency. One source estimates the average budget at that time at about \$750 million annually.

Richard Nixon sent Helms to Iran as U.S. ambassador in February 1973, replacing him with James R. Schlesinger, formerly a defense analyst, whose only intelligence experience was in conducting a review of the CIA and sister agencies in 1970. Schlesinger began a post-Vietnam reduction of Agency manpower, cutting about 10 percent. He was sent on to the Pentagon only a few months later, and was replaced by William E. Colby. Colby became the second DCI to be promoted from within the CIA. He had broad DDP experience in both Europe and the Far East, where he had been chief of station in Saigon and later headed the pacification organization which carried out the still-

controversial Phoenix program.


Colby broke the power of the CIA staff, forcing Jim Angleton and several of his senior deputies into retirement. Colby also revamped the NIE process, eliminating ONE and the Board of National Estimates and replacing them with a National Intelligence Officer system under which officers specialized in particular subject areas become executive agents who assemble and draft intelligence estimates in those areas. Colby in turn was replaced by George Bush in January 1976, a political appointment by President Gerald Ford. A year later the incoming Carter administration appointed Admiral Stansfield Turner, who served as DCI until 19 January 1981.

Turner's tour as DCI has been the most acrimonious in recent years. He continued the post-Vietnam reductions in force, letting go some 820 officers from the Directorate of Operations (DDO), as Schlesinger had retitled the old DDP. Though most of these CIA officers actually retired (according to Turner only about 20 were fired), and though the total number was similar to those moved out by Schlesinger, Turner was subjected to vehement attacks by former CIA officers. Another Turner reform was to reorganize the DDI and rename it the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC). This also did not prove very popular and it has since reverted to DDI.

Some changes by DCI Turner have stuck. He introduced a new method of listing collection priorities called National Intelligence Topics (NITs) and these have continued. Collection assignments are handed out by a National Intelligence Tasking Center, which Turner established in late 1977. The former interagency group chaired by the DCI, the United States Intelligence Board, was revised by Turner into the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB). This too has continued.


The Reagan administration introduced William J. Casey as its DCI. Casey was an OSS veteran, perhaps the last of that generation who will achieve this distinction at the CIA. Casey presided over the biggest increase in the CIA since the early years of the cold war. He got the Agency its new annex building, large manpower increases, and

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL



SOURCE: Richard L. Knudson, *The Whole Spy Catalogue*. NY: St. Martin's Press, 1986.

INTELLIGENCE COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES



budget growth that probably now puts CIA's annual appropriation in the \$5 to \$10 billion range. Casey divided up jurisdiction over intelligence issues between the NFIB and a new National Foreign Intelligence Council (NFIC). Within DDI Casey abolished the Office of Political Research, which Colby had introduced in 1974, and replaced OSR with an Office of Scientific and Weapons Research.

A number of changes within the Directorate of Intelligence, which lost many of its old offices during the NFAC period, now make it barely recognizable to a CIA analyst of the 1960s or 1950s. The new DDI has largely replaced old functional offices with regional ones. There are now offices for African and Latin American Analysis, East Asian Analysis, European Analysis, Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, and Soviet Analysis. OCI and OER are gone. The Office of Global Issues has been retained from NFAC. DDI has added an Arms Control Intelligence Staff, special assistants for nuclear proliferation intelligence and for community affairs, a Technology Transfer Assessment Center, a Management and Analysis support Staff, and a Senior Review Panel.

Among the old elements that still remain and are recognizable are the Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff, the Office of Imagery Analysis, the Office of Central Reference, which maintains the archives, and the Office of Current Operations, which mans the watch office called the National Indications Center.

It is not possible to describe in detail the current organization of the Directorate of Operations because this is classified. However, there is no doubt that the present arrangement continues to be a mixture of regional offices and functional offices or staffs.

Because of the number of covert actions carried out by the Casey CIA, the covert action staff must necessarily have been augmented. The existence of a Central America Task Force to carry out the Nicaragua paramilitary action also points to augmentation of the old Western Hemisphere Division. In addition, the recent Iran-Contra scandal has identified a unified Soviet-European Division

and a Near East Division. The large-scale paramilitary operation in Afghanistan suggests that there may now be a separate regional division for South Asia. It is probable that the Far East and Africa Divisions exist unchanged.

Judging by the large number of espionage and defector cases of recent years (see Part II, starting on page 30), it is quite likely that the Counterintelligence Staff has been beefed up and has gained special importance. Nothing is known regarding the present status of special Staff D, which used to conduct special bugging and other electronic intelligence missions for DDO, but it would be surprising if an equivalent unit did not exist within the directorate.

The Central Intelligence Agency was estimated to have between 16,000 and 20,000 employees in the Washington area in 1983. If the ratio of headquarters to overseas staff remains consistent with that of the late 1960s, this would indicate total CIA manpower on the order of 25,000. The Agency is currently under fire for its role in the Iran-Contra affair, but Bill Casey did not survive to witness the embarrassment of the organization he rebuilt. In the heat of the controversy, much of which revolved around Casey himself, the DCI suffered a seizure in December 1986 and passed away in early May 1987. In the Spring of 1987 he was replaced by the former director of the FBI, William H. Webster.



Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB)

(Committee for State Security)

The Committee for State Security is one of the most powerful institutions within the Soviet Union. The Committee, KGB by its Soviet initials, combines the functions of foreign intelligence collection, foreign and domestic counterintelligence, security (including nuclear weapons security and protection of Soviet leaders in the Kremlin), and border and coast guard. Given these wide-ranging functions, the KGB is an immense organization—somewhere between 500,000 and 750,000 in total strength, including several hundred thousand border guards, 30,000-50,000 in signals intelligence work, and perhaps 100,000 domestic informants. The component that conducts foreign intelligence work employs about 15,000 personnel at central headquarters with an unknown number dispersed on operations world wide.

The origins of the Committee for State Security can be traced to the very first days after the Russian Revolution of 1917. Only six weeks separated the accession to power of the Bolsheviks and the formation of the first predecessor of the KGB, familiarly known in those days as the Cheka, a contraction of its Russian language title.

The chief of the Cheka, known today as the originator of state security organizations, was a man named Feliks Dzerzhinsky, who remained in control from 1917 to July 1926. During that period the intelligence and security organization had already undergone several changes of title—to GPU (*Glavnoye Gosudarstvenno Politicheskoye Upravleniye*—State Political Administration) and


then OGPU (*Obiedinennoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye*)—United State Political Administration). In 1930 it received secret police powers with the authority to banish individuals to labor camps, and by 1934 it had a monopoly on police functions. That year the organization was redesignated NKVD (*Narodnyi Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del*—People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs).

In 1941 it was again retitled, to NKGB (*Narodnyi Kommissariat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*—People's Commissariat for State Security). Later in 1941 the NKVD title was resuscitated, only to revert to NKGB in 1943, when part of the organization was given that title and both existed. In 1946 the NKVD became the MVD *Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del*—Ministry of Internal Affairs) while the NKGB became the MGB *Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*—Ministry of State Security). The MVD and MGB were merged in 1953, under the leadership of Lavrenti Beria, who made an ill-considered bid for power in the USSR and was arrested and executed. Yet another reorganization followed when the KGB was created on 13 March 1954. The MVD retained control of the police, border troops, and labor camp system and regained its independence. In 1957 the KGB took control of the border troops and labor camps once again, creating the organization that still exists today.

The repeated changes of title and reorganizations of KGB are but the most evident indication of the stormy history of that organization, particularly during the time of Soviet leader Josef Stalin. Leadership of state security was a post of great power and prestige, but also a position of great personal danger.

Dzerzhinsky himself died under questionable circumstances and many of his successors fell in the purges they themselves were ordered to conduct. OGPU chief Vyacheslav Mezhdinsky is alleged to have been the victim of a medical murder; his successor, Genrikh G. Yagoda, was openly executed. His successor, Nikolai I. Yezhov, died in a Soviet psychiatric hospital, either by his own hand or under circumstances contrived to look that way.

COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY ORGANIZATION



The first NKGB chief, Vsevolod N. Merkulov, was executed with Beria in 1953. Only in the post-World War II period have state security chiefs, with the exception of those involved in the Beria conspiracy, been permitted to retire when purged or forced out for health reasons. One KGB chief, Yuri V. Andropov, left state security to become leader of the Soviet Union.

As befits a large organization, the Committee for State Security is divided into a vast array of components. The main ones are shown in the chart accompanying this text. KGB organization includes chief directorates, directorates, and independent departments. These units in turn are divided into further departments, service branches, and directorates. The major units from the foreign intelligence standpoint are described in the narrative below. It should be noted that these descriptions pertain to the KGB in the postwar period and not necessarily to its wartime or pre-war antecedents. (Note also that, to avoid confusion among the many successive organizations and names for State Security, the acronym KGB is used throughout this source book for Soviet intelligence, even when operations or individuals from an earlier period are discussed.)

Foreign intelligence gathering, the province of agents and case officers, spies and their handlers, is the function of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, familiarly known as the Foreign Directorate (*Innostrannoye Upravleniye* or INU). This chief directorate does both intelligence collection and analysis, as well as counter-espionage abroad and disinformation, "active measures" in Soviet parlance. The First Chief Directorate consists of three subdirectorates, three special services, two special departments, and 17 regular departments. Headquarters personnel, totaling between 20,000 and 25,000, are concentrated at the KGB's new building outside the Moscovring road, not its traditional Moscow site, 2 Dzerzhinsky Square. If KGB foreign personnel levels approximate those of its American counterpart, the CIA, this suggests overall First Directorate manpower of somewhere between 30,000 and 35,000 persons.

One of the most important units is Directorate S,


the "Illegals" Directorate, which is responsible for the selection, training, and operation of officers who work overseas under cover and without embassy jobs or diplomatic immunity (and thus are operating illegally). Prospective illegals are primarily Soviet nationals selected during secondary or college training or while in the armed forces. They are carefully investigated for loyalty and special capacity or affinity for the proposed operation. Recruits receive specialized mission training, as well as their general espionage training, in KGB safe houses and have no contact with the wider organization. The training is entirely individual unless the KGB contemplates a team operation. Directorate S officials, most of them also former illegals, are sensitive to the special difficulties of this style of training.

Directorate S is composed of four divisions. Recruiting and training is the function of the first division, cover and documentation are handled by the second, and the third manages illegals already in the field. The last division administers regular KGB officers who are assigned to embassies in various countries as support officers for illegal agents. Directorate S is also responsible for Department Eight, formerly the Executive Action Department, which plans sabotage and assassination operations in support of war plans for wartime or final prewar situations. This department, placed in the directorate during the 1970s, executes a planning function, not an operational one. While Directorate S conducts a certain proportion of Soviet espionage activity, a far greater proportion is more openly conducted by legal officers.

The legal operations are the task of the First Chief Directorate's eleven geographical departments. The majority of KGB personnel assigned to foreign embassies are employed by these departments, acting as case officers for the agents recruited by the KGB. The largest of these units is probably the First Department, which is responsible for the United States and Canada and staffs the legal residencies at Washington, Ottawa, and UN headquarters in New York, plus the San Francisco consulate.

Latin America is under the Second Department.

FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE ORGANIZATION



Another major unit is the Third Department, which works in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Scandinavia. Focused on NATO is the Fourth Department, formally responsible for the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria. Most of the rest of NATO is under the Fifth Department, which works France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Ireland.

The Sixth Department works in North Korea, China, and Vietnam. Much of the rest of Asia is covered by the Seventh Department. Middle Eastern countries are observed by the Eighth Department, which also covers Turkey and Greece (NATO nations) plus Yugoslavia. The English-speaking nations of Africa are monitored by the Ninth Department while the French-speaking African countries are monitored by the Tenth Department.

The distribution of countries among the First Chief Directorate's geographical departments seems a little strange at times, but every area of the world is covered in one department or another.

A special directorate of great importance today is Directorate T, the Scientific and Technical Directorate. This was formed in 1963 from the former Tenth Department as the Soviets realized the importance of acquiring Western scientific and technical processes and ideas. Under the State Scientific and Technical Committee, which formulates an annual acquisition priorities list, Directorate T makes its own efforts to gain the material and also coordinates the efforts of Soviet military intelligence and of Soviet bloc intelligence services in this area.

The directorate is subdivided into four departments and its field officers are assigned to a unit known as Line X. They are typically assigned as scientific attaches in embassies or equivalent positions in the commercial or economic sections of embassies or international organizations. Most Line X KGB officers are in fact scientific specialists both by academic and professional training. The CIA believes the largest Line X field stations are probably in Bonn, London, Cologne, New York, Tokyo, and Vienna. Paris was one of the largest until 1983, when French authorities expelled 47 Soviet diplomats for espionage activity. From 1963

to 1973, the headquarters staff of Directorate T increased to several hundred KGB officers; between then and 1985, headquarters increased further to about 700. Line X officers in the field in 1985 were estimated at about 300.

Directorate K of the First Chief Directorate is the unit responsible for counter-espionage abroad. Formerly known as Special Service II, Directorate K facilitates the work of Soviet positive intelligence units. There are two aspects to this work. The better-known aspect is the effort to monitor the political loyalty of Soviet diplomats and intelligence officers assigned abroad. This prevents penetrations by foreign intelligence services. Less known but equally important is Directorate K's assignment to penetration operations into foreign counter-espionage units. This specific kind of penetration could be expected to furnish the KGB with information as to which of its own intelligence activities have been detected, countered, or turned.

Below the level of directorates are special services. Service A evolved from the former Department A, formed in 1958 to conduct what the Soviets call "active measures," better known in the West as disinformation. Most Service A activities are conducted through KGB officers of other sections, as Service A does not have its own field agents or offices.

Offensive disinformation consists of circulating materials, often forged documents made to appear like official documents of foreign governments and designed to discredit policies or individuals of nations the KGB is operating against.

Defensive active measures are intended to mislead adversaries about the success of Soviet activities or the credibility of Soviet defectors. For example, although this has never been resolved, the Nosenko affair of the 1960s and the Yurchenko affair of 1985 may have been Soviet defensive active measures.

Service A has risen to become one of the most important elements of the KGB. Some experts, notably the Soviet defector who writes under the pseudonym Victor Suvorov and the defector and former KGB major Anatoli Golitsin, claim that active measures is the most important component



of Soviet operations. They believe that all other foreign policy goals and military objectives have been subordinated to furthering active measure policies. Golitsin goes so far as to claim that a 1958 KGB conference adopted a global master plan, still being carried out today, for the subversion of all Soviet adversaries. Soviet active measures have been around for a long time; what is new is the attention given to them in the West.

Service R is the latest incarnation of an independent directorate established in 1969 for planning and analysis. This unit was to review Soviet espionage operations and draw conclusions on the efficacy of various techniques. In the mid-1970s this unit was evaluated as little more than a sinecure for overage officers and "misfits with patrons in the Party," but in fact the unit has considerable influence. Service R analyzes details and results of meetings between agents and their Soviet case officers and develops statistical reports for the head of the First Chief Directorate. These reports cover the quality of penetration achieved and the number and potential of agents recruited by each foreign residency. Considering the great value the Soviets place on performance when deciding promotions, Service R can hardly be termed a sinecure any longer.

Service I, formerly Special Service I, is the Information Service. This unit is the equivalent of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. It assembles and analyzes the results of all First Chief Directorate intelligence activities and disseminates the results to the Politburo and other intelligence consumers. Service I uses the results of intelligence work, excepting the technical material gathered by Directorate K, to publish a weekly intelligence bulletin and brief KGB officers assigned for tours abroad. This unit also conducts special studies on given subjects at the direction of the Central Committee. One of the significant differences between Soviet and American intelligence practice is that in the KGB the intelligence analysis is carried out by the same organs as are responsible for intelligence collection.

Other units of the First Chief Directorate are independent departments. The 11th Department

is the Advisors unit that conducts daily relations with between the KGB and sister intelligence services of the bloc nations, including the Cubans. As of 1974 there were 110 KGB officers seconded to the bloc services and Cuba. An unknown number were assigned to North Korea and what was then North Vietnam. KGB officers have since been assigned to Grenada, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua. Officers of the Czech and Polish services apparently refer to the KGB men as "the uncles."

The 12th Department works on arrangements for KGB officers assigned abroad. Often called the "Cover Organs Department," the 12th arranges cover assignments for KGB men with the Soviet foreign ministry, trade delegations, and so forth. On occasions when the KGB requires special services from other ministries of the Soviet government, the 12th Department also arranges for these.

The 13th Department is rather important in the conduct of Soviet espionage. It arranges communications with agents abroad, as well as with residencies and case officers. The 13th enciphers outgoing messages and deciphers those arriving and supplies codes to all who require them. Several types of communications techniques are used, including two-way radios for high-speed burst transmissions, sophisticated satellite transmissions to embassies, and even one-way "open" codes in which the arrangement or content of regular broadcasts over Radio Moscow are prearranged to convey information to agents instructed to listen on short wave at given times of day.

