

Campaign


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Toulon 1793


Napoleon's first great victory



Robert Forczyk • Illustrated by Adam Hook




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Toulon 1793

Napoleon's first great victory



Robert Forczyk • Illustrated by Adam Hook

Series editor Lee Johnson

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Dedication

This volume is dedicated to 1LT Edward D. Iwan, 2-2 IN,
1st ID, KIA in al-Fallujah 12 November 2004.


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warship, the *San Juan Nepomuceno*.

Key to military symbols

Army Group	Army	Corps	Division	Brigade	Regiment	Battalion
Company/Battery	Infantry	Artillery	Cavalry	Unit HQ	Engineer	Medical
Navy	Ordnance					


Key to unit identification



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STRATEGIC THREATS TO FRANCE, SUMMER 1793




INTRODUCTION


ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN

In August 1793, Revolutionary France was on the verge of collapse. After only one year of war, French armies were reeling in retreat on virtually all fronts. On the Rhine front, an Austro-Prussian army had forced the surrender of a 23,000-man French garrison at Mainz on 23 July. In Belgium, another Austrian army had driven the French Army of the North out of Brussels, while an Austro-British army had landed to besiege Dunkirk. In south-west France, a Spanish army was rolling up the weak French border defences and driving on Perpignan. Meanwhile, Jacobin political repression in France resulted in the outbreak of serious counter-revolutionary insurrections in the Vendée region in March and the pro-Girondist or Federalist insurrections in southern France in April–June. Militarily, the Republican regime in Paris was attempting the seemingly impossible task of fighting a four-front war abroad while dealing with widespread civil warfare at home. However, as if all this was not enough, a new and greater threat to the regime was about to arise in the Mediterranean port of Toulon.

Jacobin civil leaders in Toulon were desperate in the summer of 1793. The execution of King Louis XVI in January 1793 had aroused considerable political opposition to the Jacobin preference for brutal expediency in governing Republican France. Open rebellion against their heavy-handed and extremist policies was breaking out throughout southern France and dissent seethed underneath the surface in Toulon. Yet when the local Jacobins in the city attempted to intimidate moderates with force in July 1793 they only managed to galvanize a previously unorganized opposition. In short order, the Jacobins' opponents managed

The execution of Louis XVI in Paris on 21 January 1793 created international outrage in Europe. England and Spain soon joined the coalition against the French Republic – a coalition only held together by the fear that other monarchies in Europe were at risk from the new Revolutionary ideologies. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)





Welcomed by the cheering citizens of Toulon, British marines under Captain Elphinstone land on the wharf of the Old Arsenal on the morning of 28 August 1793. The British troops quickly occupied Fort LaMalgue. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)

to orchestrate a civil coup that removed them from power. During 14–18 July, moderates formed a General Committee to govern the city, supported by the *petite bourgeoisie* of the national guard. Many Jacobin leaders were arrested, including both representatives on mission in the city, and ultimately 40 persons were executed after trial by people's courts. As rebellion spread throughout southern France, the civil authorities in Toulon refused to assist the Jacobins in carrying out retributions against rebels in Marseille. On 12 August, the General Committee declared that the Republican regime in Paris was illegitimate since it had excluded moderates. Toulon was not repudiating the Revolution, only Jacobin leadership of the process.

Rear-Admiral Jean Honoré Comte de Trogoff, interim commander of the Mediterranean fleet in Toulon, initially remained aloof from this civil struggle for power. Although few of the French naval captains were of noble birth, the Jacobins had soured relations with the fleet as well. First, Jacobins had imprisoned a number of naval officers without charge in June. Second, Jacobin political agitation among dockyard workers in Toulon had brought naval repairs to a virtual standstill. Finally, Jacobin leaders constantly pressed Trogoff to sortie his ill-trained fleet to engage the Royal Navy offshore. When Trogoff showed reluctance to risking his fleet, the Jacobins accused him of treason. Yet when the moderates in Toulon seized power, they too attempted to gain control over the fleet. There were also major problems with the 6,000 dockyard workers in the naval arsenal, who had been subverted by outside agitation and conducted a short-lived uprising on 19 August.

Meanwhile, the Republican regime in Paris was beginning to mobilize its resources to crush the rebellion in the provinces. A scratch force under the newly promoted Major General Carteaux was dispatched from the garrison at Valence in early August to deal with Marseille. Other troops were sent to deal with Lyon and Bordeaux while Major General Lapoye's division was ordered back from Italy to deal with Toulon. Suddenly, the bubble burst for the moderate rebels in Toulon when they realized that they could not escape Jacobin despotism so easily. Regular troops, directed

by vengeful Jacobin commissars, would soon be at the gates. Members of the General Committee now realized that their heads were on the line and would surely be lopped off in the event of the Jacobins retaking the city. They also realized that they lacked the resources to withstand a prolonged siege – there was only six to seven weeks' worth of food in the city and a handful of loyal national guardsmen. Despair and panic spread among the civil leaders.


Into this boiling political cauldron waded the Royal Navy. Vice-Admiral Hood's fleet had only been operating off the southern French coast for a few months when it began to receive reports of the outbreak of widespread civil insurrection throughout Provence and south-western France. Hood did nothing but continue his military mission of blockading the French fleet in Toulon. On 22 August, as Republican forces began to close in on the rebels in Marseille, the desperate citizens of that city sent envoys out to Hood's fleet to request British assistance. Initially Hood refused, since he saw no strategic or tactical benefit to committing his limited ground forces to the defence of that city; it fell three days later.

However, the French rebels from Marseille were desperate and persistent, since they realized that without foreign intervention they were doomed. Another delegation arrived on 23 August and suggested that Toulon was ripe for rebellion. These envoys succeeded in convincing Hood that not only was the city eager to rebel against the Republic and declare itself loyal to King Louis XVII (then an eight-year-old boy in a Paris prison), but that the exuberant citizens would gladly turn the French fleet and naval base over to the British in return for guarantees of British military intervention. This was a different matter for Hood because at one stroke this move could easily achieve his strategic aim of permanently neutralizing the French Mediterranean fleet. Therefore with little evaluation, he agreed to land troops at Toulon if the city would declare itself loyal to the Bourbons.

Meanwhile, the French military situation inside Toulon was confused. Rear-Admiral Comte de Trogoff was involved with the General Committee's deliberations and was willing to acquiesce to surrender if it would save the fleet – Lord Hood had proposed that the fleet and base would be held in safe-keeping until Bourbon control was resumed. On the morning of 25 August, the General Committee sent a declaration to the French fleet of the impending surrender. However, many officers and men in the fleet, who felt no compunction to obey Toulon's civil leaders, received this missive with defiant indignation. The fleet's second in command, Rear-Admiral Jean-René-César Saint-Julien de Chambon, attempted to organize the fleet to resist both the Royal Navy and the rebels in Toulon. On 26 August, Saint-Julien held a council of war on his flagship and ordered the occupation of several of the forts that commanded the harbour approaches. Although a handful of sailors did seize Fort Balaguier from the complacent national guardsmen, Saint-Julien was unable to rally more than a token number of the more than 10,000 conscript sailors in the fleet.

Saint-Julien's defensive preparations on 26–27 August provoked a round of threats and counter-threats between the fleet and the civil authorities in Toulon. When the General Committee learned of Saint-Julien's preparations to resist, it ordered the fleet to stand down. When this order was refused, the General Committee threatened to bombard

FEDERALIST INSURRECTIONS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE, AUGUST 1793




the fleet with 'red-hot' shot from the Great Tower battery. Saint-Julien responded by threatening to shell the city and hang the members of the General Committee if his fleet was attacked. On the night of 26/27 August, Saint-Julien ordered the fleet to move outside the range of the city batteries and to anchor in line-of-battle formation at the harbour entrance. Again, the General Committee threatened to bombard the fleet and 'reduce it to cinders'. This tense situation placed the virtually leaderless French fleet between enemies in Toulon and English enemies waiting outside the port. Loyalties were confused and strained.

During the night of 27/28 August, morale in the French fleet collapsed. Loyalties were divided, with some warships supporting Saint-Julien and others Trogoff. Aware that the next morning would probably bring a hopeless battle with the fleet being fired on from both sides, the conscript sailors and many officers began to desert. Several warships were completely abandoned and most of the others quietly left the line of battle and slipped back into the inner harbour. As dawn broke on 28 August, the French will to resist evaporated. Members of the General Committee at Fort LaMalgue and the Great Tower signalled Hood's fleet at 0915hrs to enter the port, and as they did so most of the remaining French sailors abandoned the fleet and retreated inland. Saint-Julien turned himself in to the British, rather than risk possible lynching at the hands of the Toulonnais.