The 14th Department is responsible for documentation. This includes false passports and other documents and papers to establish cover for agents, as well as supplying special materials for invisible writing. This department also provides technical services and equipment such as specially designed weapons, cameras, and the like. The 15th Department is the central registry for the First Chief Directorate and maintains its extensive file system. The 16th Department recruits regular KGB officers and manages agency personnel. In recent years a 17th Department has been added among the geographical departments con-

ducting espionage. This unit covers India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

The actual espionage operations are carried abroad by KGB stations, which are called Residencies. The senior intelligence officer assigned to any given country is the Resident. All KGB officers, including those who monitor loyalty of Soviet nationals, report to him. Some officers are assigned agents to work with, others pursue technology transfers or work on counter-espionage. Usually at least one officer is assigned to a Residency for support of illegals, and there may be an illegal Resident in a country as well as a legal one. The Resident in a country may himself be the case officer for one or more of the most valued agents active at any moment.

It used to be KGB practice that the Residency in a given country worked against a country other than that in which it was located—a development of the pre-World War II period when the Russians found it impossible to work directly inside Germany. This practice does not seem to have been carried into the present, however. Today the Soviet Residency in Washington, for example, works against the United States.

Of the remaining elements of the Committee for State Security, the most important for present purposes is the Second Chief Directorate. This KGB unit is charged with internal security, including counterintelligence against foreigners within the Soviet Union. The Second Chief Directorate is divided into a Political Security Service, a Technical Support Group, an Industrial Security Directorate, and 12 departments.

The First Department's task is to work against diplomats and intelligence officers of the United States and Latin American countries, and to deny them unauthorized contacts with Soviet citizens.

The First Department consists of five sections. The First Section works to recruit U.S. embassy personnel. The Second Section counters U.S. intelligence operations in Russia. The Third Section monitors Soviet citizens who are in any kind of contact with Americans. The Fourth Section monitors contacts by American personnel during travel

outside Moscow. The Fifth Section does all this work for the Latin American countries.

The First Department is supervised by a chief with two deputies. Under them are about 50 permanent staff KGB officers, some 300 officers in surveillance teams on assignment from the KGB Surveillance Directorate, and a corps of reservists and informants. Headquarters of the section is located in a five-story building about a half mile from the U.S. embassy.

The Seventh Department works against tourists and other foreign residents in Russia. It is the largest department in the Second Chief Directorate. This department has about 100 officers in Moscow, an equal number elsewhere in the Soviet Union, and a cadre of about 1,600 agents and informants, including the ubiquitous Intourist, hotel, and Aeroflot officials whom visitors frequently suspect of KGB connections. Wherever possible, the department also attempts to recruit non-Soviet nationals working for foreign airlines and businesses in the Soviet Union.

This department has six sections. Of these, the First Section focuses on American, British, and Canadian nationals. The Second Section covers all other nationalities. The other sections are functionally oriented: the Third Section covers hotels and restaurants; the Fourth Section covers Intourist; the Fifth Section does separate coverage of contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners; and the Sixth Section maintains observation posts and a communications network throughout the Soviet Union.

The other departments of the Second Chief Directorate are either geographically oriented against diplomats or function to provide specific services to the unit. They are organized along lines similar to those covered above. The Second Department works against diplomats and intelligence services of the British Commonwealth, the Third against those of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as Austria and Scandinavia, the Fourth against all other western European nations, the Fifth against all other nations the KGB considers to be developed countries, the Sixth against nations considered to be underdeveloped countries.

The Eighth Department of the Second Chief Directorate operates computer services for all other units of the organization. The Ninth Department watches and attempts to recruit foreign students. The 10th Department is charged with surveillance and recruitment of foreign journalists; it also staffs the Soviet Foreign Ministry unit that services the foreign diplomatic corps. The 11th Department approves travel abroad by Soviet citizens. The 12th Department investigates corruption, graft, and waste in Soviet industry.

There are also at least seven offices called "Directions" under the Second Chief Directorate. Of these, the First through Fourth supervise investigations by local KGB offices, the 10th works against so-called "economic criminals," the 11th publishes KGB manuals for the service. The 12th Direction, organized in 1963, works against Chinese diplomats and other nationals.

The Fifth Chief Directorate was established as a consequence of rising Soviet concern regarding dissidence. It was created in 1969 with the Directions whose numbers are missing from the Second Chief Directorate. These Directions are responsible for such areas as religion, ethnic groups, intelligentsia, criminals, and citizens with relatives living abroad. In 1971 a special Jewish Department was added because of concern over Jewish attempts to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

The Eighth Chief Directorate is responsible for communications security and signals intelligence. It is the Soviet equivalent of the U.S. National Security Agency and is thought to employ perhaps 50,000 people. This unit develops code systems for the KGB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It also monitors Western telecommunications traffic from the vantage points of Soviet embassies and the large facility at Lourdes, Cuba. It was the Eighth Chief Directorate that received the U.S. encryption equipment seized from the U.S. Navy ship *Pueblo*; this directorate also undoubtedly made great use of the espionage material gained from the Walker spy ring.

The Border Guards Chief Directorate has the distinction of being one of the oldest elements of the KGB. It was created by an order from Lenin in

1918 and has been watching Soviet borders ever since. The border guards absorbed the first shock of the German invasion of Russia in 1941 and of the Sino-Soviet hostilities in 1969. Today there are about 300,000 border guards, with ground, naval, and air components, armed with equipment that includes tanks and guns, ships up to mid-size (*Petya*) frigate class, and aircraft.

In addition to the chief directorates, there are three numbered independent directorates within the Committee for State Security. The Third Directorate consists of 12 departments and is responsible for political security in the Soviet armed forces, including detecting subversion or espionage at all levels. This is the current incarnation of what was known in World War II as SMERSH (*Smert'shipionam* or "Death to Spies").

The Seventh Directorate is the Surveillance Directorate, with a professional staff plus about 3,500 officers. These used to be farmed out, mostly to the Second and Fifth Chief Directorates, but more recently the Seventh conducts some operations of its own and has set up its own analytical group. Of the 12 departments in this directorate, the First watches U.S. and Latin American citizens, the Second follows foreign journalists, businessmen and students, the Fifth supervises embassy militia guards, the Sixth conducts background investigations of Soviet citizens being considered for KGB employment, and the Seventh develops and maintains surveillance equipment.

The Ninth Directorate, the Guards Directorate, is responsible for the security of the Kremlin and other important installations. Officers of this directorate are the only ones allowed to bear arms in the presence of top Soviet leaders. Guards Directorate officers also maintain the security of Soviet nuclear weapons. KGB officers of this directorate are intensively screened.

Finally, there are several unnumbered directorates and independent departments within the KGB. These departments include Special Investigations, Collation of Operational Experience, State Communications, Physical Security, Registry and Archives, and Finance.

Part II:

Espionage

Case Files

John H. Bothwell (b. 1927)

One of the more curious espionage cases of recent years is that of John H. Bothwell, the man at the center of a chain of events that benefited the West, who was arrested by the British on espionage charges on 16 February 1986. The whole thing turned out to be a misunderstanding occasioned by statements made to the CIA by a KGB agent whom Bothwell had encouraged to defect.

Bothwell's story began in the United States Navy, a service he joined in World War II and then made a career. A competent, decorated officer, Bothwell rose to the rank of commander, at different times skipping three submarines. In 1963 the Navy seconded Bothwell to take the year-long course at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. There he met officers from the CIA who impressed him greatly.

Meanwhile, the Navy officer had personal difficulties resulting from typical Navy practices—the long absences at sea were hard for his wife and the separations difficult for him. As a result he decided to retire in 1965 after 22 years in the service. Following retirement, Bothwell went to work for the Central Intelligence Agency on special operations involving naval activity.

In 1968 the CIA sent Bothwell to Athens and set him up as a maritime agent—a commercial middleman who arranges fuel and food supplies or who books cargoes for merchant vessels. Athens was an ideal location because Soviet merchantmen and fishing vessels from the Black Sea needed supplies as well as intermediaries to arrange these for them in distant operating areas such as off South Africa, where the Soviet fishing vessels often operate for months at a time. The CIA was interested in supplying the Soviets in order to gather information regarding their merchant and fishing fleet movements.

This was ideal for everyone except Bothwell, whose marriage continued to deteriorate and end-

ed in divorce. He resigned from the CIA in 1972 but then decided the best thing he could do was what he was doing already, so he continued his maritime agent business as a regular commercial operation rather than an espionage cover. The pace of Soviet business remained high, often amounting to arrangements for a ship a week. Bothwell was happy, remarried a British divorcee, and continued in the business even after he moved to Bath, England, in 1978. He simply commuted back and forth to Athens, where he continued to maintain a residence.

As a maritime agent, Bothwell frequently dealt with commercial attaches at the Soviet embassy in Athens, and naturally a certain proportion of those individuals were themselves operating as intelligence officers under diplomatic cover. One attache with whom he began to deal in the mid-1980s was Viktor Gudarev, in actuality a colonel in the KGB. Typically they would meet for lunch about once a month at one of the many Piraeus bars to discuss their business arrangements.

Gudarev, meanwhile, appears to have had an agenda of his own, attempting to draw Bothwell into something resembling espionage activity. Gudarev often asked Bothwell to explain the workings of the U.S. government or other questions about which he professed ignorance. Bothwell supplied basic explanations from his American experience. As Gudarev got more arcane in his questions, for example asking about the European Ariane space program, Bothwell gave answers culled from such sources as the British press and *Time* magazine, while noting down the Russian's questions to show what areas Gudarev was interested in. This information Bothwell passed along during regular meetings with the U.S. naval attache in Athens. At one point Bothwell even assembled a 30-page paper he titled "Changes in Behavior Patterns Among Soviet Officials." Bothwell was effectively acting as a one-man intelligence operation.

In May 1985 it happened that Sergei Bokhane, ostensibly the first secretary of the political section of the Soviet embassy (actually an officer of Soviet military intelligence, the GRU) defected

from Athens. In the Soviet operating style this immediately cast doubt on all other members of the Soviet mission, in particular the KGB, which has the responsibility for ensuring the loyalty of the other Russians assigned to each embassy.

Colonel Gudarev appears to have felt the pressure. At his meetings with Bothwell he began to ask the American how defectors were received in the U.S. Once he asked what Bothwell thought about the Bokhane defection and the former CIA man characterized it as "a wise career choice." On subsequent occasions Bothwell encouraged Gudarev to think about defecting. Finally, Gudarev asked Bothwell where he might turn himself in and the American suggested the U.S. Officers Club at a downtown Athens hotel, even drawing a diagram for Gudarev of the club's entrance, exit, and bar.

On 14 February 1986 Colonel Viktor Gudarev actually did defect to the United States. The event threw the Soviet embassy into an uproar. Cars full of Russians were spotted circling the U.S. embassy, which placed its own Marine security detachment on alert and called in the Greek police.

Meanwhile Gudarev, perhaps to enhance his credibility or his value as a defector, apparently named Bothwell as an agent with whom he had been working. Gudarev evidently did this even in his initial debriefings, for British counterintelligence officers and members of Scotland Yard's Special Branch arrested Bothwell only two days after the Gudarev defection. Bothwell was held for five weeks in a maximum security cell in London's Wormwood Scrubs prison and for several days was allowed to call no one, including his wife or his lawyer. After that followed over three months under restrictive bail. Then all charges were dropped and the British government was ordered to pay Bothwell's \$7,500 in legal fees. John Bothwell's story ended well, and the West got another KGB defector in the bargain.

Christopher J. Boyce (b. 1954) and Andrew D. Lee (b. 1952)

The Boyce-Lee case represented a windfall intelligence gain for the Soviet Union essentially born of the greed of one American. Chris Boyce and Andrew Lee were childhood friends who grew up together on California's Palos Verdes Peninsula. They attended the same schools, went to the same parties, had many experiences in common. Lee was the son of a doctor, a pathologist, whose home was a ranch-style house across the street from the Pacific Ocean. He played Little League baseball, went out for high school wrestling and football, and served mass as an altar boy.

Christopher Boyce was the eldest of nine children of a career FBI agent. He too was a Roman Catholic and altar boy at the same church as Lee. Boyce loved birds and kept a pet hawk he would take out to fly in his free time. Quiet, intelligent (he had an I.Q. of 145) he still found it difficult to apply himself to academic work, and attended three different colleges as a history major before deciding to try working for a change.

Boyce's father was director of security for McDonnell Douglas Corporation while a friend, another former FBI special agent, was director of security for reconnaissance systems at TRW Systems Incorporated. Boyce's father helped his son get a job with TRW. Christopher Boyce went to work for TRW on 29 July 1974 in Building M-4 of Department 1986 of the TRW plant at Redondo Beach. Boyce was hired as a clerk in the communications center with which TRW kept in touch with the Central Intelligence Agency. The center's vault also housed a variety of classified documents, reports, and manuals for the reconnaissance systems office. Boyce operated two types of encryption devices that coded and decoded messages going through the center, including not only

CIA traffic but copies of Army, Navy, and Air Force messages containing such information as notification of submarine movements.

Andrew Lee, in the meanwhile, had fallen on the wrong side of the law. Lee became much more deeply enmeshed than his friend in the drug culture of American youth of the 1960s and 1970s. Where Boyce smoked some marijuana, Lee became a dealer of that and more powerful drugs. He was arrested a first time in 1971 for possession of marijuana, not too serious, but in August 1973 he was caught trying to sell 23 grams of cocaine to undercover officers of the Los Angeles County sheriff's department. He served seven months of a one-year sentence. He returned to the business and fled the country when a warrant was issued for his arrest for violation of probation.

At a party one night Boyce told his friend a story he had seen in the message traffic that outraged him—the CIA evidently had been attempting to infiltrate labor unions in Australia. Lee got his friend to write the story down on paper with some vague notion of surfacing it in the press through friends of his father. Boyce did so, but rather than attempting to expose nefarious CIA schemes, Lee promptly took the material to Mexico City where he went to the Soviet embassy and offered to sell them information from the TRW code room. The KGB accepted and asked for a wide variety of information, including daily settings for the code machines months in advance.

The KGB assigned a case officer in Mexico City to this operation, Boris A. Grishin, codenamed John. Throughout 1975 and 1976, Lee continued to sell them information, making trips to Mexico City almost monthly. He would use tape to put a white "X" on a certain telephone pole each time contact was desired. The KGB paid \$70,000 for the intelligence, of which Lee paid some \$15,000 to Boyce. Lee apparently used his own share of the money to finance further drug deals.

Christopher Lee was none too happy with the arrangement and did not want to be involved in espionage, but according to his trial testimony Boyce blackmailed him throughout this period. Lee threatened to send a copy of his original Aus-

tralian story to the security people at TRW. Later, when Boyce said he didn't care, Lee shifted targets and threatened his friend's father. Boyce finally insisted he was going to quit TRW and went on one of the Mexico City trips to tell the Russians of his intentions. Lee was quite deflated when the Soviets went right along with Boyce, encouraging him to go to college and study political science so he could aim at a State Department job later. The KGB even offered to put up \$40,000 to finance his college studies. It was a change from using a minox camera to photograph documents in the TRW vault and Boyce then quit the job.

It was Andrew Lee who compromised this operation trying to get more money from the KGB. To get Grishin's attention at the Mexico City embassy, on 6 January 1977 Lee went up to the embassy and threw a Spanish-English dictionary through the fence with the letters "KGB" written in it. The action was observed by a Mexican policeman who promptly arrested Lee. Lee was searched and found to have a sealed envelope full of minox film. Lee was extradited to the United States, tried, and sentenced to life. Boyce was also arrested and found guilty. He was sentenced to 40 years.

On 22 January 1980, Andrew Lee escaped from prison and became a fugitive. He was eventually tracked to a small town in northern Oregon and recaptured. No doubt he is now held under tight security.

Guy F. Burgess (1911-1963)

The Cambridge ring of Soviet spies has become notorious in British espionage history and resulted in major information leaks from both Great Britain and the United States. One of its four members, known as scions of the upper class establishment, was Guy Francis de Moncy Burgess. He provided the Soviets with information on directions for and current thinking of the British Foreign Office.



Son of a commander in the Royal Navy, Burgess was born in a house within sight of the Devonport naval base. Burgess left home for the well-known public school Eton in 1924, made the soccer team there, and acquired pretensions he kept throughout his life. Unable to really apply himself, however, he moved over to the naval preparatory school, Dartmouth, in 1925. There he lasted for two years before developing a vision defect that precluded naval service. Burgess was lucky to be permitted to return to Eton where he finished his high school education. In 1930 he gained admittance to Trinity College, Cambridge, where he was enrolled in the period that Marxist student clubs gained popularity there. Burgess became secretary of the Apostles, one of these groups. He was gay, and remained so through his life.

Accounts agree that Burgess was recruited by the Soviets during his Cambridge period. His case officers encouraged him to submerge his political leanings, which must have been difficult for Burgess, who had been open and strident. On one occasion Burgess organized a strike of waiters at Cambridge. He also visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1934, before graduating in 1935.