Hood's fleet entered Toulon's harbour, and at 1130hrs began to land 1,200 British troops and 200 sailors under the command of Captain Elphinstone from HMS *Robust* (74). There was no resistance. Not a shot was fired in defence of the fleet or naval base. The British quickly occupied Fort LaMalgue and sent detachments into the town. Most of the French warships were ordered to download their powder stores and they were tied up in clusters alongside the two great piers at the naval base. At no cost, Britain was master of the second largest naval base in France. However, the lack of sufficient troops was immediately obvious and Hood quickly put out the word that reinforcements were urgently needed (word of Toulon's capture did not reach England until 7 September). He asked for British reinforcements from Gibraltar as well as Allied contingents from Spain, Sardinia, Austria and Naples. Shortly after the British landing, de Lángara's Spanish Mediterranean fleet of 12 ships-of-the-line arrived along with over 3,000 Spanish troops. Inside Toulon, the Allies established a military government and allowed the General Committee and national guard units to maintain order.

The capture and siege of Toulon was one of the defining moments of the early French Revolutionary Wars. More than any other threat, both sides saw the loss of the fleet and the key southern naval base as a litmus test of the survival of Republican France. The siege of Toulon also witnessed the emergence of Napoleon Bonaparte and the beginning of his rise to power.

Toulon before the Allies arrived.
The operational warships are anchored out in the inner harbour, protected by the guns of Fort Balaguier. In the arsenal, many dismantled warships sit in 'ordinary', awaiting repairs.
(Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)



CHRONOLOGY

1793

21 January 1793 Execution of King Louis XVI

21–26 February 1793 Unsuccessful French landing in Sardinia; Captain Bonaparte's baptism of fire

Spring 1793 Political split in Convention in Paris develops – radicals versus moderates

29 May 1793 Anti-Jacobins overthrow Jacobin regime in Lyon

31 May–2 June 1793 Moderate elements, dubbed 'Girondists', are purged from Convention. End of parliamentary democracy

June 1793 On leave from French service, Captain Bonaparte is active in Corsican politics but is eventually forced to flee back to Toulon

June 1793 Jacobins in Toulon imprison a number of naval officers without charge

July 1793 Captain Bonaparte returns to the 4th Artillery Regiment in Nice and is ordered to proceed to Avignon to organize an ammunition convoy for the Army of Italy

12 July 1793 Jacobins in Toulon attempt to intimidate the local opposition, but the result is a municipal coup that removes them from power

14 July 1793 The General Committee is formed in Toulon

15 July 1793 Jacobin representatives are arrested in Toulon

27 July 1793 Avignon is retaken by Carteaux's forces

9 August 1793 Siege of Lyon by Kellerman's army begins

12 August 1793 The Toulon General Committee declares that the Republican regime in Paris is illegitimate

19 August 1793 Uprising in Toulon naval dockyard by workers

21 August 1793 Carteaux re-occupies Aix

22 August 1793 Toulon sends envoys to the British fleet offshore to request assistance

23 August 1793 Carnot issues the *levée en masse* decree

23 August 1793 The second delegation from Toulon arrives at Hood's fleet; Hood agrees to land troops

25 August 1793 Marseille is retaken by Carteaux

25 August 1793 The General Committee warns the French fleet of the impending surrender

26 August 1793 Rear-Admiral Saint-Julien tries to organize French fleet in Toulon to resist the English, but fails

27 August 1793 Morale collapses in French Toulon fleet, with thousands of sailors deserting.

28 August 1793 Anglo-Spanish forces land in Toulon and secure port and French fleet

30 August 1793 Carteaux's advance guard occupies Ollioules

31 August 1793 An Anglo-Spanish column under Captain Elphinstone repulses the French advance guard at Ollioules

4 September 1793 Carteaux is named commander of all French forces around Toulon

6 September 1793 Lapoype's troops occupy the village of Sollies, 12km north-east of Toulon. Lord Mulgrave arrives to take charge of British forces in Toulon

7 September 1793 Skirmish at Ollioules, Captain Dommartin is wounded

16 September 1793 Captain Bonaparte is given temporary command of Carteaux's artillery

18 September 1793 Bonaparte establishes battery *de la Montagne* and opens fire on Allied warships in the inner harbour

18 September 1793 Bordeaux is retaken by the Republicans

21 September 1793 Allies land troops at Fort Balaguier and establish new position – Fort Mulgrave. Hood allows 5,000 French sailors to sail from Toulon to Atlantic ports

30 September 1793 Lapoype conducts infiltration attack up Mount Faron with Victor's Brigade

1 October 1793 Allied counter-attack ejects Victor's Brigade from Mount Faron

1 October 1793 The Bourbon flag is raised over Toulon

9 October 1793 Lyon is retaken. Allied sortie against the battery *des Sablettes*. Allies occupy Cap Le Brun

14 October 1793 Skirmishing near Fort Malbousquet

15 October 1793 Major skirmish near Cap Le Brun and La Valette

18 October 1793 Bonaparte is promoted to major and commander of all artillery around Toulon

27 October 1793 Large British convoy arrives from Gibraltar with 1,000 troops and generals O'Hara and Dundas. O'Hara is now in command

28 October 1793 Bonaparte is named *chef de bataillon* in 2nd Regiment of Artillery

10 November 1793 Carteaux is replaced by Doppet

15 November 1793 Doppet allows botched attack against Fort Mulgrave

16 November 1793 Dugommier takes command

30 November 1793 Disastrous Allied sortie against French batteries; O'Hara is captured

17 December 1793 The final French assault seizes Fort Mulgrave and Mount Faron; Bonaparte is wounded at Fort Mulgrave

18 December 1793 An Allied council of war decides to evacuate Toulon. Partial scuttling of French fleet by Sir William Sydney Smith's flotilla

19 December 1793 Last Allied troops embark. French troops enter Toulon

22 December 1793 Bonaparte recommended for promotion to brigadier general by representatives

26 December 1793 Bonaparte is ordered to organize and inspect all the coastal defences in Provence

1794

24 March 1794 Bonaparte is appointed commander of the artillery of the Army of Italy

OPPOSING PLANS

FRENCH PLANS

In Paris, the Jacobin leaders reacted with horror to the news that Toulon and the Mediterranean fleet had been given up to treacherous counter-revolutionaries and detestable foreign interventionists. Major General Carteaux's army had just secured Marseille on 25 August and Lapoype's division was at Nice. Both forces were ordered to converge on Toulon and extirpate this den of traitors. Although the generals were inclined to moderation, the political representatives viewed the conquest of Toulon as the suppression of counter-revolution rather than just another siege.

In this hour of desperation, the Republican Minister of War, Lazare Carnot, sought to employ every resource at the state's disposal and announced mass conscription in the *levée en masse* decree of 23 August 1793, five days before the surrender of Toulon. Carnot was the member of the Committee on Public Safety (CPS) responsible for military administration, and his simplified quantitative approach to strategy was to shove as many troops and guns at an enemy as the state could muster. Meanwhile, the CPS-initiated Terror was beginning to sweep across France, eliminating or silencing all foes of the regime. French plans for regaining the initiative thus rested upon using their numerical superiority on the battlefield and in weeding out domestic enemies by government-sponsored purges.

French Republican forces converged on Toulon without any plans for a protracted campaign. Most of the pro-Girondist cities in the south of France had been taken after brief sieges, and at first Toulon did not appear to be any different. The military amateurs who ran the French military effort in this sideshow of the war were incapable of detailed military planning, and were content to rely upon numerical superiority for victory. However, the presence of foreign troops and warships at Toulon, as well as formidable defensive terrain, would negate much of the French numerical superiority and require greater planning than had heretofore sufficed in the summer of 1793. Indeed, the lack of any real plan of campaign would offer opportunities to those French officers – like Napoleon Bonaparte – who had the brains and ambition to advocate a plan of action.

After dealing with Marseille, Carteaux's forces approached Toulon from the west and tentatively approached the port. French intelligence was initially poor, since most of Provence was anti-Jacobin and, consequently, Carteaux assumed that the Anglo-Spanish had landed a force that was superior in numbers to his tiny command. Lapoype's command approached Toulon from the east, using Nice as a base of operations. French planning and operations for both commands were severely handicapped at the outset because of the lack of a unified command or



clear-cut mission or tactical objectives. Thus, the French campaign started as a meeting engagement, followed by a blockade of the port, and drifted into a siege.

ALLIED PLANS

Although Toulon was a coalition operation for the Allies, it was the British navy that directed how the campaign unfolded. Britain's strategy for 1793 focused on committing a major ground army to Flanders to cooperate with the Austrians. A secondary effort was to be made in the West Indies, where a small expeditionary force would be sent to seize France's poorly protected colonies. Yet when civil discord in France in the summer of 1793 presented Britain with opportunities to intervene in the Vendée or Toulon, Secretary of War Dundas failed to adjust Britain's strategic priorities. Instead, he tried to conduct all four operations without any real prioritization; consequently, all four ventures failed. British strategy was too rooted in traditional methods of maritime warfare, such as seizing distant colonies, to realize the opportunities presented by the French near-collapse in the summer of 1793. At the operational level, Vice-Admiral Hood could not decide what he was trying to accomplish at Toulon; was it merely a raid or a prolonged occupation of the port? He even split his meagre forces and attempted to secure Corsica as well. Finally, the British were contemptuous of their Spanish allies and found them convenient scapegoats. At the tactical level in Toulon, poor army-navy cooperation, disdain for coalition operations and the local French in Toulon, as well as conflicting views on the mission objectives handicapped British plans. Indeed, the clumsiness of coalition operations at Toulon are a classic example of the lack of what would now be called operational agility and flexibility.


Enlistment of a volunteer battalion in 1792. Revolutionary fervour and patriotism were sufficient at the beginning of the war to raise large numbers of troops. However, by the summer of 1793 the pool of patriotic recruits was thinning out and Republican France resorted to the *levée en masse* to create mass-based armies to deal with threats on all fronts. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)



A French Republican army on the march in southern France. The Committee of Public Safety in Paris rapidly ordered scratch forces from the border armies to crush the Federalist revolt. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)

Spanish military plans at Toulon were complicated by historical and strategic factors. Spain was a traditional ally of France, and England was a traditional enemy of both countries – this created a great deal of mistrust and made joint operations at Toulon difficult. Spanish officers still resented the defeats in the Seven Years War, and one Spanish unit – the Hibernia Regiment – had actually fought 12 years earlier against the 69th Foot, one of the British units that it had to serve alongside at Toulon. However, Spain's monarchy abhorred the regicidal Republican regime in France, fearing that its anti-monarchical and anti-Catholic ideology might spread to their own domains. Yet the French Revolution was seen as a temporary political aberration that could be undone by foreign military intervention. Spain, like most of the other European countries, believed that once the French monarchy was restored normal politics would be resumed. Spain's leaders had no desire to see the balance of power in Western Europe permanently disrupted by the destruction of the French Mediterranean Fleet. Although temporarily allied with England because of the peculiar circumstances of the French Revolution, Spain's leaders were worried about the growth of English naval dominance both in European and colonial waters. Without the French navy as a balance, the Royal Navy would become the de facto naval superpower in the world. The French navy had succeeded in temporarily neutralizing British naval power in 1781–82 and it might do so again. Potentially, the French Toulon squadron could assist the Spanish in retaking Gibraltar or combining with the Spanish fleet at some future time to contest British dominance in the Mediterranean. Thus the temporary neutralization of the French fleet and its naval base suited Spanish interests, but the permanent destruction of those assets did not.


Realizing that most British army resources were committed elsewhere, Secretary of War Henry Dundas hoped to enlist troops from whatever resources were at hand. British gold was able to quickly gain the promise of brigade-sized contingents from Sardinia and Naples, but these were regarded merely as stopgaps until better material became available. It was hoped that Austria would commit a large force to hold Toulon – and if Austria had contributed even part of its army in Italy, the French would



The city of Lyon, second largest in France, joined the Federalist revolt on 29 May 1793 and the Jacobins were determined to crush this challenge to their authority. After a two-month siege, the city fell to Republican forces on 9 October. The Terror was applied in full force in Lyon, with at least 1,967 people executed by Jacobin tribunals. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)

have had a much more difficult time recapturing the port. However, what is even more amazing is that the British were unable to gain either Austrian or Sardinian agreement to launch an attack on the much depleted French Army of Italy. With about one-third of its resources committed to Toulon and with its lines of communication virtually severed, the French Army of Italy was highly vulnerable to an Allied riposte in late 1793, but Austria foolishly allowed the opportunity to pass.

Tactically, the defence of Toulon was a classic case of interior versus exterior lines, and the Allies should have held the advantage. Rough terrain effectively split the two French besieging corps, and a centralized Allied reserve should have been able to fend off any enemy penetrations of the defensive line. Unfortunately for the Allies, a fragmented command structure made it extremely difficult to mass any substantial reserve, as each national contingent looked to its own interests.



French national guardsmen from the city of Narbonne in 1792. Most of the guardsmen who supported the rebellion in Toulon were bourgeois shopkeepers and merchants who feared the Revolution's excesses. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)


OPPOSING LEADERS

FRENCH MILITARY LEADERS

The French siege of Toulon was initially hindered by inferior senior leadership but assisted by superior junior leadership. During the four-month siege, there were three French commanders. The first, **Major General Jean François Carteaux** (1751–1823), was a 42-year-old non-nobleman who had served in the army as a dragoon in the 1770s until he left in 1779 to become a painter. At the start of the Revolution, Carteaux came back to the army and was made an aide to General Lafayette in July 1789. In May 1793 he was promoted to brigade command and sent to Valence in the Army of the Alps. When the Federalist rebellion broke out in the summer of 1793, Carteaux quickly crushed the revolt in Provence and reoccupied Marseille in August. Owing to these successes, the Convention made Carteaux a divisional commander and assigned him to lead the forces converging on Toulon. While Carteaux was competent enough to crush localized civil rebellions, he was totally unable to command a combined army in the field or to conduct a siege. Once the political representatives recognized that Carteaux lacked the intelligence or ability to lead a large force, he was replaced by **Major General Amédée Doppet** (1753–99), a 40-year-old former doctor from Grenoble. Doppet was brought into military service because of his Jacobin political fervour but was an incompetent amateur. After being given command of the Légion des Allobroges in 1792, he was rapidly promoted to brigadier general in August 1793 and then major general in September. It was not until the third month of the siege that Dugommier, a professional soldier, was appointed to command. **Major General Jacques Coquille Dugommier** (1738–94), a 55-year-old nobleman born in Guadeloupe had fought in several campaigns in the Caribbean during the Seven Years' War. In 1790 he helped put down disturbances in Martinique and in 1791 was sent to Paris to represent the colonies in the Convention. He re-entered military service in October 1792 and was made a divisional commander in late 1793. Dugommier was a competent, but uninspired, veteran who was able to energize the French siege forces with a unified command.

When Carteaux was given command of the army around Toulon, his former Army of the Alps was divided into two divisions. The first was given to **Brigadier General Henri-François Delaborde** (1764–1833) and the second to **Brigadier General André Mouret** (1746–1818). Both were former enlisted men and NCOs in the old royal army who had been given commissions in 1791 and had risen quickly to battalion command. After a year in battalion command, both were given command of a division. The troops sent from the Army of Italy were under the command of **Major General Jean François Lapoype** (1758–1851), a 35-year-old nobleman from Lyon. Lapoype had entered the royal army in 1777 and was made a

Major General Jacques Coquille Dugommier (1738–94) was a professional soldier brought in to command the final assault on Toulon. Bonaparte's relationship with Dugommier was apparently quite good and based on mutual respect. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)



brigadier general in September 1792, serving well in the Army of the Alps. In May 1793 Lapoype was made a divisional commander and sent to Nice to deal with the growing unrest in Provence. Although technically under Carteaux's command, Lapoype operated semi-independently throughout the siege, aided by the fact that Representative Fréron was his brother-in-law. Of note, Lapoype's wife and daughter were held prisoner inside Fort LaMalgue throughout the siege.

At the junior level, the demise of the old aristocratic prejudices in the French army allowed a wide range of talents to flower, foremost of which was the heretofore obscure **Captain Napoleon Bonaparte** (1769–1821), a 24-year-old Corsican-born regular army artilleryman. Commissioned in 1785, Bonaparte had served only one year with the Régiment La Fère at Valence before the Revolution. Much of his first eight years of service were spent on leave in Corsica or in Jacobin or Corsican nationalist political agitation. He served a few months with the 4th Artillery Regiment at Valence in 1791 before again going on leave. Bonaparte's political efforts in Corsica were dismal failures. Returning to the 4th Artillery Regiment at Nice in June 1793, Bonaparte was assigned to organize ammunition convoys for the Army of Italy from the storage depots at Avignon to the forward depots at Nice. At this point, he had served only a few years with no real command or staff time and virtually no combat experience, except a minor foray to Sardinia in February 1793 and witnessing the suppression of rebellion in Avignon in July. Yet Bonaparte had been well trained in technical artillery skills and he was politically ambitious. Two other artillerymen were significant in the siege: **Captain Elzear Auguste Comte de Dommartin** (1768–99), a 25-year-old officer commanding Carteaux's artillery and **Captain Auguste Marmont** (1774–1852) a 19-year-old nobleman who had studied at the artillery school of Châlons and was commissioned in 1792.

With the French infantry at Toulon were no fewer than three future marshals. **Lieutenant Colonel Claude Victor** (1764–1841) was a 29-year-old volunteer who had joined the national guard in 1791 and rapidly rose to command the 2nd Battalion of Volunteers of the Bouches-du-Rhône in the Army of Italy in September 1792. **Lieutenant Colonel Louis Suchet** (1770–1826) was a 23-year-old bourgeois volunteer who had joined the national guard in 1791 and rose to become commander of the 4th Battalion of Volunteers of l'Ardèche on 20 September 1793. **Brigadier General André Masséna** (1758–1817), a 35-year-old former sergeant who had served 14 years in the Bourbon army (1775–89), returned to the army as a volunteer in 1791 and rose to become a brigade commander in the Army of Italy in 1793. Both Masséna and Victor served under Lapoype at Toulon. Finally, **Sergeant Jean Andoche Junot** (1771–1813), a 22-year-old bourgeois volunteer in the Côte d'Or battalion, served as Bonaparte's secretary during the siege of Toulon and would later become a general under the empire.