After graduation, Burgess had a short career as an investment advisor before joining the British Broadcasting Corporation in October 1936. For the BBC Burgess hosted a weekly radio show on which he interviewed newsworthy figures, often members of Parliament. This exposure made him seem useful to British intelligence, which opened a channel to Burgess as an informant. He was offered a staff position in the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in December 1938. He went to work in January 1939 for SIS Section D, responsible for propaganda, subversion, and sabotage. SIS let him go in August 1940 as he was considered somewhat unstable, but he was seconded to the Joint Broadcasting Council, actually a propaganda unit under control of Section D. Later he returned to the BBC and resumed his radio talk show.

In 1944 Burgess learned of an opening in the Foreign Office press department and applied for the job. He was hired and began working for them on 4 June 1944. Thus began a diplomatic career of

seven years during which Burgess passed the Soviets anything he thought might be of interest to them. In 1945 when Clement Atlee's cabinet replaced that of Churchill, Burgess was promoted to special assistant to Hector McNeil, minister of state, the highest diplomatic corps official under Foreign Secretary Aneurin Bevan. In this post Burgess had access to the full range of Foreign Office policy papers and operational cable traffic.

Although Burgess avoided seeming to be interested in documents for himself, he consulted much material for his minister and showed contempt for many Foreign Office regulations. There were complaints about Burgess from many quarters but he was initially shielded by McNeil. In 1946 a new Foreign Office security director found Burgess to be taking cables home at night to study at his leisure, but the special assistant defended himself by citing his impossible workload.

At length McNeil decided to pass Burgess on, and he was reassigned for a three-month trial period to a new unit, the Information Research Department, which was to do Cold War propaganda. Burgess did not work out there either, and he was next assigned to the Far Eastern Department. His first actual foreign posting was to Washington as first secretary of the British embassy in 1950. There Burgess stayed with Kim Philby.

Throughout these years the diplomat's problems were growing apace. He had always had a fondness for liquor but he had by now become an alcoholic. He engaged in outrageous behavior, even with his friends, seeming to delight in inflicting hurt or embarrassment. Shortly after Burgess arrived in Turkey to visit Philby there in 1947, Philby's wife had a nervous breakdown. Burgess himself was dependent upon sedatives by 1948. Then there was Burgess's trip to Tangier, by way of Spain and Gibraltar, which left a trail of unpaid hotel bills and reports of barroom brawls, and occasioned complaints to the British Security Service, MI-5.

In May 1951 Burgess was visiting Britain and helped to celebrate a birthday with his friend Donald Maclean. As the two caught up with each other, Maclean learned he was to be pulled in on

suspicion of espionage by MI-5. Maclean determined to flee the country and Burgess decided to go with him. The warning came from another member of the Cambridge ring, Anthony Blunt, but Burgess's participation in the flight, in view of the fact that he roomed with SIS officer Philby, inevitably cast suspicion on that man. This ill-considered move virtually ended the SIS career of Philby, an agent far more valuable to the Soviets than Burgess himself. Burgess's decision to go with Maclean, as if on a lark, was yet another example of a serious lack of judgment.

Burgess and Maclean fled to France and then disappeared. They surfaced again in 1956 in Moscow, where Burgess at a press conference denied ever having been a Soviet spy. Guy Burgess died an alcoholic in Moscow in 1963 and was buried at the Donskoy Monastery in an ostentatious funeral. A band played the *Internationale*; one of the speeches eulogizing him was by Donald Maclean.

Larry Wu-Tai Chin (1923-1986)

Chin worked as an agent for the People's Republic of China against the United States. Born in Peking in 1923, Wu-Tai Chin first worked for the U.S. during World War II, when he served as an interpreter for the Army Liaison Office in Fuzhou, on the coast of Fukien Province, in 1943-1944. Chin subsequently studied English language and journalism at China's prestigious Yenching University. He resumed working for the United States in 1948 as an interpreter for the U.S. consulate at Shanghai.

Chin's espionage career is thought to have begun at that time, when he was approached by a Mr. Wang of the Shanghai police, evidently an undercover agent for the Chinese communists. Chin continued his service for the United States in Korea, where he assisted in the interrogation of Chinese prisoners, also feeding back interrogation reports to his Chinese handlers. In 1952 he joined the Foreign Broadcast Information Service,

(FBIS), a component administered by the CIA, which monitors and translates radio transmissions.

Wu-Tai Chin was assigned to the FBIS facility on Okinawa for almost a decade. In 1961 he was reassigned to a station at Santa Rosa, California. Four years later he became a naturalized American citizen. Transferred in 1970 to Rosslyn, Virginia, close to the CIA's Langley headquarters, he worked there until his retirement in 1981. Chin was one of the most experienced FBIS Chinese translators and held a Top Secret security clearance. In that capacity he was called upon by CIA operations officers to translate covert agent reports in addition to his normal duties.

Chinese intelligence reportedly reactivated its channel to Chin during the 1960s, using a case officer identified as Ou Qiming. Chin was given communications instructions and contact information for Chinese agents in Canada should he require extraction. Among specific intelligence he is thought to have divulged is a secret 1970 report to Congress detailing Richard Nixon's intention to open relations with China. Chin also fabricated at least one intelligence report—a Chinese translation of James Bamford's book on the National Security Agency, *The Puzzle Palace*, which Chin peddled as a secret report. On a visit to China in 1982, Wu-Tai Chin was the guest of honor at a banquet attended by senior Chinese intelligence officials.

In 1970 Chin took and passed the only polygraph test administered to him during his CIA career. His own subsequent testimony suggests that the CIA's Office of Security may have conducted a routine investigation of him in 1974-1975. The latter may have been related to Chin's penchant for gambling, manifested in numerous trips to Las Vegas and Hong Kong.

Actual suspicion of espionage apparently arose after the defection of a Chinese official in the early 1980s. A counterintelligence investigation of Chin began in December 1983 and continued for over two years. This included surveillance, extensive wiretaps, photography of over 500 pieces of mail, and warrantless search of his luggage in



1983 when returning from a foreign trip. On 22 November 1985 FBI agents confronted Wu-Tai Chin at home; he was arrested shortly afterwards. Chin was convicted on 17 counts of espionage on 7 February 1986 after acknowledging his activities at the trial. Chin maintained his motive had been to encourage rapprochement between the U.S. and China, though evidence showed he had been paid large amounts for his reports. Two weeks later, on 21 February, Wu-Tai Chin committed suicide while awaiting sentencing in a Maryland jail.

Christopher M. Cooke (b. 1956)

This is a case with a Walter Mitty quality—a case of a man who was not what he wanted to be, who was saved from the consequences of his errors by the mistakes of others. Christopher M. Cooke was a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force and deputy commander of a Titan II missile silo, stationed at McConnell Air Force Base near Wichita, Kansas. He was eventually arrested on charges of passing secret and top secret information to the Soviet Union.

Through his early years Cooke gave no indication of any disposition to betray his country. Born in Portsmouth, Virginia in 1956, Chris was one of five children and spent summers working for his father's electronics company. He played on his high school tennis team. He was a political science major at Norfolk's Old Dominion University and graduated magna cum laude. He represented his college at one of the model United Nations sessions sponsored by the United Nations Association of the United States.

During the controversy over the Carter administration's efforts to develop a neutron bomb, Cooke published an op-ed piece in the *Norfolk Ledger-Star* opposing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. Later, however, he argued that the U.S. must regard use of nuclear weapons as credible given the disparity in conventional force manpower between the U.S. and the USSR. Cooke advanced

this argument in the masters thesis he wrote at the College of William & Mary, from which he graduated cum laude in foreign affairs. During this period Cooke applied for a summer internship at the Central Intelligence Agency in 1978, and for an analyst job the following year, but was informed there were no openings for someone of his background.


Christopher Cooke then decided to join the Air Force, which he did in December 1979, passing through Officer Candidate School and then missile training at Vandenberg Air Force Base. Following completion of his training, Cooke was assigned to the 381st Strategic Missile Wing at McConnell Air Force Base.

Somewhere in all this Cooke evidently developed visions of espionage. From Wichita he made the first of a series of phone calls to the Soviet embassy in Washington almost as soon as he arrived at McConnell. There would be 10 more over the next year. Reports claim that Cooke fantasized about shooting his crew mates if they caught him copying documents; he evidently did buy a .25 caliber Beretta automatic pistol with a shoulder holster.

For a break from his first Kansas winter, Cooke went home to visit the family in Richmond in December 1980. On the way home he stopped in Washington to visit the Soviet embassy, using the name Mark Johnson. Cooke gave the Soviets copies of data tables from his masters thesis on 17 December.

Six days later he borrowed his mother's car to make a second visit to the embassy, this time allegedly supplying them with real information about Titan launching codes and maintenance schedules. This trip proved his undoing, as the car broke down in Anacostia, one of Washington's poorer neighborhoods where Cooke felt distinctly out of place. He found a cab to take him to the embassy, returned to his car the same way, but still could not start it. Once again Cooke took a cab to the Soviet embassy, where he called home on the telephone, enabling U.S. authorities to trace the call and his identity.

Thus the Strategic Air Command learned that



something was amiss, but confusion persisted since Cooke's brother Robert was also an airman stationed at McConnell. Thus nothing was done for a few more months. During a 15-day leave to Richmond, Cooke visited the Soviet embassy once more on 2 May 1981, when he was positively identified. Three days later he was taken into custody by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and held at Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia, for questioning.

In an effort to learn the details of the leak, a legal officer at the Strategic Air Command authorized OSI to make a deal with Cooke—no prosecution and an honorable discharge in return for full disclosure. He was questioned at Langley by an 18-year OSI veteran, Lieutenant Colonel Jerome E. Hoffman. Cooke at first maintained he had sought a Soviet viewpoint for an article on nuclear weapons he had intended to write for publication, but then also admitted giving information to the Russians. Cooke passed a polygraph test on the details of his confession.

The Air Force determined to prosecute Cooke upon learning the details and gaining the knowledge that no spy ring was involved. It went back on the agreement made with Cooke, and had been questioning him without reading Cooke his rights or, initially, giving him a lawyer. Cooke was variously held at stockades at Langley, McConnell, and Fort Meade, Maryland. The trial began in September 1981 at the 1776th Air Base Wing headquarters at Andrews Air Force Base.

By this time Cooke had both military counsel and a well-known trial lawyer, F. Lee Baily. They succeeded in showing how the Air Force had reneged and presented evidence that Air Force legal authorities believed the service was bound by the agreement made with Cooke. The defense moved that the charges be dismissed. On 23 September 1981 trial judge Lieutenant Colonel David Orser halted the trial pending adjudication of the defense motions by the Court of Military Appeals. That court ordered the charges against Cooke dropped on 22 February 1982. Cooke had made unauthorized contacts with the Soviets and not reported them, which is contrary to regulations,

but the agreement had to be observed to preserve the integrity of the military justice system.

Cooke left the Air Force with a dishonorable discharge but was lucky to get off that easily. The information he gave the Russians was important, but it concerned a weapon that was being phased out of U.S. nuclear forces and has since passed into history, and launch codes are periodically changed anyway for security reasons. In an article on 30 September 1981, the Russian newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* charged that the Cooke affair had been a provocation designed to stimulate a wave of anti-Soviet feelings among Americans.

Fedora

Source Fedora continues to be one of the great mysteries of postwar intelligence lore. Fedora was the codename assigned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to *its* Soviet agent, a "walk-in" approach from an individual supposedly working under diplomatic cover at the United Nations. The Russian described himself as an officer in the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, the unit charged with collecting technical and scientific intelligence, and insisted he was disillusioned with the Soviet system. Fedora offered to provide the United States with information on Soviet nuclear weapons and guided missile programs, major targets for U.S. intelligence collectors.

It was highly unusual for the FBI to run a "positive" intelligence agent, that is, one supplying intelligence from the other side, as opposed to a double agent being turned against the adversary—more normal FBI fare. Most likely this was only possible because the contact occurred inside the United States and because Fedora approached the FBI and not the CIA. J. Edgar Hoover, chief of the FBI, immediately adopted the source without much thought to Fedora's bona fides, reportedly notating an early report to the effect that the source was of known reliability.

Although standard arrangements within the U.S. intelligence community provided for pooling infor-

mation, especially about sources and their reliability, the FBI was loath to do this with Fedora. At first the CIA was unable to learn the identity of the source, and the FBI even withheld from Langley contextual information sufficient to allow independent judgments as to Fedora's access.

At first Fedora did supply certain intelligence on Soviet missile systems, and later some on Soviet bargaining positions in strategic arms limitation talks. But in the mid-1960s, after the defection of KGB officer Yuri Nosenko, who many believe to have been a plant intended to mislead the United States, Fedora provided information confirming portions of Nosenko's story later shown to have been false. He also supplied information exposing a British agent.

Some of Fedora's reports were judged so important that Hoover took them directly to the President. This was the case in 1969, when Fedora confirmed a report from another FBI Soviet source, Top Hat, supposedly a KGB colonel at the UN, that a priority assignment since 1967 had been to assess U.S. capability for chemical warfare. The implicit suggestion of an incipient arms race for chemical weapons was among the factors that led Richard Nixon to adopt a policy of renouncing development of further chemical weapons in a presidential decision of November 1969. Similarly, in 1971 Hoover carried to Nixon a Fedora report that Daniel Ellsberg had given a copy of the Pentagon Papers to the Soviet Embassy. Fearing such leaks, Nixon set up a covert unit, called the "Plumbers" in the White House, that used extralegal means and helped embroil that president in Watergate.

Fedora eventually retired from work at the United Nations. In 1981 source Fedora returned to the Soviet Union, a comment on his original protestations of dissatisfaction with Russia. Some counter-intelligence specialists, like James J. Angleton of the CIA, had been skeptical of Fedora for some time. An FBI re-evaluation in 1980 reportedly concluded that Fedora had remained loyal to the KGB all along. The truth about Fedora, however, will never be known.

Anatoly N. Filatov (b. 1940)

One of the most valuable Central Intelligence Agency agents of recent years is Anatoly Nikolaevich Filatov, a Soviet national who had risen to become a colonel in the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU. Details of this case remain sketchy, but Filatov, reportedly code-named Trigon, was another of that valuable species, the walk-in agent. Filatov evidently approached the CIA with a proposal to pass on intelligence while he was stationed in Algiers under diplomatic cover.

Filatov, according to the account of his activities published by the Soviet news agency TASS during his secret trial, began to supply information in February 1974. He provided a range of Soviet military and intelligence secrets, including material on Soviet relationships with national liberation movements.

This initial phase proved highly successful, but at some point Colonel Filatov was reassigned to GRU headquarters in Moscow. The CIA was doubtless highly concerned at the Moscow assignment, given the difficulty of conducting American support operations directly inside the Soviet capital. It is likely that Filatov was offered an opportunity to defect to the United States, an offer he did not take. Though likely, it is not known for certain that such an offer was made, but in any case Colonel Filatov did return to Moscow for the GRU headquarters tour.

The CIA went ahead with a high-risk operation to support Filatov in Moscow. This intelligence channel was active for about a year after which there was a hiatus. In the spring of 1977, Colonel Filatov resumed reporting but there was evidently some difference in the quality of his information. One item was a copy of a secret cable that purported to be an account of a breakfast meeting on 11 April 1977 between Henry Kissinger and the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoli Dobrynin. The cable alleged that Kissinger

advised the Soviets to reject arms control proposals recently advanced by the Carter administration.

This and other reports from Filatov raised questions among CIA counterintelligence experts over whether their Soviet agent had not been discovered and was being played back against the United States. It is not known whether the Soviets learned about the CIA's growing doubts regarding Filatov. In the summer of 1977 the KGB decided to wrap up the Filatov spy operation.

On 15 July 1977 a woman from the U.S. embassy in Moscow, Martha Peterson, ostensibly a vice consul but most likely a CIA officer, was arrested by the KGB servicing one of the prearranged "dead drops" used by Filatov. According to an account printed in the Soviet newspaper *Izvestiya*, Peterson drove her car to a side street, changed from a white dress to a black outfit, and cleared her tail by taking a bus, a streetcar, the subway, and a taxi, before proceeding to the drop, which was a chink in a stone wall. Peterson was picked up there by KGB officers and found with espionage equipment including instructions, a camera, currency, and gold. Peterson was questioned then, having diplomatic immunity, she was deported.

Colonel Filatov was himself arrested at about this time in 1977, and went to trial on 10 July 1978. He was condemned to death and his execution was actually reported in the Soviet press, but that story was misleading. Instead, Filatov's sentence was commuted to 15-years imprisonment, as part of an arrangement that allowed the Soviets to regain two of their agents sentenced to prison in the United States.

Filatov was held at Lefortovo Prison in Moscow after his 14 July sentencing. Two months later, a woman who identified herself as Filatov's wife, Tamara, spoke with two American newsmen at Red Army Park and reported that Filatov had attempted to write a letter to President Jimmy Carter which had been intercepted by the KGB. He was, she said, depending on the mercy of Carter. This information was among the considerations that led the U.S. to insist on the inclusion of Filatov in the spy trade previously noted.

One final point should be noted on the Filatov case. An attempt was made by certain American conservatives to tar a high National Security Council staff aide to Jimmy Carter with the charge of having blown Filatov's cover. The story was that this man had revealed information in a conversation with a Rumanian diplomat at a diplomatic reception that allowed the Soviets to trace the agent. Investigations of these charges were carried out by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. All of the investigations found the aide to have been blameless in the affair.

Oleg G. Gordiyevsky (b. 1939)

One of the most valuable Western spies ever to operate against the Soviet Union was Oleg G. Gordiyevsky, a KGB officer who became disillusioned with the Soviet system and allowed himself to be recruited by the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), also known as MI-6. Born just before World War II, Gordiyevsky joined the KGB at 23 years of age and was carefully trained for foreign intelligence assignments.

Gordiyevsky's first foreign posting was to Copenhagen in 1966, ostensibly as a consular attache. The KGB station there specialized in operations against Scandinavia, including Sweden and the northern tier of NATO: Norway and Denmark. This initial tour lasted four years, after which Gordiyevsky returned for two years to Moscow. He was posted again to Copenhagen from 1972 to 1978 with his cover being a variety of posts in the Soviets' Copenhagen embassy. Very likely he was the KGB station chief. In Denmark Gordiyevsky was known as a pleasant and friendly man, jovial by some accounts, an expert at knife-and-fork espionage at diplomatic receptions, and willing on occasion to make disparaging comments about the

Soviet ambassador there.

Gordiyevsky's association with SIS began either around the end of his first Copenhagen posting or at the beginning of his second. The British, aware they could not support their double agent without Danish assistance, brought the Danes' counterintelligence unit into the operation. In addition, given the enormous power and reach of the Central Intelligence Agency, at some point Gordiyevsky had to choose between continuing to work for SIS or transferring to CIA control. Impressed with the discretion and professionalism of SIS, the double agent decided to stay with the British.

Gordiyevsky's information was of considerable help to the Danes and NATO. It may have been instrumental in apprehending a Danish engineer and businessman who was given a long prison term for exporting embargoed electronic equipment to the Soviet Union through the KGB. In 1977 Denmark expelled three Russian embassy officials for activities incompatible with their diplomatic status. In addition Gordiyevsky may have furnished early leads that contributed to the unmasking of Arne Treholt, a Norwegian defense ministry official who became a Soviet agent.

Later the KGB posted Gordiyevsky to London as deputy chief of station, with cover as chief of the political section of the embassy. In this job the double agent provided SIS with some valuable intelligence. Among this material was the news in 1981 that the KGB had ordered an extraordinary state of alert for its London station due to fears that the United States was about to attack the Soviet Union. This state of alert remained in effect through 1983. In that year information from Gordiyevsky may have been instrumental in foiling a KGB attempt to double British counterintelligence officer Michael Bettaney.

In 1984 Gordiyevsky's information was used to help brief Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher prior to the December visit of Soviet Politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev. Gordiyevsky himself, as deputy chief of station, worked within the Soviet embassy preparing the trip and then was with the Gorbachev party throughout their visit. Gordiyevsky also supplied background information and


insights on former KGB chief Yuri Andropov during his brief tenure as Soviet leader. For the Americans, Gordiyevsky provided material used to help brief President Ronald Reagan prior to his November 1985 Geneva Summit meeting with Gorbachev.

In June 1985, the KGB promoted Gordiyevsky to chief of station in London, one of the most senior field positions in that organization. Their suspicions had evidently been aroused, however. That summer Gordiyevsky received a sudden summons to return to Moscow. The SIS promised all its resources, if needed, to help extract Gordiyevsky from Russia. The double agent returned as requested and, determining that he was indeed under suspicion, alerted his British handlers. In a daring extraction that involved travel by land, sea, and air, the SIS managed to get Gordiyevsky out of the Soviet Union and to Britain, where he was taken to a safe house in the countryside near London. The SIS had hoped to be able to extract Gordiyevsky's wife and two daughters as well, but this evidently proved impossible, although accounts vary.

Gordiyevsky became the highest ranking KGB officer to defect to date. He was extensively debriefed by the SIS, which shared its results with the CIA. In addition, it has been reported that Gordiyevsky was brought to Washington under tight security in February 1986 for several days of meetings with senior U.S. intelligence officials, military men, diplomats, and representatives of the National Security Council. Altogether, a highly successful operation.

Edward L. Howard (b. 1951)

Some of the gravest damage ever inflicted on Central Intelligence Agency espionage efforts was the work of a man who seems to have gone to the KGB essentially out of pique. Edward L. Howard was born on 27 October 1951 at Alamogordo, New Mexico, otherwise known as the site of the first



atomic bomb test. He was the son of an Air Force electronics specialist who worked on guided missiles and had been stationed in Germany, England, and Texas.

Young Edward graduated from high school at Branden, England. He played Little League baseball as a child and was a Boy Scout and Explorer Scout. At the University of Texas he belonged to the karate club. He graduated cum laude in 1972 with a degree in business administration. Howard then joined the Peace Corps and was sent to Bucaramanga, a town in Colombia where he met another Peace Corps volunteer, Mary Ceadarleaf, of St. Paul, Minnesota, whom he married in 1976. Howard went back to school after the Peace Corps, to American University in Washington, D.C., where he earned a masters degree in business administration, also in 1976. Howard then joined the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), which assigned him to administer AID loan projects in Peru. The Howards lived in Lima from 1976 to 1979.

The Howards then returned from Lima and Edward decided to leave AID for work in private industry. They moved to Chicago where he secured a job as manager of an environmental firm called Ecology and Environment Incorporated. The Howards bought a home in the Barrington suburb of Chicago. Edward Howard held the Chicago managerial position for two years but at length became bored with the work and cast around for something more exciting.

What could be more interesting than working for the Central Intelligence Agency? Howard applied for an agency slot and was hired in January 1981 as a career trainee for the CIA's Directorate of Operations. As with all CIA trainees, Howard was given questioning under polygraph, "fluttered" in agency parlance, and admitted recreational drug use starting during his time with the Peace Corps in Colombia. He promised to stop and the CIA continued his training. Fluent in Spanish and German, with an advanced degree, and accustomed to living abroad, Howard seemed a good candidate to Langley.

Edward Howard received initial familiarization

training at CIA headquarters and was then sent to Camp Peary for more advanced and directed instruction in espionage craft. Often called "the Farm," Camp Peary is an isolated installation near Williamsburg, Virginia, very similar to a military basic training facility. Students at Camp Peary's operations course are given basic physical conditioning, instruction in firearms and hand-to-hand combat, practice in detecting and avoiding surveillance, in servicing dead drops, in communications, and in behavior under interrogation. The agency reportedly also provided Howard with five aliases he could develop as covers for his true identity and CIA role. Mary Howard, meanwhile, moved east in the spring of 1981 and was hired for a secretarial job in the Directorate of Operations.

At this time, the Directorate of Operations' Soviet European Division was looking for fresh officers to send to Moscow to maintain contact with CIA agents in the Soviet Union. The division prefers to send recent recruits to Soviet posts since these officers are in no danger of having been identified as CIA from previous agency assignments. The Howards, who could be sent as a husband-and-wife team, appeared well suited for a Moscow assignment and they were selected.

Edward Howard received special training for the Moscow post. He was put to work learning Russian and given a State Department appointment as a Foreign Service Officer in the consular service for his cover. The Howards told friends they were going to Moscow for the State Department and bought a car they prepared to ship there. Edward was instructed on the specifics of the CIA's means of communicating with its agents in Russia. Mary Howard was also given a short course in surveillance and countersurveillance so she could help her husband if need be. During their final preparations, on 19 March 1983, a son, Lee, was born to the family.

As part of the Central Intelligence Agency's final arrangements for sending its officer to Moscow, Howard was fluttered one more time. His answers to some questions were deceptive and, confronted with this, Howard admitted to continued drug use, taking change from vending machines, and steal-

ing money from a woman's purse during an airline flight. Instead of being sent to Moscow, Howard was fired by the CIA in June 1983.

The agency did pay for some psychiatric treatment Howard sought, but he was basically furious at his treatment by the CIA. Howard returned to New Mexico and managed to land a job as an economic analyst for the staff of the Finance Committee of the New Mexico State Legislature. He seemed a hard worker to colleagues there, but he had a problem with alcohol that only got worse after he left the CIA. In February 1984, on a drunken binge, Howard pulled a silver .44 Magnum, one of his collection of guns, on several young men in Santa Fe. The incident ended with Howard putting a bullet through the roof of a jeep before being disarmed and getting beaten up. Arrested for attempted murder, Howard pled guilty to a reduced charge of aggravated assault and was sentenced to five years probation and required to pay \$7,500 to the man whose jeep had been damaged. The incident did nothing to improve Howard's mental outlook.

Still angry at the Central Intelligence Agency, on one occasion in late 1983 Howard stood outside the Soviet embassy in Washington and contemplated contacting the KGB, but he did nothing at that time. In late September 1984 Howard was interviewed by FBI agents on suspicion of espionage. A day or two later the Howards left on a trip to Switzerland to visit friends and then went to St. Anton, Austria, where Howard evidently made contact with the KGB, who gave him the code-name Robert. In 1985 he met with a former CIA colleague, William Bosch, and discussed the KGB contact and the possibility of getting money for information. In the meantime KGB officer Vitaly Yurchenko, during his 1985 temporary defection to the United States, revealed the Robert contact to his CIA debriefers and specified the man was a former agency employee.

The Yurchenko information led to a CIA investigation and renewed suspicion of Howard, and to a request to the FBI to place him under surveillance. Edward Howard saw the case building against him, evaded the watchers with the help of

his wife Mary, and fled. Howard appeared in Helsinki, Finland, then crossed into the Soviet Union where he was given political asylum which the Soviets announced in August 1986. Interviewed on Soviet television, Howard described himself as a patriotic American who would never do anything to betray his country. Assuming Howard actually believed this, the statement suggests his information to the KGB must have consisted of knowledge of dead drops, without revealing specific Soviet agents for the CIA. The damage from the Howard affair was considerable, however, as the CIA lost a number of agents in Russia, including the very valuable A. G. Tolkachev. The Central Intelligence Agency is still working to bounce back from the damage inflicted on its networks by the Howard affair.

Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson (1920-1972)

Robert Johnson was a walk-in agent carefully developed by the KGB. He was of immense value to the Soviets. A young Army sergeant in the United States Army, Johnson was a heavy drinker and a gambler. Assigned to Vienna in 1948, during a period in which Austria was under joint military occupation following World War II, he became acquainted with a Viennese woman, Hedwig Pipek. Four years later Pipek joined Johnson in Berlin, where the sergeant was then assigned as a clerk in the Berlin Command intelligence section, G-2. She hoped to marry him.

Johnson, in the meanwhile, was disgruntled at his lack of prospects in the United States and entertained the notion of defecting to Russia. He proposed to Pipek on Christmas Day 1952, but on condition that she put him in touch with the Soviets. Following a couple of abortive attempts, Sergeant Johnson succeeded in making contact with a couple of Soviet intelligence officers from their Karlshorst headquarters on 22 February 1953.

The Russians convinced Johnson not to defect but rather to become their agent.

Sergeant Johnson passed the Russians routine information that came across his desk at G-2.

Johnson married Pipek in April 1953 and took leave for a honeymoon in Bavaria. The sergeant and his new wife instead crossed into East Germany, quite easy to do in those days before the Berlin Wall, and received espionage training from the Soviets in Brandenburg. He continued to pass the Russians information that crossed his desk at G-2. He also drew into the network a good friend, Sergeant James A. Mintkenbaugh. Their first Soviet case officer, codenamed Paula, was Vladimir Vasilovich Krivoshey.

Sergeant Johnson had met Mintkenbaugh during previous duty at Fort Hood, where Johnson's gambling against new recruits had brought him extra money. Entertaining the idea of making a living from gambling, Johnson got a discharge from the Army in 1956 and went to Las Vegas, where he lost his savings over the space of a few months and reportedly was supported by his wife through prostitution. Their young son Robert witnessed their problems, drinking, and fighting.

Mintkenbaugh got back in touch with Johnson in January 1957 and passed along a suggestion from the KGB that he re-enlist in the service, preferably the Air Force. Rejected there, he re-enlisted in the Army instead and was able to get his old rank back. Johnson was assigned to a Nike-Hercules base at Palos Verdes, California, and over 1957-1958 gave the Russians photographs and diagrams of that surface-to-air missile system. Subsequent assignments were to Fort Bliss and then, in late 1959, to an ordnance battalion at Orleans, France. His case officer in the U.S. was "Charles," Petr Nikolaevich Yeliseev, a protocol officer at the Soviet embassy. In France the contact was "Viktor," Vitali Sergeevich Orzhurmov.

At his Orleans posting, Johnson had few opportunities to uncover sensitive information and in the summer of 1960 the KGB asked him to try to get duty at NATO headquarters. He was interviewed there in March 1961 but was not selected. Instead

Johnson was able to get an assignment to the Armed Forces Courier Center at Orly airport, where secret documents were temporarily held for couriers in transit. Although French neighbors had overheard his wife Hedy calling Johnson a spy during their arguments, U.S. agreements with France precluded Americans from questioning French citizens. Johnson was able to get a Top Secret security clearance to work at the center in late 1961.

Documents at Orly were held in a vault that was constantly guarded and also defended by technical barriers: a steel door closed by a beam with combination locks at both ends, plus a second steel door with a key lock. The KGB got Johnson to volunteer for painting duty allowing him to determine there was no alarm system on the building itself. He also volunteered for night and weekend duty giving him unimpeded access to the vault on Sunday morning graveyard shifts. Listening to an officer's conversation, Johnson was able to get one lock combination, while a moment of carelessness on the part of another officer enabled Johnson to get an impression of the required key, which the KGB then duplicated. The combination to the third lock was discovered by means of an x-ray device the KGB supplied Johnson.

Preparations were completed by the end of November 1962. Between 15 December and 20 April 1963, Johnson made seven forays into the vault and supplied the KGB with 90 envelopes bulging with secret documents. The KGB took the material to technical experts flown into Paris for each entry and these men photographed the documents, getting the originals back to Johnson in time for him to replace them in the vault before the end of his shift. On the last occasion Johnson fell asleep and missed the rendezvous with his case officers to get the documents back. The KGB men threw the packet into his car and he found it just in time to replace the materials. Penetrations of the vault were then terminated by the KGB.

Sergeant Johnson was reassigned to Washington to be close to his wife, who was undergoing psychiatric treatment at Walter Reed Hospital, and he made an attempt to have her committed on 2 Octo-

ber 1964. Apparently desperate, Johnson then disappeared, returning to Las Vegas where he again lost all his savings gambling. In the meantime Hedy Johnson admitted to Army investigators the espionage activities of her husband. Destitute, Johnson surrendered himself to authorities in Reno, Nevada on 25 November 1964 and was prosecuted for espionage. He was convicted on 30 July 1965 and sentenced to 25 years at the federal penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. There his son Robert, just returned from service in Vietnam, knifed Johnson to death at the start of a prison visit on 18 May 1972.

William P. Kampiles (b. 1954)

Kampiles's espionage career turned out to be much shorter than he could have ever anticipated. Though he provided the Soviet Union with information of great value, he saw himself as a patriotic American attempting to help his country. He approached the Soviets as a walk-in agent, getting involved through some romantic notion of becoming an undercover spy.

The son of Greek immigrants to the United States, William Kampiles was born in Chicago in December 1954. Raised a Roman Catholic, he was a responsible fellow who managed to stay out of trouble before his time with the CIA. Kampiles lived in a nice neighborhood in the southeast corner of Chicago, was an altar boy, and held early jobs as a paper delivery boy and a grocery boy. He attended Indiana University and graduated in 1975, afterward becoming a salesman for a hospital supply company.

Kampiles wanted to be a spy because he viewed the profession as a glamorous calling compared to his more mundane work. He applied for a job at the CIA and was hired in March 1977 as a watch officer for Langley's National Indications Center, a job with a civil service rank of GS-7 and pay of \$11,523 a year, about \$5,000 less than he previously had earned.

Kampiles quickly tired of his work at the watch center, which involved frequent 12-hour shifts logging incoming information and messages. It was a period in which no major international crises occurred to relieve the tedium. He hoped to transfer to the CIA's clandestine service as an intelligence officer but was told it was premature to expect such an assignment. In November 1977 he quit his CIA job.

The former CIA man evidently had some idea that he could come back into the agency in the capacity he wished by proving himself to be indispensable. One day while still at Langley, he took a copy of the Top Secret intelligence manual describing the capability of the Key Hole 11 reconnaissance satellite, hid it in his jacket, and smuggled it out of the office. In February 1978, after cutting off the top secret markings from the manual, he took it with him on a trip to Greece.