Bonaparte returned to Paris in May 1792 and was re-instated and promoted to captain. However, he used his 15-year-old sister Marie Anne's need for a male escort as an excuse to return to Corsica again in October 1792. (René Chartrand Collection)



LEFT Napoleon Bonaparte connived to be elected lieutenant colonel in the Corsican national guard on 1 April 1792 while on leave from the French army. However, he was soon struck from the roll of the Régiment La Fère and recommended for court martial. (René Chartrand Collection)

André Masséna, a 35-year-old former sergeant, was part of a new generation of ruthless and aggressive military leaders empowered by the French Revolution. In 1793, he commanded a brigade in the Army of Italy and was sent to Toulon in time for the final assault. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)



FRENCH REPRESENTANTS EN MISSION

In order to provide a means for the central government to control French military forces in the field, the National Convention voted on 9 April 1793 to dispatch three *représentants en mission* (representatives on mission) to each of the field armies. These deputies were given 'unlimited powers for the exercise of the functions delegated to them', and they could imprison for up to ten years any individual who interfered with their official business. In the field, the deputies were primarily responsible for assisting the military commanders in prosecuting the war effort by eliminating bureaucratic red tape to secure necessary supplies and manpower. Yet this supporting role could also include active involvement in directing military operations, demoting and promoting officers and even temporary assumption of command.

With the beginning of the Terror in August 1793, the representatives became the primary means of Robespierre's Committee of Public Safety (CPS) gaining total control over the war effort. After the April 1793 defection of General Dumouriez, commander of the Army of the Ardennes, and the demonstrated political unreliability of many *ci-devant* (i.e. old regime) officers, the CPS sought to meld ideological fervour with military competence. The representatives, who were appointed by the Convention but reported daily to the CPS, were given ever broader authority to arrest and execute individuals guilty of counter-revolutionary acts. A dual chain of command quickly evolved, with army officers still in command but wary of the representatives who participated in all councils of war. Lack of proper Republican spirit, military blunders or even vague rumours of counter-revolutionary sympathies could send an officer to prison or the guillotine. Officers with aristocratic backgrounds were particularly vulnerable to intimidation by the representatives.

When the insurrection first began at Toulon, the French generals in

Italy and the Alps were focused on their respective war fronts against conventional enemies and preferred to end the revolt through negotiation. Yet the ideologically driven representatives would not allow negotiation; rather, the revolts in Lyon, Marseille and Toulon would be crushed with extreme force. While the military men might survive successful counter-revolution, the representatives knew that their careers and lives depended upon the success of the Revolution. Thus the representatives altered the military mission of these two armies from defence of the national border to internal counter-insurgency.

The two primary representatives influencing operations around Toulon were Barras and Fréron, both named commissioners to the Army of Italy and Provence to deal with the civil insurrection in those regions. **Paul Vicomte de Barras** (1755–1829) came from a noble family in Provence and had served as an army officer, mostly in India, from 1771 to 1783. Unemployed in Paris in 1783–89 and disenchanted with the *Ancien Régime*, Barras welcomed the Revolution as a wonderful opportunity to begin a new

career in politics. He became a Jacobin and was elected a deputy to the National Convention. **Stanislas Fréron** (1754–1802), a former newspaper editor and writer of popular oratory, was also elected a deputy and sent south with Barras. The former was a corrupt ex-army officer and the later was a bloodthirsty fanatic, both were part of the savage new breed unleashed by the Terror.

Military operations around Toulon crossed many military and civil jurisdictions, so a number of other representatives were involved. Most significant was **Antoine Salicetti** (1757–1809), a 36-year-old Corsican-born lawyer serving as a civil representative with the Army of Italy. Salicetti had met Bonaparte in Corsica in 1792 while both were involved in revolutionary agitation and the lawyer had taken a liking to the young artillery captain. Twelve days before Salicetti secured Napoleon's position as Carteaux's artillery chief, he also aided Napoleon's older brother, Joseph Bonaparte, in securing a position as commissary officer for the Army of the Alps. Such men could make or break careers.

The power of these representatives was graphically demonstrated to French officers serving in Provence by the treatment of General Gaspard Brunet, a 59-year-old *ci-devant* regular officer serving as the commander of the Army of Italy in the summer of 1793. Brunet was slow to dispatch a division from Nice to Toulon in response to the arrest of the local representatives by the rebellious General Committee. Barras and Fréron alleged that Brunet was sympathetic to the rebels, and he was arrested in August. In November, he was sent to the guillotine. Brunet's fate was a vivid example to the commanders serving in the siege of Toulon of the power of the representatives.

Given the great disruption caused to the French military by the Revolution, the representatives were a necessary evil. Dictatorial powers to fire incompetent or unsuccessful officers and promote aggressive subordinates opened the door to a whole wave of military talent that might never have risen to high command under the *Ancien Régime*. The representatives were ruthlessly mission-oriented and in time they were able to motivate the new French Revolutionary armies to perform beyond all expectations.

ALLIED LEADERS

At the top, the man most responsible for directing the British war effort at Toulon was **Secretary of War Henry Dundas** (1742–1811), a 51-year-old Scottish lawyer and career politician who served as Pitt's war minister from 1793 to 1801. Dundas was primarily responsible for setting Britain's strategic course early in the War of the First Coalition, and deciding how the limited ground forces would be employed. Dundas's incompetence played a major role in the operations at Toulon. On 26 September 1793, Dundas wrote to inform Major General O'Hara that significant reinforcements would be dispatched to augment the defence of Toulon but he subsequently diverted the intended reinforcements to minor tasks and never bothered to inform the British commanders in Toulon of the changes. In 1806, Dundas was removed from his post as First Lord of the Admiralty for misappropriation of public funds.



A representative of the people in his official regalia. The Revolution empowered these men to maintain civil control over the military. They had the power to make or break careers. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)



Colonel Lord Mulgrave, a 38-year-old aristocrat who suddenly found himself in charge of the British ground forces at Toulon. He was a gifted diplomat and a brave soldier, but lacked the experience for independent command. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)



Rear-Admiral Federico Carlos Gravina (1756–1806) was appointed commandant of Toulon and helped to lead the Allied counter-attack on Mount Faron, where he was seriously wounded. Previously he had fought against the British during the siege of Gibraltar in 1779–83. Gravina later served as second in command of the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar in 1805, where he was mortally wounded. (Museo Naval)

On the ground, the British forces served under three different commanders. **Colonel Lord Mulgrave (Sir Henry Phipps)** (1755–1831) of the 31st Regiment, a 38-year-old aristocrat who distinguished himself at the Battle of Germantown in 1777, was first to arrive in Toulon. Mulgrave had been sent to Italy as British military liaison with the Austrian and Sardinian armies. Since he was the ranking British army officer in the area, he was brevetted as a brigadier general and made commander of British ground forces in Toulon, 6 September–27 October 1793. Mulgrave did little to improve the Allied perimeter defences during his command, except to spread the garrison over too many poorly supporting positions. He was replaced by an experienced ground commander in late October, when **Major General Charles O'Hara** (1740–1802), a 53-year-old career soldier arrived from Gibraltar. O'Hara joined the army in 1752, had seen action in Germany and Portugal, then later commanded a penal battalion in Senegal. He arrived in America in 1778 and commanded the Foot Guards at Guilford Courthouse, where he was badly wounded. He was Cornwallis's second in command at Yorktown in 1781, and it was he who surrendered his sword to the Americans in the place of his sulking commander. Promoted to major general, O'Hara served in Gibraltar until he was sent to Toulon, where he commanded British ground forces from 27 October to 29 November 1793. O'Hara was an over-aggressive, excitable officer who did not work well in a coalition environment. After O'Hara's capture, he was succeeded by **Major General David Dundas** (1735–1820), who remained in command for the last three weeks of the siege. Known as 'Old Pivot' for his favourite manoeuvre, Dundas had combat experience in the Seven Years War and was best known for writing the first drill manual for the British Army in 1788. Dundas was an old-style, conventional commander, but poor health inhibited his activity. All three British generals were extremely distrustful of the Spanish. Indeed, Mulgrave wrote about the Spanish troops, 'the fact is that they are good for nothing, officers and men ...' Such attitudes did not bode well for Allied co-operation.

A considerably more flamboyant figure commanded Britain's naval forces. **Vice-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood** (1724–1816), the 68-year-old commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet, had 52 years of experience at sea, including the Seven Years War and the American War of Independence. While commanding part of the British fleet in American waters in 1781, Hood's fumbling response to the French fleet had contributed to the debacle at Yorktown. He redeemed himself by combining with Rodney's squadron to defeat de Grasse's fleet in the Caribbean in 1782. Hood was an experienced veteran but was worn out and his judgement no longer sound. His greatest flaw was an inability to comprehend ground or joint army–navy operations. Under Hood were a string of rising naval stars, who were just starting to make their mark. **Captain George Keith Elphinstone** (1745–1823), the 48-year-old captain of HMS *Robust* (74), already had 32 years of experience, including service in the American War of Independence at Charleston. **Captain Horatio Nelson** (1758–1805), the 35-year-old captain of HMS *Agamemnon* (64) had 23 years of experience at sea but no substantial combat experience. He was dispatched to Naples early in September 1793 to secure Neapolitan troop reinforcements for Toulon. **Captain Sir William Sydney Smith** (1764–1840), a 29-year-old British naval officer and adventurer had

considerable combat experience under Hood and Rodney during the American War of Independence. Smith also fought the Russians in the Baltic as a volunteer with the Swedish fleet in 1790. Returning to British service, he joined Hood's fleet at Toulon in his own privately purchased sloop. Smith saw daring bravado as a means of advancing his career, but he was also ill disciplined and self-serving.