Noticing a garden party in progress at the Soviet embassy in Athens, Kampiles ventured in and struck up a conversation with Mikhail Zavali, a Soviet military attache. After three more meetings in which Kampiles spoke of his CIA work and claimed he could supply secrets, the Russians overcame their fear that he might be a plant and advanced \$3,000 to him. At first he gave the Russians photocopies of the manual's table of contents, summary, and an artist's conception of the satellite, but at their next meeting Kampiles gave Zavali the rest of the manual.

The aspiring spy told a CIA friend he was in contact with the Russians and offered to feed them disinformation. None of this was taken seriously until U.S. intelligence noticed the Soviets were taking countermeasures to limit observation by the KH-11 system and the FBI began a security investigation. Kampiles, who wanted \$10,000 from the Soviets for the manual and was planning to return to Athens in a few days, agreed to take a polygraph test which he twice failed. He then confessed to giving away the manual, whose absence was never noticed at the CIA until an inventory two days after his confession. The 17 August 1978 investigation found that 14 of the 350 copies printed in late 1976 were missing, ironically including

one assigned to the office of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Kampiles never got the rest of the money he expected from the Russians. He was found guilty of four counts of espionage and two of theft and sentenced to 40 years in prison on 22 December 1978, the day after his 24th birthday.

Karl F. Koecher (b. 1934)

This case developed when the Czechoslovak intelligence service tried to penetrate the Central Intelligence Agency. Koecher, a Czech national, was trained by their intelligence service from 1963 to 1965 for the mission of moving to the United States as an illegal, or undercover agent. He built up a cover story as a Czech who had smuggled information out of his country for the benefit of Radio Free Europe. Koecher and his wife Hana emigrated to the United States in 1965 and later became naturalized American citizens.

On his resume, Koecher stated he had been a consultant to Radio Free Europe. In 1969 he was hired as an instructor in philosophy by Wagner Community College on Staten Island, and was promoted to assistant professor the following year.

In public the Koechers maintained a stance of virulent anti-communism, with strident statements against the Soviets and, indeed, almost anything liberal in American politics. Among other things Koecher did volunteer work for his local Republican Party organization in New York City. Koecher's wife told friends her father was a Communist Party member in Czechoslovakia and gave the impression she was rebelling by turning away. She was hired as a saleswoman for one of the jewelry concerns in New York's Diamond District, west of Fifth Avenue. In 1979 she became a partner in the Novissa Corporation, a jewelry concern at 30 West 47th Street. The Koechers lived in a co-op apartment at 50 East 89th Street, at the northern edge of the very fashionable Upper East Side.

Karl Koecher continued his work as an academic until he eventually found an entry into the U.S. intelligence community sometime in 1972. He was given a background investigation that led to the granting of a security clearance. With this in hand, he resigned from Wagner College in January 1973, and the following month was hired as a contract employee by the Central Intelligence Agency. Koecher worked as a CIA contractee from February 1973 to August 1975. Afterward he performed unspecified work for the CIA office in New York from 1975 to 1977. He spoke to friends openly and proudly of his work for the CIA and was dismayed to be let go. He expressed disappointment that the agency did not accept his ideas.

From September 1979 until August 1980 Karl Koecher was employed as a teacher of humanities at the Old Westbury campus of the State University of New York. He is not known to have had any other employment and lived quietly while Hana continued working in the jewelry business. In 1984 the Koechers planned a trip to Switzerland and Karl talked to friends about moving to Austria where he could work in a construction company with a relative. Karl Koecher was arrested on 27 November 1984, four hours before his plane was scheduled to leave New York's Kennedy Airport. Hana was held as a material witness.

The indictment against Koecher stated that he had passed on virtually all the classified information with which he had come into contract during his 1973-1975 period as a contract employee. He pleaded no contest to the charges and renounced his U.S. citizenship in February 1986. He was sentenced to life in prison.

At that point, Koecher was already the object of an exchange arrangement with the East. On 11 February the Koechers and three other Polish or East German agents were released in exchange for Soviet dissident Anatoli Sharansky and three CIA or West German agents being held in Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

Lieutenant Commander Arthur Lindberg (b. 1936)

In the late 1970s, this married United States Navy specialist became the center of a quite elaborate design to feed phony intelligence to the Soviets. In 1977 Lieutenant Commander Arthur Lindberg held a billet as purchasing director for the naval air station at Lakehurst, New Jersey and was serving out his last months before retirement. In Washington, then-Attorney General Griffin B. Bell and other senior Carter administration aides felt the KGB was too brazen in its activities in the United States and were pleased when the FBI came forward with a plan to trap some of the Soviets' agents.

The FBI plan involved approaching the Russians with a credible American who would offer to spy for them. Since it was known the Soviet Union was extremely interested in identifying U.S. capabilities for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), the idea was to dangle information on that subject offered by the most credible double agent—a naval officer. Commander Lindberg's name came up and he was asked to cooperate. Lindberg mulled over the FBI proposal for weeks until, at church one Sunday, he heard a sermon enjoining parishioners to seize opportunities to serve God and country. Lindberg agreed to the FBI plan.

This operation began with a vacation. Lindberg went for a cruise on a Russian ocean liner suspected to be a rendezvous for Soviet intelligence officers. Aboard ship he sent a note to a Russian merchant officer, volunteering his services. Ten days later, the Navy officer was called at home and directed to a phone booth. On the phone he was questioned at length by a Soviet agent, evidently Valdik Enger, officially a diplomat working in New York for the United Nations Secretariat.

Thus began nine months of surreptitious contacts between Commander Lindberg and the KGB, all monitored by the FBI. Lindberg received ASW information from the FBI which he concealed in milk and juice cartons and left at roadside landmarks near the Garden State Parkway. He would inform his KGB handlers of the locations and they would make pickups, leaving payments of \$9,000 a delivery in the same manner. On 20 May 1978, with the Russians about to leave a \$16,000 payment, the Americans called the hand.

Three Russians were arrested at Woodbridge, New Jersey. They were Enger, Rudolf Petrovich Chernyayev, another UN Secretariat employee, and Vladimir P. Zinyakin, a member of the Soviet UN delegation. Zinyakin had diplomatic immunity, the others were subject to prosecution.

In the interagency group that monitored secret operations for the Carter administration, there was no opposition to picking up the Russians. The only real questions centered on whether to take the captured agents to trial. The State Department opposed a trial because of possible impact on SALT talks and a prospective summit. The CIA was concerned over the possibility that the KGB might retaliate against some CIA officers in Moscow. The Carter administration decided to go ahead and the FBI made the arrests as noted.

Zinyakin was immediately ordered out of the country. The other two KGB agents were held for \$2 million bail each at the Metropolitan Detention Center (the Tombs) in lower Manhattan. The KGB did indeed retaliate, but not against the CIA.

Instead it arrested an American businessman in Moscow, Francis J. Crawford, on charges of violating money exchange laws. In a compromise, the detainees on both sides were released to the custody of their respective ambassadors to await trial. The Soviet agents were even allowed to return home on a visit. Businessmen warned the Soviets of the dangers to bilateral commerce posed by their holding of Crawford, with magnate Armand Hammer making this point personally to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. In September 1978 the Soviets put Crawford on trial for one day, declared him guilty, gave him a suspended sentence, and

put him on a plane for the United States.

In October 1978 the two remaining Soviet agents, Enger and Chernyayev went to trial in the United States. They were found guilty and each received a sentence of 50 years in prison. Negotiations continued between the U.S. and Soviet Union over the disposition of the men, who remained free on bail to pursue their official jobs—Enger as an assistant to the UN Undersecretary General, Chernyayev as a personnel officer. In April 1979 the two KGB officers were exchanged for five Soviet dissidents and a Russian pledge not to execute a CIA agent whom the Soviets had captured.

Donald Maclean (1913-1983)

The Cambridge ring of Soviet spies has become notorious in British espionage history. This group of spies was responsible for major information leaks from both Great Britain and the United States. One of its four members was Donald Maclean. He provided the Soviets with information on Anglo-American relations and on the atomic bomb project.

Donald Maclean was born in London on 25 May 1913. He was the second son of Sir Donald Maclean (1864-1932), a Liberal member of Parliament and sometime cabinet minister. Donald attended public school at Gresham's School, in Holt, beginning in 1927. For a university education he was accepted at King's College, Cambridge, arriving there in 1931. It was during the Cambridge period that Maclean was spotted and recruited by the Soviets, which was not difficult since he was hardly reticent regarding his views. Maclean published an article in a socialist review, *Cambridge Left*, in 1933. He told his mother that as soon as he finished college he would be off to the Soviet Union to help in the revolution.

Maclean's Soviet handlers evidently counseled him to tone down this rhetoric; this led to a marked change in his behavior. He placed first in

French and German in December 1934, graduated the next year, and immediately began preparations for the Foreign Office examinations.

Maclean did well enough on the written exam to be called in for an interview, which was very successful. He began to work at the Foreign Office in 1935. His first posting abroad was to Paris in 1938, eventually as third secretary. Here he met an American student, Melinda Marling, of whom he became enamored, exchanging a gay orientation for a bisexual one.

Maclean served in the Paris embassy through the beginning of World War II, the "Phony War," and the German invasion of France and the Low Countries. With the Germans at the Channel coast and turning south against Paris, Donald married Melinda and the two, with other British diplomats, made good their escape at the last moment.

An early threat to Maclean's espionage role arose from the defection in 1940 of Soviet general Walter Krivitsky, who claimed knowledge of an agent in place in the British Foreign Office. Krivitsky told his tale to some in England but he was apparently not taken seriously. He went on to the United States, where he was found dead one day in a Washington hotel room. The death was ruled a suicide but many doubted this judgment.

Donald Maclean came to America in March 1944, assigned as first secretary at the British embassy. Despite his American wife, Maclean seemed not to like Americans and spoke disparagingly of the United States. Within the embassy Maclean was in an ideal position for espionage in a senior post such as first secretary. Moreover, the head of chancery was absent at that time and the British ambassador choose Maclean to act in his stead. This meant that Maclean saw every cable, report, or paper that crossed the ambassador's desk. He frequently took material home with him to work on at night. When Melinda joined him in Washington, they got a house and Maclean had one room adapted as a study and darkroom. He seems to have used microdot technology to transmit documents to the Soviets, who used the codename Homer for him. KGB operational messages regarding Homer were channeled through their

consulate in New York.

Maclean's importance to the Soviets increased further in the summer of 1945, when his ambassador nominated him to be secretary for the Anglo-American Combined Policy Committee on Atomic Development. In this capacity Maclean had a pass that allowed him unrestricted access to all U.S. files and secret sites, including Los Alamos and Oak Ridge in addition to facilities in Washington. Homer's access was considered so vital by the Soviets that they brought a second agent, "Basil," a nuclear physicist, into this net to provide specialized knowledge that would help Maclean find the most useful information.

The British detected no difficulty with Maclean and were well satisfied with him throughout his tour in Washington, with the exception of his latent anti-Americanism. Still, the strain of his double role began to show, at least to Melinda, who witnessed Maclean's excessive drinking, physical violence when drunk, and increasingly open homosexuality. Nevertheless the Foreign Office happily promoted Maclean to the official position of head of chancery at his next post, Cairo, where he was sent in May 1948.

Meanwhile Homer's cover was wearing increasingly thin. American specialists had early noted that the volume of radio traffic from the Soviet consulate in New York had increased markedly in the summer of 1945. Cryptographer Meredith Gardner of the Army Security Agency was working on the KGB codes, which had been changed in 1945 but were similar to a code the Russians used in Finland in 1944, a copy of which was in U.S. possession. Moreover, a code clerk at the Soviet consulate in 1945 had mistakenly sent some messages in the earlier code. FBI counterintelligence officers were able to provide Gardner with copies of some Soviet consulate messages that had been quietly pilfered during the war. The cryptographer was able to reconstruct much of the code.

The Army Security Agency then attacked the New York consulate message traffic with the aid of their new knowledge. They soon discovered that the Soviets had been aware of certain negotiations


between the British and Americans in 1945 that had been carried out entirely by cable. This radically narrowed the field of where the leak might be, pointing directly at those British and American individuals who had had a role in the negotiations. Maclean was one of the suspects. The FBI passed this information to British intelligence liaison officer Peter Dwyer in 1948.

Maclean was initially protected by his establishment status and a certain disbelief in American methods. But the breaking of the cases of several atomic bomb spies and others had set the wheels in motion by 1950. At the same time, Maclean's drinking and bizarre behavior in Cairo seemed to make him more of a problem for the Foreign Office. In May 1950 Maclean was recalled from Cairo and went to a sanitarium for treatment of his drinking problem.

Back on the job by the end of the year, the Foreign Office made Maclean chief of its American Section. But by this time security had ruled out American sources for the 1945 leaks and indeed most British ones with the exception of Maclean. The British Security Service, MI-5, eventually got approval to conduct a full interrogation of Maclean and planned to apprehend him on Monday, 28 May 1951.

Three days earlier the British diplomat celebrated his 38th birthday with a dinner at home with Melinda and his friend Guy Burgess. That day or just before Maclean was warned by a fellow member of the Cambridge ring, Anthony Blunt, who had worked in MI-5 and retained connections with it, that he was to be interrogated. Maclean determined to flee the country and told Burgess of his decision, whereupon Burgess decided to come along for the ride.

After the birthday dinner Maclean and Burgess got in a car and drove to Southampton, where they boarded a ship bound for St. Malo in France. From there they took a cab to Rennes, probably a plane to Paris, and disappeared. Because of the weekend they had a three-day lead on MI-5, which never caught up. Maclean and Burgess surfaced in Moscow in 1956 and told a news conference they had never been spies. Maclean remained in Russia,



importing his clothes from Britain and continuing his drinking. Melinda visited Maclean in Moscow and had an affair with Kim Philby after which the Macleans separated, with Melinda keeping custody of a daughter and two sons. The Soviet Union announced Maclean's death on 11 March 1983 and he was cremated and buried in a 15-minute ceremony that day at Donskoy Monastery.

Alexandr Dmitrevich Ogorodnik (?-1977)

The Central Intelligence Agency achieved another significant penetration of the Soviet Union, this time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1974. This was the recruitment of Alexandr Dmitrevich Ogorodnik, who at that time was serving as a political secretary in the Soviet embassy at Bogota, Colombia. There are two versions of this recruitment. One was that Ogorodnik was a walk-in, a volunteer. The second was that he was set up by the CIA in a "honey trap," a situation in which the young diplomat was compromised with a woman, photographed, and threatened with exposure unless he cooperated.

Whatever the motivation, Ogorodnik agreed to go ahead and supply intelligence to the CIA. The agency received information from diplomatic cables moving through Bogota until Ogorodnik was reassigned to Moscow in 1975. During this period the Soviet agent met clandestinely with CIA officers for training in espionage craft, anticipating just such an assignment.

Again there are two versions of what happened to Ogorodnik thereafter. According to a Soviet foreign ministry official who later defected, the KGB began to suspect Ogorodnik while he still served in Colombia, but did nothing to alert him until they could arrange for what would seem to be a routine transfer to Moscow. In Moscow he was assigned to the Foreign Ministry's Policy Planning Department, a unit with wide access to secret

cable traffic. There he was observed for several months until he was caught passing documents.

A second version is given by a KGB officer who subsequently defected to the United States. According to a KGB briefing he was given on the case, there was no suspicion of Ogorodnik prior to his return to Moscow. In this version the diplomat got his routine transfer, then in Moscow was assigned to the Global Affairs Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, again a unit with wide access to Soviet classified information including, in this case, KGB reports. The division was also the repository of highly detailed annual reports from both Soviet ambassadors and KGB residents. In this account Ogorodnik was able to select and forward the best of this information for over 20 months. The Central Intelligence Agency used this information to inform itself, the National Security Council, and the State Department.

By the summer of 1977 the KGB had become aware of a serious leak from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Later they were able to narrow their focus to the Global Affairs Division. Analyses of what was known of the leaks plus covert surveillance of division staff proved inconclusive and did not lead to the traitor. The Soviets were unable even to determine how the supposed agent communicated with the CIA. Finally the KGB resorted to installing hidden closed-circuit television monitors to watch the Global Affairs Division officers. These cameras eventually photographed Ogorodnik copying documents one Saturday night and the diplomat was then arrested.

At his arrest Ogorodnik immediately admitted his activities to benefit the CIA and promised to cooperate with a full written confession. He asked to use a favorite pen, and the KGB acceded to Ogorodnik's wish. Although they undoubtedly examined the pen before handing it to the prisoner, poison capsules were concealed so cleverly inside the instrument that they were not found.

All accounts of the Ogorodnik case agree that the agent did in fact commit suicide. Accounts also imply this occurred before his interrogation could be completed. Ogorodnik's resort to suicide lends credence to the view that he was a volunteer spy

rather than an agent operating under duress. Either way, the Ogorodnik affair constitutes a major defeat for the KGB and Soviets in the espionage competition.

Ronald W. Pelton (b. 1941)

The intelligence Ronald Pelton gave the Soviets came from his memory, not from documents, but nevertheless represents a major loss for the United States. His information concerned his past years of service but it had value for the Soviets in the present and into the future.