The Spanish expedition to Toulon was under the command of **Lieutenant General don Juan de Lángara y Huarte** (1735–1806), commander of the marine corps and an experienced sailor. **Rear-Admiral Federico Carlos Gravina** (1756–1806), the 37-year-old third in command of Lángara's fleet was the most significant Spanish leader at Toulon. Previously, he had fought against the British during the siege of Gibraltar in 1779–83. Gravina was appointed commandant of Toulon and served aggressively in ground combat until he was wounded. He later served as second in command of the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar in 1805, where he was mortally wounded. Gravina was experienced, capable and well respected. The Spanish ground commander at Toulon was **Major General don Raphael Valdés** (who arrived on 18 October), assisted by Brigadier General don Domingo Izquierdo.

OPPOSING ARMIES

FRENCH FORCES

The French command structure for the units sent to recover Toulon was extremely tangled. Major General Carteaux's division was detached from General Kellerman's Army of the Alps while Major General Lapoype's division came from General Dumerbion's Army of Italy. Like all French Revolutionary armies at the time, operational directives originated from Paris and there were no theatre-level commands to co-ordinate different armies operating in the same area. Thus, the two detached divisions sent to deal with the Federalist insurrections quickly became independent from their parent commands and it took time for the National Convention in Paris to make the logical step of creating a new command structure. Owing to this lack of unity of command, the French effort to operate against the Allies in and around Toulon was greatly impeded at the outset.

Carteaux's division initially consisted of about 4,700 troops in six volunteer infantry battalions, the regular 2nd Battalion/59th Infantry Regiment and 140 cavalry. His division also had 313 artillerymen with a ragbag collection of 26 guns (18 4-pdrs, four 8-pdrs, two 12-pdrs and two 16-pdrs) under the command of Captain Dommartin. Although the forces initially sent to deal with the insurrection were small, the Committee of Public Safety in Paris continued to peel off detachments from the other field armies to send southwards. By early September, Carteaux's division was reinforced to 7,900 men and grew to 12,000 by the end of September. Lapoype's division initially was formed around Brigadier General André Labarre's brigade of four battalions (1,700 troops in three volunteer battalions and the 1/28th Line) and about 1,200 poor-quality national guard troops conscripted around Nice. Once the siege began, Carteaux's division was designated as Division de l'Ouest (western division) and Lapoype's became Division de l'Est (eastern division). However, these divisions were mere administrative entities, not tactical organizations. Although demi-brigades of one line and two to three volunteer battalions each had been authorized by the First Amalgamation order in February 1793, because of the pressures of campaigning few were organized by the autumn of that year. The brigade structure employed at Toulon was extremely ad hoc in nature and changed from week to week. At Toulon, the basic tactical unit of the Republican army remained the battalion. The large number of unconsolidated separate companies and detachments arose from how this new army was scraped up from odds and ends, but it was wasteful of manpower.

By the end of the siege of Toulon, the French Republic had concentrated eight regular infantry battalions, about 50 volunteer infantry battalions and nine national guard battalions, plus about 30 company-sized detachments. Oddly, Lapoype's force grew to about 21,000 troops by the

A French volunteer fusilier wearing the 1791 Tarleton-type helmet. Recently raised volunteer units formed three-quarters of the French infantry at Toulon. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)



end of the siege, including two-thirds of the regular infantry. The western force remained slightly smaller, with about 17,000 troops.

Of the eight regular infantry battalions that served at Toulon, none had distinguished records thus far in the war. Two battalions of the 35th Line that had surrendered at Mainz in July arrived in time to join Lapoype's command just before the end of the siege. The 1/28th Battalion had seen action in Savoy and the 2/59th Battalion participated in the siege of Lyon. The other four French regular battalions, the 1/10th, 2/10th, 1/52nd and 2/52nd were garrison units with no recent combat experience.

A French infantry battalion of 1793 was authorized 30 officers and 770 men, but typical battalions used in the siege had only about 25 officers and 500–600 men on paper (effective strength averaged 300–400). Most of the regular units had been heavily diluted by conscript replacements but they still retained an edge in terms of junior officer and NCO experience; about 11 per cent of the enlisted men and 65 per cent of the NCOs had ten years or more of service. Volunteer units consisted of independent battalions and *compagnies franches* or free companies (light skirmishers). One unique unit was the Légion des Allobroges, formed in 1792, which consisted of 14 light infantry companies, three dragoon troops and an artillery battery (by December 1793 the Legion's strength was 1,129 troops). While the *levée en masse* of 23 August 1793 provided the basis for mass conscription, most of the troops used at Toulon had been called up between May 1792 and February 1793. The conscripts of 1792–93 were of fairly good quality, with a decent percentage motivated by patriotism and revolutionary ideology.

Although the bulk of the French army around Toulon was composed of infantry, the supporting arms acted as important combat multipliers. By the end of the siege, the French had amassed over 1,600 artillerymen and well over 100 artillery pieces and mortars. Like the infantry, the gunners were a mixed lot; 42 per cent of the artillerymen were volunteers, 33 per cent were regulars and 25 per cent were naval gunners. Once given command of the artillery at Toulon, Napoleon gathered men, cannons and *matériel* from the area in order to form a credible siege train. The regular French artillerymen still retained an edge in training despite defections following the Revolution, and provided an excellent instructional model for the large influx of volunteer artillery detachments. The French engineer corps in 1793 was a tiny elite that had suffered very few losses through emigration and still retained much of its pre-Revolutionary experience. In October 1793, the Committee of Public Safety ordered the formation of sapper battalions, but there was not time to form a complete



French fusilier lieutenant, c.1793. Each fusilier company was authorized one lieutenant and one sous-lieutenant. Most of the volunteer officers were just as ragged in appearance as their men, but this individual is fortunate in possessing shoes. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)



A French *cantinière* with her barrel of brandy and sporting a republican bonnet and cockade. The *cantinières* were officially authorized and helped to sustain the morale of French troops. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)

sapper battalion for the siege of Toulon. Lieutenant Colonel Armand Marescot arrived to command the pioneer detachment of 64 men, supplemented with drafts from infantry units and *ouvriers* (workers), in the final three weeks of the siege. Later, Marescot became inspector general of engineers of La Grande Armée until dismissed by Napoleon in 1808. The French also had several small detachments of dragoons, mostly under Lapoype's command, with about 340 cavalry. However, there was little role for cavalry in this campaign and they served primarily as gendarmerie to control desertion in the rear areas.

The French army had long excelled in logistics and had a penchant for organization, to which they added a gift for scrounging and foraging in 1792–93. Unlike the armies operating in Belgium and Germany, the forces in the south of France relied primarily upon a depot system. Unfortunately for the Jacobins, two large depots at Toulon and Nîmes were lost to the rebels at the start of the insurrection and this handicapped French logistics in the initial stage of the campaign. The French used river barges to ship heavy cargoes down the Rhône River to Avignon and then moved them up to Toulon by coastal vessels – something that the Royal Navy failed abysmally to stop. An old comrade of Bonaparte's from the Régiment La Fère, Major Jean Jacques Gassendi, was instrumental in organizing the materials and supplies for Bonaparte's siege train at Toulon. However, the shortage of artillery ammunition and construction materials seriously impeded the progress of Bonaparte's battery construction programme and as more troops gathered around Toulon the rudimentary French commissary system found it harder to keep this growing army supplied with food.

ALLIED FORCES AVAILABLE

The British army in 1793 was in poor condition, with most units under strength and inexperienced – it had been 12 years since the last major ground combat. Leaders were usually over-age relics of the earlier Seven Years War or the American War of Independence. Although the British army establishment had about 50,000 regulars on hand, 57 per cent were scattered guarding India and the colonies. Fewer than 20,000 regulars were available for operations on Continental Europe. Efforts were under way in 1793 to raise additional regulars, but these measures were not timely enough to influence operations at Toulon. In fact, the main British effort on the Continent at this time was the siege of Dunkirk by the Duke of York's army of over 7,000 regulars. A secondary operation with about 5,000 regulars was planned for an expedition to the West Indies. Toulon was a sideshow operation.