Ronald W. Pelton was born in Benton Harbor, Michigan, on 18 November 1941. Pelton attended Benton Harbor High School and graduated with a B+ average. Rather than going on to college, Pelton began an association with cryptology that lasted throughout his professional career—he enlisted in the U.S. Air Force and became a cryptologic technician. Pelton served in the Air Force for four years beginning in 1960. During that time he was assigned to the Air Force electronic intelligence base at Peshawar, Pakistan, and to the Air Force electronic warfare center in Texas. He also was sent to learn Russian at the Air Force Language School operated by Indiana University at Bloomington, where he found time to earn two years' worth of college credits.

Pelton received an honorable discharge from the Air Force in 1964 and returned to Benton Harbor where he worked for a time as a television repairman. Soon tiring of the quiet life, however, he applied for a job with the National Security Agency (NSA) and was accepted. With his wife Judith Ann, Pelton moved to Maryland, to NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, and received agency training. From 1966 to 1972, the NSA sent Pelton to work at one of its facilities in the United Kingdom. Thereafter he returned to Fort Meade as a signals analyst.

In 1973 the NSA promoted Pelton to a staff orga-

nization job at Fort Meade, where he had access to a wide range of material. He worked on at least one interagency task force and, from 1976 to 1978, assembled a "Signals Parameter File," an encyclopedic survey of about 60 different Soviet communications links and the methods that might be used to monitor each of them.

Pelton was forced to declare bankruptcy in April 1979, after vandals stole much of the equipment on the site of the house he had begun building in Howard County, Maryland. This left Pelton over \$60,000 in debt and with no remaining credit. Knowing that agency discovery of a bankruptcy was a frequent reason for termination of an employee, in July 1979 Pelton resigned his \$24,500 a year job at the National Security Agency.

Espionage came soon afterwards. Pelton tried various schemes to make money, including trying to sell fuel cells to improve the fuel economy of cars, selling boats, and brokering loans. His efforts met with indifferent success. On 14 January 1980, after considering the prospect for only a couple of weeks, Pelton put in a call to the Soviet embassy in Washington offering information they might be interested in. The call was taken by KGB officer Vitaly Yurchenko and recorded by the FBI. (Information supplied by Yurchenko during his temporary defection in 1985 was instrumental in identifying the former NSA officer.)

In the meantime the KGB was quite interested in Pelton and arranged for him to travel to Vienna in October 1980 for more extended talks. Walking in Vienna's Schonbrunn Park, Pelton was met by KGB officer Anatoly Shalnov and driven to the Soviet embassy compound, where he was housed for three or four days in the ambassador's apartment while the KGB debriefed him for eight hours a day. This followed a three-hour meeting Pelton had already had with the KGB in Washington on 15 January.

In the first meeting Pelton disclosed material regarding the size and technical problems of a sophisticated device the U.S. was using to read a particular Soviet communications link. In Vienna he gave more information from the Signals

Parameter File on which he had worked. The KGB rewarded him with \$20,000 plus travel expenses.

Pelton made a second trip to Vienna handled in an identical fashion in January 1983. Information he divulged included knowledge that a particular Soviet communications channel that carried orders from the top to the next lower level of the high command was being intercepted, mention of two other special collection projects, and details of an NSA equipment modernization program including the last five-year budget projection of which he had been aware. On this trip the Russians paid Pelton's expenses plus \$15,500.

Each of these trips began with a visit to Pizza Castle in Falls Church, Virginia, where Pelton received instructions over a public telephone as to where he might recover packages with travel money. He followed the procedure once again in April 1985 and made the trip to Vienna, but in the interim Pelton had lost almost 75 pounds and his KGB handlers evidently did not recognize him. The aborted trip was rescheduled for October, but on this occasion the car driven by Pelton's girlfriend (he had separated from his wife that year) ran out of gas before making it to Pizza Castle.

It was during this same summer that the FBI received the information from Yurchenko that enabled U.S. authorities to identify the voice on its 1980 tape recordings. FBI agents interviewed Pelton at a hotel in Annapolis, Maryland on 23 November and arrested him two days later.

Pelton went to trial in late May 1986 and pled innocent, but he was nevertheless convicted on five out of six counts of espionage and disclosure of classified information on 5 June. Pelton subsequently cooperated in providing the NSA and FBI with a 210-hour debriefing covering his contacts with the Soviets, but on 16 December 1986 Pelton was sentenced to three concurrent life terms plus 10 years in prison in addition to a \$100 fine. Pelton's debriefing may have taught the U.S. something of Soviet tradecraft, but the case was a net intelligence loss for the United States.

Harold A. R. Philby (b. 1912)

The Cambridge ring of Soviet spies has become notorious in British espionage history and was responsible for major information leaks from both Great Britain and the United States. One of its four members was Harold Adrian Russell Philby, familiarly known as Kim. Philby provided the Soviets with information on British and American intelligence operations and agents.

Philby was born on New Year's day in 1912 at Ambala in the Punjab, in what was then British India. He was the son of the well-known explorer and arabist Harry St. John Philby, who did much to open British relations with what eventually became the unified kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Kim Philby's sobriquet undoubtedly was drawn from the juxtaposition of his birth in India and the famous Kipling poem of that name. His boyhood was spent with his mother and three sisters as Harry St. John wandered in and out of their lives.

Kim followed his father's footsteps to Westminster public school and then to Trinity College, Cambridge. At age 16 he visited Spain for his initial exposure to the country that would figure prominently in his later life. Philby arrived at Cambridge in 1929 and saw the beginning of the Great Depression and the rise of Hitler from this vantage point. In 1933, after Cambridge, Philby went to live in Vienna for a year, where Austrian socialists and fascists engaged in virtually open warfare. Several authors believe that Philby received his assignment to penetrate the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in Vienna at that time.

In Vienna Philby nevertheless did something that might have precluded his ever getting into SIS. Kim had an affair with Alice ("Litzi") Friedman, nee Kohlman, the daughter of his landlord and a Jewish socialist activist involved in the thick of Vienna's turbulent political conflict. By 1934 the fascists were in the ascendent and Litzi was in trouble. Philby got her out of Austria by marrying

her. Soon after Philby's return to England their relationship collapsed and they separated. Litzki ended up as a propagandist in East Germany after World War II, but SIS officials were willing to make exceptions for Kim Philby and assisted him in getting a divorce so that he could marry Aileen Philby, with whom he had four children, all sons.

In any case, after returning to England, Philby did all he could to bury the image of himself as a leftist activist. For a time he even edited the proto-fascist publication of the Anglo-German Fellowship. Philby continued in journalism, getting a position with the prestigious *Review of Reviews*. By his own account Philby was already having weekly meetings with his Soviet controller during this period. Philby saw an opportunity during the Spanish Civil War to further improve his credentials while the Soviets saw the chance of getting a front-line intelligence agent.

Kim Philby went to Spain in February 1937. There he worked as a freelance writer, contributing pieces to the *London Times*. On the side he sent intelligence on the Spanish Nationalists to the Soviets, who were supporting the Republicans. Philby was actually wounded at one point and personally given a medal by Nationalist leader Francisco Franco. Meanwhile *The Times* offered Philby a regular job as correspondent on 24 May 1937. Kim continued to cover the Spanish Civil War until almost the end, in July 1939, when the war clouds were gathering over Europe and *The Times* recalled him.

World War II began in September. The British swiftly dispatched an expeditionary force to France while *The Times* sent Kim Philby along as their correspondent. He continued to report from France through the "Phony War" and the German drive to Dunkirk. The British evacuated and the commander of their force asked Philby to write an official account of the campaign.

Shortly afterward, *The Times* was asked by SIS to release Philby for war work and he was hired by the intelligence service. Philby himself says he was introduced in the right places by Guy Burgess, at that time also an SIS staff member. In August 1940 Philby became an officer in Section

D of SIS, responsible for sabotage and subversion, among other things. For training he was sent to the Special Operations Executive (SOE) school at Beaulieu, Hampshire.

In the summer of 1941 Philby was transferred to the SIS counterespionage unit, Section V, then located in a pair of country houses near St. Alban's. Philby was made chief of the Iberian subsection, with a central role in many of the machinations between the espionage services of the two sides that occurred in Spain and Portugal. A good deal of Philby's work was unmasking German agents attempting to move through Spain and training Americans sent to learn the trade among the English. The Americans included James J. Angleton, later to become the CIA's counterintelligence guru.

Toward the end of the war, SIS's thoughts turned to the postwar period and a new focus, the Soviet Union. The British spy chiefs decided to form a new Soviet department, Section IX. Philby, who had recently failed in a bureaucratic maneuver to unseat his own boss, was felt to be a good candidate to head Section IX when it went into action in October 1944. A few of Philby's associates were less sanguine about his assignment. One of them was Malcolm Muggeridge who had witnessed a couple of Philby outbursts that seemed vaguely pro-Soviet as well as one incident in liberated Paris that showed Philby engaging in histrionics. On that occasion the two went out for a night of drinking after which Philby insisted on driving up to the new Soviet embassy on the Rue de Grenelles. In the darkness, outside the building, Philby shook his fist at it and exclaimed, "how are we going to penetrate them?"

An incident that occurred in August 1945 almost unmasked Philby as a Soviet spy. In March the Soviets had sent a new station chief to Turkey. This man, Konstantin Volkov, suddenly turned up at the British embassy offering to defect and bring priceless intelligence, in exchange for L27,500 and free passage to Cyprus. Volkov stated he had knowledge of two Soviet spies in place in the Foreign Office and another one at SIS. He insisted the British make their decision within three weeks

and that no cables or telephone calls be made with regard to this matter.

The British diplomat who fielded Volkov's proposition in Ankara stayed up most of the night composing a paper in longhand which was sent to London by diplomatic pouch. He thought it strange that London made no reply. As the Soviet counterespionage chief, of course, it was Philby who handled the Volkov affair for SIS. Kim evidently informed the Russians, then waited as long as he could before doing anything on Volkov for SIS. If he did nothing, however, it would clearly have been suspicious, so in the end Philby traveled to Turkey to meet Volkov. In the interim a Soviet military plane landed at Ankara just long enough to pick up an individual on a stretcher swathed in bandages, most likely Volkov. When Philby arrived, no prospective Soviet defector appeared to meet with him. Kim was safe, especially when it turned out that Volkov had been the subject of some indiscreet telephone talk in London.

For his role in World War II, the Crown awarded Kim Philby the Order of the British Empire.

The Soviet spy continued in charge of SIS's Soviet section for two more years. From 1947 until 1949 he was sent to Turkey as SIS station chief at Istanbul. By this time there were those in SIS who spoke of Philby as a possible future director general of the service. In September 1949, Philby was selected as SIS liaison officer with the U.S. intelligence services in Washington, where he replaced Peter Dwyer.

At least one American with whom he dealt, Thomas Lamphere of the FBI, found Philby boring when they met that October and was relieved to learn Kim expected to focus on the CIA relationship and was to meet with Lamphere only about once a month. Philby's contacts with James Angleton, his interlocutor at CIA, were restricted mostly to languid liquid lunches. Other formal contacts furnished Philby with a wealth of information for his Soviet handlers, including details of CIA and SIS plans to foment anti-Soviet movements in Albania and the Soviet Union itself, operations in Germany and Berlin, and details of

the counterintelligence efforts against the atomic bomb spies including Donald Maclean.

Guy Burgess roomed with Philby at his home in Washington. When Burgess fled with Maclean in May 1951, it left Philby exposed, under suspicion as the most obvious candidate for having given them warning. At least the Americans thought so; CIA orders were to have nothing further to do with Philby. By the summer of 1951, FBI training classes were told Philby was a major Soviet spy.

SIS recalled Philby, his usefulness in Washington at an end. But the service itself could not make up its mind about Philby. He was interrogated and denied everything. Even so he was asked to resign, but after denying all once again in another investigation during 1955, SIS brought Philby on again as an agent source in Beirut with cover as a journalist for *The Times* and *The Economist*. Philby had been drinking in increasing quantities since the height of World War II, and in Beirut truly let himself go, losing Aileen and a third wife as well.

In 1963 the Philby case was reinvestigated by SIS and Philby questioned informally in Beirut, where he agreed to undergo a more detailed debriefing. Before that could begin, Philby disappeared and surfaced in Moscow, where he had an affair with Melinda Maclean, again married (a Russian woman), and became a colonel in KGB counterintelligence. Writing under KGB supervision, in 1968 Philby published an autobiographical account of his own career heaping scorn on the West, SIS, and the CIA. At this writing he is the only known member of the Cambridge ring still living.

Geoffrey A. Prime (b. 1938)

A spy case that rocked Britain in 1982 was that of Geoffrey Arthur Prime. A former member of the Royal Air Force and later in the United Kingdom's equivalent to the National Security Agency, which is called Government Communications

Headquarters (GCHQ), Prime engaged in espionage of great value to the Soviet Union.

Geoffrey Arthur Prime was born at Stoke-on-Trent on 21 February 1938, shortly before World War II. He was the youngest of three sons of a gardener and nursery operator. Prime attended a Roman Catholic village school and, in 1952, a small technical school in Staffordshire. His main interests were soccer and reading.

In 1956 Prime joined the Royal Air Force (RAF) as an enlisted man and communications technician. He served a tour in Africa, returned to Britain in the early 1960s, and was seconded to a service Russian language school at Cambridge. Prime completed the course in May 1964 and was then assigned to RAF Gatow, an airbase in Berlin that acquired prominence during the 1948 Berlin Airlift. At Gatow, Prime worked on interception of Soviet and East German communications, learning German in the process and earning promotions to corporal and sergeant.

At some point in this period, Geoffrey Prime transferred his allegiance from the United Kingdom to the Eastern bloc. Returning from leave in January 1968, he slipped a note to a Soviet officer who was manning one of the check points at the entrances to West Berlin. In this note he offered his services to the Russians. Prime was instructed to make a contact at a certain time and place. There he met with two KGB case officers who identified themselves as Igor and Valya. He was trained to use miniature cameras, one-time code pads, and KGB communications equipment. Prime evidently began to pass information to the Russians in December 1968.

The beginning of Prime's espionage coincided with his leaving the RAF and applying for a position with GCHQ. He passed a security investigation and was accepted into GCHQ's Joint Technical Language Service, which did translations of intercepts and was then located in London. Prime began work at the service on 30 September 1968. A swift and very efficient translator, Prime was considered valuable by the service. He was kept on in 1976 when the unit moved to GCHQ's main complex at Cheltenham.


In March 1976, Prime was transferred to J Division of GCHQ, responsible for Eastern bloc message and traffic analysis. Within that division he was promoted to section head on 1 November 1976 and later made a personnel supervisor. Previously married and divorced, Prime remarried a woman with three young sons during this period.

Prime continued his contacts with the Soviets throughout, reportedly being assigned the KGB codename Rowlands. He made a pickup of equipment and money from a dead drop in 1971; a Soviet couple posing as friends left a package for him with a relative in 1974. In May 1976 Prime traveled to Vienna to meet with KGB agents there. The Soviets told him that if he wished to defect at any time he would be given a pension and made a colonel in the KGB.

In 1977 Prime became concerned over the security of his activities following the arrest in the United States of Christopher Boyce and Andrew Lee, who had provided the Soviets with information concerning a certain signals intelligence satellite. Prime had also been briefed regarding this program and feared that investigations of others with knowledge of it might uncover his own espionage activities. In September 1978, Prime resigned his job at GCHQ.

Prime had continued accumulating information until the last moment and still had 15 rolls of miniature camera film for the Russians. In mid-May 1980 he returned to Vienna and gave the film to the KGB during a two or three day sojourn aboard a Soviet cruise ship on the Danube River. In October 1981, at Soviet request, he made a visit to Potsdam, outside Berlin, where he was again debriefed by the Soviets. Throughout his espionage career, the KGB paid Prime over L4,000 for his information.

Geoffrey Prime is thought to have supplied the Russians with a variety of intelligence. This included details on which of their codes had been broken and which were secure, and which GCHQ people had access to their signals. During his RAF service he had provided details on NATO force structure including equipment ready or awaiting repair, which divisions carried tactical nuclear



weapons or were prepared for gas attack, and which were up to strength or understrength. There are claims that Prime furnished intelligence on Western agents and gave false information to GCHQ on Soviet codes, but these claims seem farfetched.

After leaving GCHQ, Prime became a taxi driver in Cheltenham for Cheltax and later A2B Private Hire Ltd., where he reportedly earned better money than with the code-breaking service. In late 1980 he became a salesman for the German wine company Pieroth Ltd., dealing with restaurants and hotels around Bristol.

Prime's espionage activity might have remained a secret but for the fact that he became a child molester. He searched newspapers for names and addresses of young girls, called them on the telephone on a variety of pretenses, all the while keeping meticulous records that ultimately encompassed 2,287 file cards. In at least three instances, Prime actually perpetrated acts of molestation on some of these girls in their own homes. Working to solve these crimes, Scotland Yard questioned Prime and noted his resemblance to a composite picture of the alleged perpetrator. Prime was pulled in again on suspicion in June 1982 and admitted to the three offenses but was initially silent about espionage. Then, on 26 June 1982, he confessed to the latter as well. Geoffrey Prime went to trial in late October at the Old Bailey before the Lord Chief Justice. On 11 November he was sentenced to three years for his sex offenses and 35 for his espionage.