The initial British army contingent that landed at Toulon consisted of 1,626 troops in detachments from the 1st/11th North Devonshire, 1st/25th King's Own Borderers, 1st/30th Cambridgeshire and 1st/69th South Lincolnshire, which had been serving as a landing force for Lord Hood's fleet. Owing to the shortage of Royal Marines at the start of the



Spanish and Neapolitan grenadiers performed well at Toulon and formed the spearhead of the Allied counter-attack on Mount Faron on 1 October 1793. The blue-coated grenadiers of the Swiss Betschart regiment (left) and white-coated grenadiers (centre) of the Neapolitan army comprised the elite of the expeditionary forces in Toulon. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)

war, army troops were substituted, but the matter of whether these troops were under naval discipline was open to question. These detachments, the equivalent of about 15 line companies, had not been organized or equipped for sustained ground combat, and in particular they lacked any field-grade officers (they later gained one lieutenant colonel and three majors). Total officer strength was only 15 captains and 41 lieutenants. Once landed at Toulon, the troops were organized into two ad hoc battalions under Captain Moncrief (4th Regiment) and Captain Brereton (30th Regiment). Throughout the siege, the absence of sufficient army officers caused the Royal Navy to provide naval officers to lead many troop detachments. On 27 October 1793, the 2/1st Royals and 1st/18th Royal Irish arrived as reinforcements, along with a company of marines under Captain Bidlake and Stephen's battery of the 2nd Battalion Royal Artillery. A total of 2,653 British soldiers and marines were eventually committed to Toulon but they were employed as company-sized detachments rather than as field battalions.

Vice-Admiral Hood's fleet initially consisted of 23 ships-of-the-line, 14 frigates and 13 other vessels (with about 12,000 sailors), but this impressive force was quickly frittered away on peripheral missions after the easy capture of Toulon. While the Royal Navy initially landed some 400 sailors to act as gunners ashore, the Royal Navy's contributions to the land defence of Toulon were sporadic and minimal. The Navy's view of land operations was oriented towards short-term landing party operations, not protracted defensive operations. Nor were naval officers willing to part with significant portions of their ships' companies for extended operations ashore, since this would degrade the efficiency of their warships and risk losses due to combat, disease and desertion. Both the sailors and Royal Marines employed on shore were not trained in large-scale ground operations and thus were best suited only for defence of static positions. Significant numbers of sailors were also detailed to recommission some of the captured French warships for use against Bonaparte's batteries.



The *Santisima Trinidad* (112) did not serve at Toulon, but four similar Spanish first rates were in Lángara's fleet. The large Spanish ships-of-the-line were impressive for fleet battles but their nearly 10m draft made them useless for inshore work against enemy batteries. (Museo Naval)

Spain contributed 6,523 troops including four battalions of regulars (2nd Bn/Cordoba, 1st and 2nd Bn/Mallorca and 1st Bn/Malaga), one Swiss battalion (2nd Bn/Betschart), one Irish battalion (1st Bn/Hibernia), the 11th Marine Battalion, two provincial infantry regiments (Chinchilla and Lorca), one dragoon squadron (from the del Rey regiment), two independent grenadier companies, and one army and one naval artillery battery. The Cordoba and Mallorca regiments were good-quality units that had existed for over a century and each of their battalions had about 645 troops. The two foreign battalions were also of good quality (556 troops in Hibernia and 700 in Betschart). Both the Malaga Regiment, which had been raised in 1791, and the two provincial militia battalions were only suitable for static defensive duties. Spanish units at Toulon had two main advantages: they were large, cohesive units and they came equipped with a full complement of field-grade officers. Although Spanish officers of the period were reputed to be corrupt and incompetent, their troops poorly trained and armed, the Spanish army had in fact performed fairly well in the first year of the war.

Spanish forces had been involved in 11 significant actions against the French on the Pyrenees front in 1792–93 and had won eight of them, inflicting over 10,000 casualties on the French against 4,500 of their own. There is no doubt that the Spanish army was deficient in many areas in 1793 but the Spanish regulars had proved themselves more than a match for the ragtag French national guard armies of the period. Unfortunately, the British did not trust the Spanish and decided to spread their units out in the defence of Toulon so that no key positions would be lost in the event of panic, incompetence or treason. Instead, this move only broke the Spanish up into company and battalion-sized penny-packets and thereby negated their efficiency.

Spanish Commander Juan de Lángara's Atlantic squadron initially consisted of 12 ships-of-the-line and eventually was reinforced to 23 ships-of-the-line and eight frigates, with about 13,000 crewmen. Unlike the Royal Navy, the Spanish fleet came properly equipped with a substantial landing force composed of an 1,100-man marine battalion and a marine artillery battalion. Spanish naval officers also served ashore in various posts, along with 300 sailors. While the Spaniards did not disperse their fleet on various subsidiary missions, it was just as impotent when it came to influencing events ashore.

Naples committed 4,332 troops in four infantry battalions (about 740 troops each), four independent grenadier companies (238 troops each), an infantry detachment (212 troops), a marine detachment (215 troops) and an artillery detachment (132 troops). Although much maligned by historians and their allies, the Neapolitan grenadier companies performed fairly well. However, the majority of the infantry was of very poor quality and had no recent combat experience. When the first Neapolitan troops arrived at Toulon, their commander, Prince Fabricio Pignatelli, promptly

demanded 1.5 million in gold ducats from the British and an annual subsidy of 5 million more. Throughout the siege, the Neapolitan troops served under British command and were subsidized by British gold. A Neapolitan naval squadron also deployed to Toulon.

Sardinian forces consisted of 1,584 troops in two regular infantry battalions (330–360 troops each), one Swiss battalion (495 troops) and one grenadier battalion (407 troops). Sardinian troops were mediocre in quality, but they did have considerable, if mixed, combat experience against the French. In the first 18 months of the war, the Sardinians had fought eight actions against the French Army of Italy and lost four of them at a cost of over 2,000 casualties. The Swiss de Courten regiment sent to Toulon had been involved in the successful repulse of the French expedition to Sardinia in February 1793 (with which young Captain Bonaparte had also been involved). Like the Neapolitans, the Sardinians were bought and paid for by British gold and also served under British command, with Brigadier General Ignace Thaon de Revel serving only as detachment commander.

On 7 September, the Allies began to raise a French anti-Republican unit known as the Royal Louis Battalion in Toulon. This initially consisted of 395 officers and men in three line companies (later raised to 480 men). Two 100-man companies known as MacLean's Chasseurs were also raised from various émigrés and rebels in early November. There were three battalions worth of French troops inside Toulon when the city went over to the Allies: one national guard battalion from Toulon, one marine coastal artillery battalion and one regular infantry depot battalion formed from diverse detachments, a total of about 1,150 troops. After desertions were taken into account, these forces possessed minimal capabilities and limited motivation. The national guard troops fought poorly at Ollioules on 7 September and most were disarmed in December because they were regarded as unreliable. Some of these troops enlisted in the Royal Louis battalion or the chasseur companies and were later evacuated and inducted into the British army.

The total Allied ground forces committed to defend Toulon numbered about 17,677 troops, but the actual number of combat effective troops was more like 7,500 men. Because of the great diversity of this coalition force, the defenders lacked any real ability to conduct large-scale offensive operations.

Britain also sought to acquire allied reinforcements from Austria, Hesse-Cassel and Malta, but these efforts came to nothing. Although Austria maintained 8,500 troops in Italy at the time, territorial disputes with Sardinia-Piedmont concerning the principality of Novara inhibited the Austrian court from dispatching any troops as part of a joint expeditionary force with the house of Savoy. Five thousand Hessian mercenaries were hired, but they were sent to Brittany instead. Amazingly, no reinforcements from Great Britain ever arrived in Toulon. Eight infantry battalions composed of 4,500 troops were loaded onto transports at Southampton in September 1793 but spent the next two months sitting idly in harbour because the War Ministry was alarmed by rumours of a possible French invasion and wanted to maintain a reserve for home defence. Elements of two other infantry battalions and a dragoon squadron were dispatched from Gibraltar but did not arrive before the fall of Toulon.

ORDER OF BATTLE

THE FRENCH MEDITERRANEAN FLEET, AUGUST 1793

IN TOULON, OPERATIONAL

Ships-of-the-Line (19): *Commerce de Marseilles* (120) [Flagship]¹; *Languedoc* (80); *Tonnant* (80); *Apollon* (74); *Barras* (74); *Centaure* (74)²; *Commerce de Bordeaux* (74); *Destin* (74)²; *Duguay Trouin* (74)²; *Entreprenant* (74)³; *Generaux* (74); *Héros* (74)²; *Heureux* (74); *Orion* (74)³; *Patriote* (74)³; *Pompée* (74)¹; *Scipion* (74)¹; *Thémistocle* (74)²; *Tricolore* (74)²

Frigates (7): *Perle* (40)¹; *Arethuse* (40)¹; *Aurore* (32)¹; *Topaze* (32)¹; *Alceste* (32)⁴; *Poulette* (26)¹; *Prosélyte* (24)¹

Corvettes (9): *Tarleton* (14)¹; *Caroline* (20)²; *Auguste* (20)²; *Bellisle* (26)¹; *Sincère* (20)¹; *Mulet* (20)¹; *Mozelle* (20)¹; *Embroye* (20)⁵; *Petite Aurora* (18)⁶

IN TOULON, REFITTING

Ships-of-the-Line (4): *Dauphin Royal* (120); *Triomphant* (80)²; *Suffisant* (74)²; *Puissant* (74)¹

Frigates (1): *Sérieuse* (36)

IN TOULON, NON-OPERATIONAL

Ships-of-the-Line (9): *Couronne* (80); *Mercuré* (74); *Conquérant* (74); *Liberté* (74)²; *Censeur* (74); *Guerrier* (74); *Souverain* (74); *Alcide* (74); *Hardy* (64)

Frigates (9): *Courageuse* (36); *Iphtigénée* (32); *Isis* (32)²; *Montréal* (32)²; *Lutine* (32)¹; *Fripone* (32); *Boudeuse* (32) *Alerte* (16); *Bretonne* (18)

IN TOULON, BUILDING

Ships-of-the-Line (1): *Spartiate* (74)⁷

Frigates (1): Name unknown (40)²

AT SEA

Ships-of-the-Line (1): *Duquesne* (74) cruising off Syria/Eastern Mediterranean

Frigates (9): *Sibylle* (44) cruising off Syria/Eastern Mediterranean; *Melpomene* (40) cruising off Corsica; *Minerve* (40) cruising off Corsica; *Impérieuse* (40) cruising off Italy. Captured at La Spezia, 11 October 1793; *Juno* (40) stationed in the Levant; *Sensible* (36) cruising off Syria/Eastern Mediterranean; *Fortunée* (36) cruising off Corsica; *Modeste* (36) at Genoa. Captured 7 October 1793; *Mignone* (32) stationed at Corsica.