Maria del Carmen y Ruiz (b. 1936)

A naturalized American citizen, Carmen Ruiz had been approached clandestinely by the CIA in the mid-1960s to spy for the U.S. in Cuba. She was given some espionage training, then let loose to use her contacts, which were considerable: Carmen was then married to Alfredo Ruiz, a senior official of the *Direccion General de Inteligencia*

(DGI), the Cuban intelligence service. She was friends with many officials and had access to virtually every section of the Cuban government. It was not difficult for her to get information.

As time went on the Cubans realized there was a leak and began to investigate. Carmen Ruiz was initially shielded by her relationship to DGI but was a natural object of suspicion due to her past. The moment of truth came in November 1967 when Carmen went to a Havana park to dig up some papers she had buried there awaiting transmission to the Central Intelligence Agency. Apparently unaware that she was under surveillance, she was surprised as the park suddenly became a beehive of Cuban security agents.

Carmen Ruiz was immediately questioned, there was some further investigation, and in January 1969 she was arrested and put on trial. In a two-hour court room session, Ruiz admitted to espionage activity and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Divorced by her DGI husband, in prison Carmen met a Polish national, Haskell Mackowski, also being held for political crimes. They later married. Both continued their sentences and by the mid-1970s were being given periodic furloughs from prison.

In April 1977, when a U.S. delegation was in Havana to negotiate agreements on boundaries, fisheries, and diplomatic representation, State Department representatives met with Carmen at Combinado del Este prison. She was moved by this token of continuing U.S. government interest, but asked State to raise with the CIA the matter of compensation for her years of incarceration. That October, as relations between Cuba and the United States temporarily warmed, Carmen and Haskell Mackowski were released from prison and left for the United States.

Over the next three years Carmen had to be hospitalized five times for a variety of illnesses she believed related to her prison health conditions. While she thought the CIA should have picked up the bills, the agency refused to do so or to recognize pension rights she believed she had been promised when hired. In 1980 Carmen Mackowski retained a lawyer and sued the Central Intelli-

gence Agency for more than \$1 million, charging that her espionage training by the agency had been inadequate and that the CIA was reneging on promises made when she had been recruited. To keep this case out of the courts and out of the newspapers, and to avoid the effect it might have upon future agent recruits, the Central Intelligence Agency quietly settled out of court.

Nicolas G. Shadrin (1928-1975?)

Shadrin was born Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov in Leningrad on 19 May 1928. His case remains one of the enduring mysteries of the espionage conflict. Artamonov began as a patriotic Soviet citizen, a member of the Pioneers and a student at a naval secondary school. When the Germans invaded Russia in 1941, rushing up to the gates of Leningrad, Artamonov was among the many Soviet citizens who joined in defending their city.

At the end of the war, Artamonov enrolled in the Frunze Naval Academy, from which he graduated in 1949. He was assigned to a destroyer of the Soviets' Baltic Red Banner Fleet as chief of the ship's combat unit of guns and torpedoes. In 1952 he was promoted to executive officer of another destroyer. Two years later Artamonov was sent to study nuclear physics and weaponry, which courses he passed with honors. Promoted to commander in 1954, in September 1955 Artamonov received command of his own destroyer. His ship became one of the most efficient craft in the Baltic Fleet and was later assigned to the Polish naval base at Gdynia as a training and demonstration vessel to help the Poles organize their own navy.

In Poland, Artamonov enjoyed great privileges as a senior member of the Soviet military assistance mission. In Poland too, Artamonov met the woman he would marry, then a student in dental school. Here Artamonov made the decision to defect to the United States. There are two versions of this event. One was that Artamonov and his wife-to-be decided to leave once she had completed


her studies. The second version was that Artamonov was recruited as a CIA agent by certain Indonesian naval officers who were in Poland for naval training from the Soviets. In any case, in 1959 Artamonov and Ewa, his fiancée, fled across the Baltic to Sweden in a 22-foot boat. There they stayed for six weeks before proceeding to America. The defection was very embarrassing to the Soviet Union, which had held Artamonov in high regard as a naval officer and had published articles about him and his ship in several periodicals.

In the United States the former naval officer changed his name to Nicolas George Shadrin and his wife became Blanka Shadrin. He was extensively debriefed on the Soviet navy and became a consultant to the CIA and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Shadrin resumed academic studies and earned a masters degree in engineering and a PhD in international relations. After the Defense Intelligence Agency was formed in 1961, it also made use of Shadrin's services. He later visited the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, to present lectures.

The Soviets evidently did not lose interest in Shadrin. In Washington in the mid-1960s he encountered a former colleague and roommate, reputedly known as the best pistol shot in the Baltic Fleet, who had been seconded to the KGB. Shadrin now refused to have much to do with the man.

In 1966 the mystery began. That May a Russian who received the codename Igor telephoned the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, at home one Saturday with an offer to spy for the United States. Igor identified himself as a KGB officer and said he wished to work as an agent in place. He provided a cache of initial information to establish his bona fides, though disturbingly that material evidently included a suggestion that KGB officer Yuri Nosenko was a genuine defector. In any case the Americans decided to work with the Russian and Igor asked the CIA to help him advance within the KGB by recruiting an American. Igor specified Nick Shadrin, by then a naturalized American citizen.

Helms' deputy, Vice-Admiral Rufus Taylor, had known Shadrin since his time as Director of Naval



Intelligence and approached Nick to take on the assignment of becoming a double agent supposedly working for Igor. Shadrin accepted the role and began to work in the twilight between the intelligence services of East and West.

At the Defense Intelligence Agency, working under the supervision of FBI counterintelligence and the CIA, Shadrin prepared a combination of real but non-critical information (called "chicken-feed" in the jargon) and misleading intelligence to be given to the Soviets. He then passed this on to the Soviets through Igor and later KGB officer Oleg Kozlov, who served under diplomatic cover in Washington from 20 May 1968 until 15 December 1972. The Russians professed satisfaction with the material they received from Shadrin.

After a time the Russians began to pressure Shadrin to meet with them outside the United States. The American double agent held them off for a long time but ultimately felt he had to acquiesce in order to maintain credibility. The first such foreign meeting occurred in Montreal during 1971. This was followed by a second foreign meeting at Vienna in 1972, where Shadrin spent a whole night with KGB officers, evidently to be instructed in the use of certain sophisticated espionage equipment. Following that meeting this equipment was moved by the Soviets through diplomatic pouch to Washington where it was given to Shadrin.

The double agent operation proceeded on track for three more years as the Soviets still seemed happy with Shadrin. Then they began to agitate for another meeting at Vienna, to which Shadrin agreed in the spring of 1975. Shadrin planned the trip to Vienna and went with Blanka. They registered at Vienna's Hotel Bristol on 18 May. The meeting with the KGB was scheduled for the evening of the 20th. Of course the CIA had agents of its own in place to support Shadrin, but it could not move in on the KGB's meeting without blowing the Shadrin operation.

Nicolas Shadrin made his rendezvous with the KGB officers on 20 May 1975. He never returned.

The United States was thrown into disarray by

the Shadrin affair. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger discussed the case with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and foreign minister Andrei Gromyko. President Gerald Ford was briefed on the matter and made a personal appeal to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. The Russians professed to know nothing of the whereabouts of Shadrin. The Carter administration also made some efforts to achieve Shadrin's release or at least gain information about him, with no discernable success.

The agent's disappearance was reported in the American press in 1977 and, in an unusual move for the Soviets, who almost never comment on their agent operations, answered with an article in the Russian weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. The Russian story was that Shadrin had been about to redefect to the Soviet Union and the CIA had acted to prevent the embarrassment that would have entailed.

Through all of this Blanka Shadrin has continued a campaign attempting to uncover the truth about what happened to her husband. She believes that Shadrin is alive in the Soviet Union and that the United States was not strong enough in its demands for his release. Further articles in the Soviet press in the early 1980s maintained that Shadrin had died in Vienna at the time of the last meeting. The mystery of what happened to Nick Shadrin has never been solved.

Arkady N. Shevchenko (b. 1930)

Like many Russian defectors and agents, Arkady Shevchenko slowly became disillusioned with the Soviet system until he finally determined to make a break with it. Shevchenko actually had less reason than most, since he was for many years a senior and highly valued Soviet diplomat. Born in the Ukraine on 11 October 1930, Shevchenko studied at Moscow's prestigious Institute of International Relations, where many Soviet diplomats and intel-

ligence officers received their academic training. Shevchenko received a doctorate from that institute in 1954.

Two years later Shevchenko joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, having rejected a recruitment offer from the KGB to pursue his postgraduate studies of disarmament. Due to his training and the articles he had written, Shevchenko started as an attache, one rank above the norm, when he joined the ministry in October 1956. He assisted in formulating Soviet disarmament positions, got a temporary assignment to the Soviet UN delegation, and joined the Communist Party in 1958. Shevchenko was a junior diplomat on Khrushchev's party during that Soviet leader's U.S. sojourn (for the UN General Assembly meeting) in 1960. He spent most of 1962 at disarmament negotiations in Geneva. He was then assigned to the Soviet UN delegation from 1963 to 1970, thereafter returning to Moscow as a special assistant to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. From 1970 to 1973 he retained this post close to Gromyko. He was seconded to the United Nations Secretariat where he served as Under-Secretary General under Kurt Waldheim, supervising an international staff of 90 members.

As Shevchenko recounts it, his discomfort at the hypocrisies of Soviet society grew throughout this period, sharpened by what he observed of the West, especially the United States. He decided to defect in the fall of 1975 and cautiously approached a U.S. diplomat during a UN reception to ask how a request for political asylum might be received. A few days later he met with CIA officers who countered with a proposition that Shevchenko should remain in place as an agent for the United States. Rejecting the idea at first, Shevchenko changed his mind soon after and began to supply information.

For almost three years this senior Soviet official worked as a double agent supplying the CIA with a variety of information including very valuable material on Soviet bargaining positions in the strategic arms limitation talks. During this time Shevchenko observed repeated KGB efforts to tighten security as a result of their uncovering a

series of American agents. Toward the end of this period, a series of subtle indicators led him to conclude that KGB suspicion was beginning to fall on him as well. On a trip home, Shevchenko, who bore the CIA codename Andy, suddenly found he was not on the access list for foreign ministry cable traffic. Later he sensed he was under surveillance during a trip south to visit his mother in the Crimea. Back in New York he sensed hostility among the KGB security men.

In the spring of 1978 things came to a head. Shevchenko received a summons home, ostensibly for consultations at the Ministry. Quietly checking with friends in the Soviet delegation, Andy learned that the committee he was supposedly being called to assist was thought to have already made its decisions. At that point he made up his mind that the time had come for extraction; he would have to defect right away. He alerted his CIA case officers who prepared the escape. On a routine Thursday night that April, Shevchenko returned home to his East 63rd Street apartment, waited for his wife to fall asleep, stole out of the apartment, going through the back door into the adjoining building on 64th street, then out of that building to a waiting CIA getaway car.

Shevchenko was taken to a safe house outside New York then extensively debriefed by the CIA. His career as a spy had ended without Soviet security apprehending him.

Adolf G. Tolkachev (??-1985?)

One of the most valuable Central Intelligence Agency sources of recent years was A. G. Tolkachev, an engineer and electronics expert for one of the Soviet military research institutes. The Soviets, of course, do not discuss the case. Since the outcome proved embarrassing for the CIA, that agency has remained similarly close-mouthed. As a consequence, almost nothing is known of Tolka-

chev's antecedents, background, education, or how he was recruited by the CIA.

What is known is Tolkachev's value and something of how the Soviets stumbled onto this spy. Tolkachev has been described as a research institute whiz on advanced aircraft technology, including aerodynamic design, sophisticated avionics, electronic countermeasures, radar, and stealth technologies. As such Tolkachev was in an ideal position to supply the United States with priceless information on Soviet aircraft and cruise missile development, fully the equal of some of the sources the Soviets have managed to tap in the United States' aircraft industry. There have also been claims that Tolkachev supplied information that helped the U.S. identify the large modern space- or missile-tracking radar the Soviets currently have under construction at Krasnoyarsk in Central Asia. American press accounts have speculated that Tolkachev's intelligence literally saved the United States billions of dollars in research and development and military production costs that might otherwise have been deemed necessary.

Tolkachev was active as a CIA agent for at least three, and probably four or more years. This is evident because in late 1981 the CIA hired and began training an officer, Edward L. Howard, for work in Moscow servicing the dead drops used by Tolkachev. Although the Howard case is profiled separately on page 40, here it should be noted that the erstwhile CIA officer passed on his knowledge of Moscow operations methods to the KGB in 1984. The interval that passed between the Howard contact with the KGB and the Soviets' arrest of Tolkachev and expulsion of his case officer suggests that these men were betrayed by KGB observation of the drop locations rather than direct knowledge of their identities.

Tolkachev's case officer was Paul M. Stombaugh, who was detained in June 1985. On 14 June the Soviet news service TASS released a statement declaring that Stombaugh, a second secretary at the U.S. embassy, had been caught in espionage and was being expelled. It is likely that Tolkachev was arrested at about the same time, though this action was not announced until that September.

According to the Soviet press, Tolkachev was caught with specially designed miniature cameras, code and cypher materials, two-way burst transmission radio equipment, and other espionage paraphernalia. It has been reported that Tolkachev was executed by the Soviet Union. His death was a blow to the CIA but his work was a great loss to the Soviet Union.

Walker Family Ring

John Anthony Walker Jr. led a ring of agents, mostly in his family, that was responsible for what are perhaps the most serious leaks of information in U.S. intelligence history. Walker recruited friends and relatives to help him with a massive penetration into the United States Navy, including both operational information and cryptography material of assistance to the Soviets, from the late 1960s until the ring was broken during 1985.

Son of a publicist for Warner Brothers, the entertainment company, John Walker was born on 28 July 1937 in Washington, D.C. He became a high school drop-out and was picked up during his youth for several burglaries in Pennsylvania. Given the choice of jail or the armed services, Walker enlisted in the Navy in 1955. It was a good alternative to a prison term for stealing two tires, four quarts of oil, six cans of cleaner, and three dollars in cash. He enlisted on the anniversary of the battle of Leyte Gulf, auspicious for a young Navy man but perhaps not for a Soviet spy.

Walker did well in the Navy. He became a communications specialist and joined the submarine service. In 1962 he was assigned to the newly commissioned Polaris submarine *Andrew Jackson* (SSBN-619). The following year he became a petty officer specialized in communications. In the summer of 1965, Chief Walker was transferred to another newly commissioned Polaris boat, the *Simon Bolivar* (SSBN-641). He received his Top Secret security clearance that October despite Navy knowledge since 1964 of his criminal record.

Walker became a member of the John Birch Society and distributed literature for that organization, but his skippers had no problems with him.

In January 1966, Walker was promoted to senior chief petty officer, and in March 1967 to warrant officer. That April he was reassigned as a communications watch officer at the headquarters of Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia. There Walker handled cryptographic material, in particular messages for operating vessels of the fleet.

How and when the original Soviet recruitment was made is a subject of dispute. Ring members say Walker made the initial contact, parking outside the Soviet embassy in Washington and then approaching a Russian official. The embassy is so closely watched, however, that this version seems farfetched. As for when he started his spying career, Walker admitted to authorities under examination that during his tour aboard the *Simon Bolivar* he had used a KGB rotor decryption device, capable of tracing the internal circuitry of encryption machines like the KL-47 used in naval vessels at that time. Walker made at least 10 trips, and probably more, to Vienna or Mexico City to meet with his Soviet handlers.


In the late 1960s, Walker was transferred to San Diego for eighteen months as an assistant director of the Navy Communications School, then did two and a half years aboard the combat stores ship *Niagara Falls*. After that he returned to Norfolk as a communications systems officer on the staff of Commander, Amphibious Force Atlantic. He separated from and later divorced his wife, Barbara Joy Crowley, with whom he had had four children, and retired from the Navy in 1976 after 21 years in the service. Walker continued to live in Norfolk, where he formed several detective or electronic security agencies operating for private citizens.

Somewhere along the way, John Walker recruited his older brother Arthur, who had gone a little further in the Navy, at least in rank. Arthur Walker was born in 1934 in Scranton, Pennsylvania, attended the same high school, St. Patrick's, and had two years at the University of Scranton before enlisting in 1953. By 1960 Arthur had become a sonarman

first class and was selected for Officer Candidate School and promoted to ensign. He served in diesel submarines including *Tbrsk*, today a tourist attraction, *Madrigal*, and *Carp*. He was aboard *Madrigal* while it completed a sea test evaluation of a guidance system for the Regulus nuclear cruise missile. From 1960 until 1963 Arthur was assigned to *Cor-sair*, a fleet survey ship. Then he moved to the submarine *Callao* which participated in evaluation of new sonar and torpedo technology. He trained reservists aboard the survey ship *Manta* from 1964 to 1966. For the next two years, Arthur Walker served as engineer officer, then executive officer of the submarine *Grenadier* (SS-525) doing unspecified classified work. He was promoted to lieutenant commander and then assigned to the Atlantic Fleet Tactical School as an instructor in anti-submarine warfare techniques until he retired in 1973.