NOTES: 1 – Taken by British; 2 – Burnt, December 1793; 3 – Deportee squadron to Rochefort/Brest/Lorient; 4 – Taken by Sardinians; 5 – Taken by Neapolitans; 6 – Taken by Spanish; 7 – Set afire but repairable

BONAPARTE'S BATTERIES (13)

NAME	GUNS	COMPLETED
<i>de la Montagne</i>	1 x 36-pdr, 4 x 24-pdr	18 September 1793
<i>des Sans-Culottes</i>	1 x 44-pdr, 1 x 2-pdr mortar	20 September 1793
<i>des Sablottes</i>	4 x 24-pdr, 3 x 12-pdr mortars	7 October 1793
<i>des Quatre Moulins</i>	2 x 24-pdr	18 October 1793
<i>de la Grande Rade</i>	2 x 24-pdr	22 October 1793
<i>du Breguart</i>	2 x 24-pdr, 1 x 36-pdr, 1 mortar	before 14 November 1793
<i>des hommes-sans-peur</i>	3 x 16-pdr, 3 x 8-pdr mortars, 2 x 12-pdr mortars	28 November 1793
<i>de la Convention</i>	7 x 24-pdr	28 November 1793
<i>de la Petite Rade</i>	3 mortars	28 November 1793
<i>de la Poudrière</i>	4 x 24-pdr	1 December 1793
<i>de la Farinière</i>	4 x 12-pdr mortars	10 December 1793
<i>des Jacobins</i>	3 x 24-pdr, 5 mortars	10 December 1793
<i>des Chasse-Coquins</i>	3 x 16-pdr, 3 mortars	10 December 1793

FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE, 11 DECEMBER 1793

Commander-in-Chief, Army before Toulon: Major General Jacques Dugommier

Western Division (Dugommier), HQ in Ollioules (16,983 troops)

Chief of Staff: Major Hyacinthe Despinoy

Dugommier's Western Division consisted of 24 infantry battalions (two regular,

17 volunteer and five national guard) and 21 detached infantry companies (all volunteer). The Western Division was organized into two sub-divisions and the exact composition of these forces fluctuated often.

Under Dugommier's Command:

Artillery of the Army (Lieutenant Colonel Bonaparte): 1,282 gunners (428 regular, 482 volunteer, 372 naval) with 37 cannon and 25 mortars.

Cavalry: one Squadron/9th Dragoons (51); Gendarmerie (27).

1st Division (right wing) (Major General Delaborde), HQ in La Seyne.

Brulé's Brigade (3,646): [Volunteer] 2nd Battalion Cote d'Or (870); 1st Battalion la Drôme (622); 4th Battalion Montagne d'Aix (288); Chasseurs Allobroges (160); Chasseurs and Grenadier companies of 6th Battalion Marseille (195); [national guard] 4th and 5th Battalions Haute-Garonne (1,511).

Victor's Brigade (3,447): [Regular] 1/23rd (587); [Volunteer] 5th Grenadier Battalion (488); 1st Battalion Gard (683); Battalion Montagne (497); 5th Battalion Hautes-Alpes (538); 1st Battalion l'Ardèche (501); two companies of Légion Allobroges (153).

Dugua's Brigade (1,258): [Volunteer] 3rd Battalion Basses-Alpes (408); [national guard] 9th Battalion Drôme (640); one company of Chasseurs of Légion Allobroges (74); two detached volunteer infantry companies (136). HQ in Bregaillon.

2nd Division (left wing) (Major General Mouret), HQ in Ollioules.

Garnier's Brigade: composition unknown.

Gardanne's Brigade: composition unknown.

Infantry battalions assigned to Mouret's Command: [Regular] 1/59th Infantry (694); [Volunteer] 2nd Battalion Carpenteras (599); 5th Battalion Vaucluse (819); 6th Battalion Montagne (452); 8th Battalion Isère (693); 12th Battalion Drôme (703); 6th Battalion Gironde (718); 5th Battalion Basses-Alpes (438) [national guard] 2nd Battalion Bouches-du-Rhône (345); 3rd Battalion Mont-Blanc (607).

Other infantry units assigned to Mouret's command: [Volunteer] ? Battalion, Aubagne (271); three grenadier companies (123); two chasseur companies (102); three detached infantry companies (251); three *compagnies franches* (191).

Eastern Division (Major General Lapoype), HQ in La Valette (21,352 troops)

Lapoype's division consisted of 38 infantry battalions (six regular, 29 volunteer and three national guard) and seven light infantry companies (all volunteer). Lapoype's command had no subordinate divisions and consisted of five brigades, which – except for Masséna's recently arrived brigade – had no fixed composition. Labarre's, Guillot's, Micas's and Argod's brigades probably had one regular and two volunteer battalions each. The remaining battalions were probably engaged in construction or line of communication duties.

Under divisional control:

Engineers: one pioneer company (64)

Artillery (374): line (117); volunteer (218); naval (39)

Cavalry (265): 15th Dragoons (196); Chasseurs à Cheval (23); Guides (21); Gendarmerie (25).

Masséna's Brigade (1,618): 1/10th (648); 3rd Battalion Haute-Garonne (700); two grenadier companies (200); one light company (70).

Labarre's Brigade: composition unknown.

Guillot's Brigade: composition unknown.

Micas's Brigade: composition unknown.

Argod's Brigade: Includes 5th Battalion Bouches-du-Rhône (473), remaining composition unknown.

La Harpe's Detachment: 2/35th (520), 1–2 light companies.

Other infantry battalions assigned to Lapoype: [Regular] 1/28th (371); 1/35th (534); 2/59th (631); [Volunteer] Légion des Allobroges (488); 2nd and 4th Battalions l'Ardèche (1,714); 10th and 14th Battalions la Drôme (1,287); 1st Battalion Barjois (595); 2nd and 4th Battalions Vaucluse (783); 2nd Battalion Luberon; Battalion Bausset (306); Chasseurs of l'Ariège (410); Chasseurs of the Revolution (388); Chasseurs l'Isère (296); Chasseurs of Saint-Hilaire (272); Battalion l'Union (426); 5th Battalion Bed d'Ambes (431); 7th Battalion Côtes-Maritimes (925); 3rd Battalion l'Isère (678); 1st and 2nd Battalions Sans-Culottes (1,133); 1st Battalion d'Apt (616); 4th Battalion Hérault (618); 2nd Battalion Brignoles

(595); 4th and 5th Battalions Montagne de Marseille (663); Battalion Landes (485); 5th Battalion Montagne d'Aix (399); 1st Battalion Marseille (372); 7th Battalion Var (486); 2nd Battalion d'Aveyron (617); [national guard] 2nd Battalion Mont-Blanc (417); 2nd and 4th Battalions l'Ardèche (1,714).

Other infantry units assigned to Lapoype: Grenadier Company Bouches-du-Rhône (35); two *compagnies franches* (98); four detached volunteer companies (278).

UNASSIGNED UNITS (1,289 troops):

These units were in general reserve and not assigned to either the eastern or western divisions:

Two infantry battalions: 2nd Battalion Mont-Blanc (417); 4th Battalion l'Isère (527).

One composite grenadier battalion: Grenadiers Bouches-du-Rhône (243).

Two independent light infantry companies (102).

FRENCH REPUBLICAN TOTAL FORCES AROUND TOULON:

37,625 infantry 343 cavalry 1,656 artillerymen (39,624)

ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE, 11 DECEMBER 1793

BRITISH ARMY UNITS SENT TO TOULON

Commander: Major General David Dundas

1st/11th North Devonshire (500 embarked)	380 troops withdrawn (excluding officers)
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1st/25th King's Own Borderers	27 troops withdrawn (excluding officers)
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1st/30th Cambridgeshire*	278 troops withdrawn (excluding officers)
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1st/69th South Lincolnshire	351 troops withdrawn (excluding officers)
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2/1st Royals (420 troops)	355 troops withdrawn (excluding officers)
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1st/18th Royal Irish (416 troops)	294 troops withdrawn (excluding officers)
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Company of Royal Marines (120 troops)

Stephen's Battery, 2nd Battalion Royal Artillery (74 troops)

* Part of this battalion was transferred to Gibraltar on 21 November 1793.