During his retirement Arthur worked on automobile radio repair at a shop he opened with financing from his brother John. He had three children with his wife, the former Rita Clare Fritsch and a Navy pension of about \$21,000 a year. He was listed as an officer of the corporation controlling the detective businesses formed by John Walker and did occasional work for them. The radio repair business folded in 1980, after which Arthur Walker found work at the VSE Corporation, in Chesapeake, Virginia, as an engineer. VSE does contract work for the Navy and has access to Navy documents. Arthur has admitted supplying John Walker with several classified Navy documents between September 1980 and April 1982. In addition to his VSE salary of \$25,000 a year, John paid Arthur some \$12,000 for his information in 1982 alone. Some authorities believe Arthur's involvement in the spy ring was considerably broader than this.

In August 1970, while John Walker helped direct the communications school in San Diego, radio-man first class Jerry Alfred Whitworth was assigned to the school as an instructor. Whitworth became a close friend of Walker's, was also recruited into the spy ring, and was allegedly paid some \$325,000 over the years for his information. Jerry Whitworth was born on 10 August 1939 in Muldrow, Oklahoma, a small town near the Arkansas border. He entered the naval reserve in



September 1956 and went on active duty in September 1962 at the naval air station in Alameda, California. He converted to a communications specialty, worked for a year with a tactical command squadron, then a communications relay ship, then sailed with the carrier *Ranger* (CVA-61) on her fifth combat deployment to Vietnam. It was after this tour that Whitworth was assigned as an instructor and met John Walker.

In February 1973, Whitworth was assigned to the naval communications station at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, an assignment for which he received a Navy commendation. He then received further training as a satellite communications specialist, returning to Diego Garcia from March 1974 to March 1975. It was in this period that Whitworth received his first payment, \$4,000, from John Walker. Another \$18,000 followed in 1976, and \$34,000 in 1977.

Whitworth was a senior communications man aboard the carrier *Constellation* from June 1976 until July 1978 and met with Walker in San Diego and Hong Kong. Next assigned to the support ship *Niagara Falls* (AFS-3) Whitworth had more meetings with Walker in San Diego, Manila, and Norfolk, while Walker met with KGB officers in Manila and Vienna to pass on the Whitworth intelligence. In October 1982, Whitworth was assigned to the carrier *Enterprise* (CVN-65) as a communications watch officer. His last packet of intelligence went to Walker on the first weekend of June 1983. On 31 October 1983 Whitworth retired from the Navy.

Another recruit to the ring was John Walker's son, Michael Lance, born in 1962 at Vallejo, California. Six months after graduation from Norfolk's Ryan Upper High School, Michael enlisted in the Navy. In July 1983 he was assigned as a yeoman to a fighter squadron at Oceana Naval Air Station at Virginia Beach. A month or so later John Walker told Michael he could earn extra money on the side by bringing him documents from his work. Michael Walker began to do so, turning over six documents between November 1983 and January 1984, when Michael was transferred to the carrier *Nimitz* (CVN-68). From *Nimitz* Michael allegedly delivered 10 stacks of documents for which he was

given \$1,000. When the ship departed for a deployment to the Mediterranean, Michael began to accumulate documents for a rendezvous scheduled for Naples in June 1985. These eventually amounted to about 15 pounds of material he had stashed in a sea locker.

John Walker's daughter Laura also entered the military, as a communications specialist with the Army Special Forces. Walker made an attempt to recruit her too, during her service in 1978 and 1979, but Laura refused to be drawn in, although she did not initially report this effort. She finally revealed it in an interview with the Christian Broadcasting Network after the Walker case had been broken.

Another who was aware of Walker's espionage was his former wife Barbara, who had actually sat in the car with John as he drove to some of his drops in the Washington area in the late 1960s. Scratching out a living in Maine after their 1976 divorce, she later moved in with another daughter in Massachusetts. She was encouraged by Laura to report John Walker to the FBI. Barbara eventually did so, telling her story to the FBI's Hyannis field office. She subsequently told both Jerry Whitworth and John Walker of her action, but Whitworth evidently felt he would not be discovered while John apparently dismissed the warning as a tall tale.

For its part the FBI followed up quite seriously on the information and began to tap Walker's telephone and put him under surveillance. In May 1985 he was overheard telling people on the phone he was leaving for a trip to North Carolina, but the FBI instead trailed him to Poolesville, Maryland, a rural area outside Washington where the suburbs have barely encroached. Walker went to a telephone pole previously designated by his KGB handlers and left a brown paper bag filled with 129 classified documents, mostly from *Nimitz*.

The FBI recovered the material and arrested John Walker early in the morning of 20 May. Michael Walker's possessions were searched aboard the *Nimitz*, his documents were found, and he was arrested on 22 May. Seven days later Arthur Walker was arrested as well. Jerry Whitworth was arrested in San Francisco on 3 June. Arthur received a life sentence and, in exchange for his

cooperation, John also got life. Michael Walker was sentenced to 25 years in prison, Jerry Whitworth to 365 years plus a fine of \$410,000. According to temporary Soviet defector Vitaly Yurchenko, the information from the Walker ring, including rotor settings for U.S. encryption devices, enabled the KGB to decrypt more than one million messages they had intercepted, in addition to the documents they received.

The KGB itself was not caught up in the Walker ring's debacle. Their agent in Washington, Aleksei G. Tkachenko, with cover as a vice-consul at the embassy, was spotted in the Poolesville area on the day of the arrest but made no attempt to get near the intelligence dropped by John Walker. On 23 May 1985 Tkachenko and his family left for Moscow aboard a regular airline flight.

Vitaly S. Yurchenko (b. 1936)

Years after the event, the United States is still trying to sort out the story of Soviet intelligence officer Vitaly S. Yurchenko. In one of the most perplexing cases of recent years, Yurchenko defected to the United States on 1 August 1985 then, three months later, escaped from his CIA escorts and redefected to the Soviet Union through their Washington embassy.

Yurchenko's background contained little to make him suspect in the eyes of either side in the espionage war. He was born in a village near Smolensk on 2 May 1936. Attracted to the military and to the sea, he attended military training schools and graduated with a degree in navigation in 1958. Yurchenko was commissioned a junior lieutenant in the Soviet navy and assigned to their Pacific Fleet headquarters at Vladivostok. That year he also married a woman engineer from one of the Moscow planning institutes. They had a daughter born in 1961 and adopted a son in 1969.

As a young man of 23, Yurchenko joined the KGB's Third Chief Directorate, the unit charged with monitoring political loyalty within the Soviet armed forces. He remained in military posts through most of the 1960s. His activities during the early 1970s are unknown, but at some point he was transferred to the KGB section responsible for embassy security. In 1975 Yurchenko turned up in Washington as chief of security for the Soviet embassy, under diplomatic cover with the title first secretary of the political section.

Soon after his arrival, Yurchenko contacted FBI counterintelligence officials to exchange telephone numbers and discuss routine procedures in case anyone under his jurisdiction, which evidently included Soviet residents in Canada, should fall afoul of U.S. authorities. He joked with the FBI about the responsibility he shared with them for monitoring Soviet nationals, giving the impression he enjoyed being with Americans. To keep Yurchenko on guard, the FBI let him know that they knew of the affair the KGB man was having with an American woman he picked up in a bar.

Yurchenko made no waves during his tour and evidently had good relations within the Soviet embassy. In 1978 the KGB changed its station chief in Washington, sending Major General Dmitri I. Yakushkin as the new broom, and Yurchenko got on well with him also. He remained the chief of security until March 1980, when Yurchenko returned to Moscow.

At KGB headquarters, the former naval man then took over as chief of Directorate K, a unit of about 200 that is responsible for foreign counterintelligence. Yurchenko held this job until April 1985, when he was suddenly reassigned as deputy chief of the First Department of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, responsible for espionage in the United States and Canada.

The Yurchenko case developed just four months later in Rome where, on 1 August, Yurchenko approached a Swiss guard at the Vatican, identified himself as a KGB colonel, and asked to be taken to the U.S. embassy. Instead he was handed over to the Italian police who nevertheless passed him along to the Americans as a defector. For most of a month

Yurchenko was secreted at a U.S. Air Force base in Italy and debriefed, then was brought back to the United States to a safe house in northern Virginia.

The Central Intelligence Agency was initially very pleased with its prize catch. Yurchenko was variously said to know just about everything, to be talking so much he was tiring out his debriefers, and to be the best defector yet. The KGB man truly made the rounds in Washington, including dinner with CIA director Bill Casey and senior agency officials, meetings with other intelligence officers, and continuing debriefings. Not above a little braggadocio, Yurchenko claimed he was a "general-designate" in the KGB as well as the fifth man from the top in that agency. He went through the motions of coming in from the cold, trying to learn English and running up a bill for almost \$19,000 at a Fredericksburg, Virginia, furniture store.

But all was not well with Yurchenko. The defector claimed he would never be able to learn English adequately, that he had no one to talk to in Russian, that his security men were unpleasant. Claiming he was finished with his wife and with Russia, Yurchenko nevertheless insisted on being taken to Canada to the wife of another Soviet diplomat with whom Yurchenko evidently had previously had an affair. When she rejected him, he reportedly became despondent. He was also said to be upset by the numerous speculations concerning him that appeared in the American press.

Things came to a head on the night of 2 November 1985. In an effort to build rapport with Yurchenko, he was taken out to dinner by one of his CIA escorts at the popular Georgetown restaurant Au Pied du Cochon. Toward the end of the meal Yurchenko asked what the CIA man would do if he got up and walked out. Would the CIA kill him? Assured that the United States did not treat defectors that way, Yurchenko excused himself and said he would be back in 15 or 20 minutes. Instead he stepped out onto Wisconsin Avenue, hailed a passing cab, and took it to the Soviet residential complex about a mile up the road.

Yurchenko told the Soviets he wanted to go back to Russia. The Soviets in turn produced Yurchenko at a full-scale press conference on 4

November. There Yurchenko charged that he had been kidnapped by the CIA in Rome, drugged, and held against his will. He claimed that he had not passed any information during the periods in which he was conscious and not drugged, and that he had been held under guard by six Americans. As to the blandishments of money, Yurchenko claimed the CIA had been trying to get him to sign a contract under which they would pay him to keep silent—\$1 million as a down payment, \$62,500 a year adjusted for inflation, \$48,000 worth of furniture, a package he thought equivalent to \$180,000 a year. Yurchenko claimed his case was a gross violation of human rights and an example of U.S. state-sponsored terrorism.

A few days later, after an exit interview with State Department representatives, Yurchenko was permitted to return to the Soviet Union. In March 1986 press reports appeared which claimed Yurchenko had been executed, but just days afterward he showed up on a Moscow street and allowed himself to be interviewed by a West German television crew, asserting that he was back at his old job in the KGB.

Sorting things out in the aftermath of the Yurchenko affair has been quite impossible because of the large number of unknowns. Was the defection a Soviet provocation? There have been reports that the information he revealed was old stuff, virtually historical as the intelligence community views things. Was Yurchenko a true defector? Many believe he was, including the former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, who reportedly stated he would stake his career on Yurchenko's bona fides. Was the defection staged to find out about CIA espionage interests, discredit U.S. human rights policy, show other Soviet defectors they could return home without fear? There are proponents for every one of those views.

Investigations of the Yurchenko affair were conducted by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, by the CIA, and by the Congressional intelligence committees. They are said to conclude that the CIA mishandled the affair, but as to whether Yurchenko was a genuine defector, probably no one will ever know.

FOR FURTHER READING

After more than a decade in print, the best one-volume study of the Central Intelligence Agency, despite its omissions, remains Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks's *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (NY: Knopf, 1974), which is available as a Dell paperback. Among recent treatments, Jeffrey T. Richelson's *The U.S. Intelligence Community* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1985) is heavily oriented toward describing current organization; John Ranelagh's *The Agency* (NY: Simon & Shuster, 1986) suffers from a peculiar viewpoint and is unreliable in certain critical places; Scott D. Breckinridge's *The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence System* (Boulder: Westview, 1986) is reasonably good but is not widely available. Ernest Volkman's *Warriors of the Night* (NY: Morrow, 1985) is unreliable in many places and should be used with care.

My own books, *Presidents' Secret Wars* (NY: Morrow, 1986) and *The Soviet Estimate* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), focus on CIA para-military operations and analysis of Soviet strategic nuclear forces, respectively.

Most of the available literature on the KGB suffers greatly from the biases of the authors, who are often retired FBI or CIA officers or individuals being fed information to write denunciations of the adversary. This is true of the works on terrorism by Paul Henze and Claire Sterling, for example, who attempt to link the KGB with every extant terrorist group. John Barron's books on the agency itself, *KGB* (NY: Bantam, 1974) and *KGB Today* (NY: Berkley, 1985) contain such a bias but are at least replete with detailed case histories along with material on KGB organization. William R. Corson and Robert T. Crowley's *The New KGB* (NY: Morrow, 1985) is equally virulent but has the virtue of devoting considerable attention

to the espionage activities of Soviet trade organizations. Former CIA officer Harry Rositzke in his *The KGB: The Eyes of Russia* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1981) takes a professional's view of Soviet espionage. Much of this material has been sifted and selected by Jeffrey T. Richelson to compose his *Sword and Shield* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1986) which presents the same information without the ideological overlay.

Most of the espionage case files presented in this source book are so recent that they have yet to figure in this literature. The most notable exceptions are the Cambridge ring, of course, which is surrounded by a vast literature all its own. A good recounting of the case can be found in Andrew Boyle's, *The Fourth Man* (NY: Dial Press, 1979). The Walker ring has also received a modicum of instant attention with John Barron's *Breaking the Ring* (NY: Reader's Digest Press, 1986) and Jack Kneese's *Family Treason* (MNY: Stein & Day, 1986). Both of these books suffer from going to press before completion of the Whitworth trial. Barron's book contains assertions that have no basis in the public record, while Kneese is sloppy in places, including on basic details of naval practice.

The Boyce-Lee case figured in Robert Lindsey's *The Falcon and the Snowman* (NY: Simon & Shuster, 1979). Henry Hurt's *Shadrin: The Spy Who Never Came Back* (NY: Berkley, 1983) profiles that case in great detail. The Johnson case is detailed in John Barron's first book, while a few of the remaining cases are mentioned in passing in Volkman's, Barron's, or Richelson's books. Shevchenko covers his own case in his memoir *Breaking With Moscow* (NY: Knopf, 1985).

TOP SECRET/S.I.TM



Official Game Accessory

Covert Operations Source Book

by John Prados

BEGIN COMMUNICATION

TO: All agents in all bureaus
FROM: Orion Foundation/Coriolis Bureau
RE: CIA and KGB histories and organizations, real-life espionage cases

This TOP SECRET/S.I.TM game Covert Operations Source Book contains a wealth of information for players and Administrators alike.

The two main espionage agencies for the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—the CIA and the KGB, respectively—are discussed in detail. The foundations of these organizations, their histories, their leaders and personnel, and much more are all described in these pages. The various divisions and units within these agencies are laid out with their areas of responsibility and expertise. Here is all the information an Administrator needs to model his TOP SECRET/S.I. game agencies on the most powerful spy organizations in the world!

Following the sections on the agencies are the stories of the real-life men and women who have been on the firing lines in the war between the CIA and the KGB. From the Cambridge spy ring to the Walker family ring, from Bothwell to Yurchenko, and from before the Cold War to the present, the spy cases that have startled and electrified the espionage community are here for Administrators and players alike.

The case histories of these men and women tell as much of their stories as has been revealed to date. The motivations of these spies, from the petty to the grandiose, are examined here. These reports tell of courage and patriotism as well as weakness and betrayal. As the cases show, human error—missed clues, shoddy security, lost opportunities, foolish recklessness—plays a large part in espionage.

The methods these spies used to accomplish their missions or betrayals are studied here. Dramatic chases, daring extractions from hostile countries, and poison pens play their parts in espionage.

In the case histories you'll find descriptions of the backgrounds and training of real spies. Where do they come from? How do they get into the espionage field? Why do they betray their countries? Each spy case gives different answers to these questions.

These case histories of real spies contain vast amounts of material that TOP SECRET/S.I. game Administrators can incorporate into their own campaigns to add life and background to the people and organizations the players encounter.

END COMMUNICATION

©1987 TSR, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Printed in U.S.A.

ISBN 0-88038-479-4

TSR, Inc.
POB 756
Lake Geneva
WI 53147 U.S.A.



0 46363 07626 9

TSR UK Ltd.
The Mill, Rathmore Road
Cambridge CB1 4AD
United Kingdom

7626

\$7.95 US