ROYAL NAVY MEDITERRANEAN FLEET*

Commander: Vice-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood

Ships-of-the-Line (23): *Victory* (100); *Britannia* (100); *Windsor Castle* (98); *Princess Royal* (98); *St George* (98); *Alcide* (74); *Terrible* (74); *Egmont* (74); *Robust* (74); *Courageux* (74); *Bedford* (74); *Berwick* (74); *Captain* (74) *Fortitude* (74); *Leviathan* (74); *Colossus* (74); *Illustrious* (74); *Ardent* (64); *Diadem* (64); *Intrepid* (64); *Agamemnon* (64); *St Albans* (64); *Romney* (50)

Frigates (14): *Aigle* (36); *Inconstant* (36); *Leda* (36); *Romulus* (36); *Isis* (32); *Juno* (32); *Aimable* (32); *Lowestoft* (32); *Meleager* (32); *Mermaid* (32); *Dido* (28); *Nemesis* (28); *Tartar* (28); *Amphitrite* (24)

*Many ships were not in Toulon in December 1793, but nearby in Italian or North African waters.

SPANISH ARMY (6,928)

Commander: Major General don Rafael Valdés

1st and 2nd Battalions, Mallorca Regiment (1,475 troops)	Colonel don Francisco Casaviella
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1st Battalion, Hibernia Regiment (556 troops)	Colonel Terence O'Neill
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2nd Battalion, Betschart Swiss Regiment (634 troops)	Colonel William Waloner
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2nd Battalion, Cordoba Regiment (640 troops)	Lieutenant Colonel don Vicente Amorós
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1st Battalion, Malaga Regiment (712 troops)	Colonel don Diego de Córdoba y Pacheco
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Provincial Regiment of Chinchilla (484 troops)	Colonel don Jerónimo Moreno Frías
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Provincial Regiment of Lorca (519 troops)	Colonel don José Rocafull
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Dragoon Squadron, Rey Regiment (155 troops)	Colonel don Ramón Aviés
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Marine Battalion (1,194 troops) Navy	Captain don Antonio de Estrada
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1st and 2nd Grenadier Companies,

Provincials of Mallorca (127 troops)

Royal Corps of Army Artillery (80 troops)
Royal Corps of Marine Artillery (352 troops)

Colonel don Marcos Keating
Naval Lieutenant don Diego
Escalera

SPANISH MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON

Commander: Lieutenant General don Juan de Lángara

Ships-of-the-Line (23): *Purísima Concepción* (112); *Mexicano* (112); *Salvador del Mundo* (112); *Reina Luisa* (112); *San Hermenegildo* (112); *San Fernando* (94); *San Rafael* (80); *San Ildefonso* (74); *San Juan Nepomuceno* (74); *Santa Isabel* (74); *Soberano* (74); *Firme* (74); *Glorioso* (74); *San Pedro Apóstal* (74); *San Joaquín* (74); *Bahama* (74); *San Agustín* (74); *San Fermín* (74); *San Francisco de Paula* (74); *San Felipe Apóstal* (64); *San Leandro* (64); *San Fulgenico* (64); *San Julián* (60)

Frigates (8): *Casilda* (34); *Diana* (34); *Esmeralda* (34); *Florentina* (34); *Mahonesa* (34); *Perla* (34); *Preciosa* (34); *Venganza* (34)

NEAPOLITAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (4,484)

Commander: Brigadier General Fabricio Pignatelli

Fusilier Battalion, del Rey Regiment (729 troops) Lieutenant Colonel don Ignacio Serrano

Grenadier Company, del Rey (238 troops)

Fusilier Battalion, Borgoña Regiment (741 troops) Colonel Alberto Micheraux

Grenadier Company, Borgoña (258 troops)

Fusilier Battalion, Royal Naples (742 troops) Lieutenant Colonel Cayetano Cusini

Grenadier Company, Royal Naples (238 troops)

Fusilier Battalion, Messapia Regiment (741 troops) Colonel, the Duke of Diano

Grenadier Company, Messapia (238 troops)

Fusilier Company, Macedonia Regiment (212 troops)

Detachment, Marine Corps (215 troops) Lieutenant Colonel don Angelo Minichini

Detachment, Royal Artillery (132 troops)

NEAPOLITAN NAVAL SQUADRON AT TOULON

Squadron Commander: Commodore Forteguerra

Ships-of-the-Line (4): *Guiscardo* (74); *Tancredi* (74); *Partenope* (74); *Samnita* (74)

Frigates (4): *Sibilla* (40); *Sirena* (40); *Minerva* (40); *Aretusa* (40)

Sloops/Corvettes (4): *Fortuna* (24); *Vulcano* (20); *Aurora* (18); *Spartiviero* (18)

SARDINIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (1,491–1,756 troops)

Commander: Brigadier General Thaon de Revel

4th Battalion of Grenadiers (407–414 troops) Colonel, the Count of Torafe

1st Battalion of Cazadores (363–406 troops) Major San Esteban

2nd Battalion, Piamonte Regiment (329–441 troops) Colonel Pampara

2nd Battalion, Swiss Regiment de Courten (392–495 troops) Brigadier General Bueler

SARDINIAN NAVAL SQUADRON

Frigates (1): *Saint-Victor*

FRENCH REBEL FORCES IN TOULON (1,542)

Infantry Battalion, Royal Louis (388 troops) Major Bustino

1st Battalion, National Guard (472 troops)* Major Saul Jordan

8th Battalion, du Var (389 troops) * Major Saurin

9th Battalion, du Var (293 troops) * Lieutenant Colonel Jean Berraid

*These units were acting as a police force to maintain order in Toulon, not fully armed.

ALLIED TOTAL FORCES AROUND TOULON, 11 DECEMBER 1793:

2,100 British 6,800 Spanish 1,500 Sardinian 4,300 Neapolitan

1,500 French

TOTAL: 16,200

THE SIEGE OF TOULON

THE DEFENCE OF TOULON, AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 1793

On 30 August, Carteaux's advance guard of 750–800 troops under Brigadier General Mouret occupied the village of Ollioules, only 6km west of Toulon. Mouret's mission was to occupy the heights on the western side of the inner harbour overlooking the naval powder magazines. However, the main road from Marseille ran through a narrow mountain pass at Ollioules and this choke point was an excellent place for a delaying action. Refugees from Marseille provided early warning to the Allies of the French approach. In response, a detachment of 200 British troops under Captain Elphinstone and 300 Spanish troops under Brigadier General Izquierdo promptly sortied from the perimeter defences around 1500hrs on 31 August and reached the pass just prior to the French arrival. After a short, sharp engagement against a poorly disciplined unit caught in march column, the Allies repulsed Mouret's advance guard, at a cost of four dead and 15 wounded (British one dead, 13 wounded; Spanish three dead, two wounded). The French lost eight killed, 30 prisoners, two cannon and two battalion colours, and the column fell back in disorder towards Beausset. A small detachment of Spanish and French national guard troops were left to hold Ollioules as a covering position, while the majority of the Allied troops returned to Toulon. Despite this initial

Despite the generally negative view of many modern historians, the French representatives enhanced French combat power by providing immediate punishment for failure and immediate reward for success. The French armies became very mission oriented as a result of the presence of these men. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)





Carteaux's Republican troops in a mopping-up action against Federalist rebels at the Durance River near Avignon, 25 August 1793. Even after the fall of Marseille to the Republicans, pockets of unrest remained in southern France for months afterwards. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)

success, the Allies lacked the strength to seriously interfere with the French build-up. At the beginning of September, the Allied forces held a 13km-long inverted U-shaped perimeter around Toulon, anchored on 11 forts and redoubts. The most important positions were Fort LaMalgue on the east side of the city, Fort Croix Faron on top of the 563m-high Mount Faron north of the city, and Fort Malbousquet on the west side of the city. The perimeter was only 4km across. A total of 1,171 British and 3,166 Spanish soldiers were defending the port, as well as about 400 British and 300 Spanish sailors.

Although the Allied troops were outnumbered three to one in early September, they held a number of significant advantages. Aside from plentiful naval gunfire support available, the Allied troops had captured over 300 French artillery pieces in the naval base and coastal forts that were quickly put to use; Fort LaMalgue alone held 124 guns. Thus the French superiority in infantry was counter-balanced by a ten to one or worse inferiority in fire support, as well as a widespread shortage of gunpowder. The terrain also favoured defence, as the preferred French tactic of assaults using massed infantry columns would be difficult to conduct up the rugged Mount Faron, while any assaults against either Malbousquet or LaMalgue would suffer enfilade fire from the Royal Navy. Fort Malbousquet's artillery batteries also dominated the bridges that crossed the river Neuve. Finally, the central position favoured a mobile defence, while Carteaux and Lapoype would find it difficult to coordinate a joint attack under the best of circumstances. Added to this was the uncertainty of the French commanders about how large an Allied force was actually in Toulon and what were their intentions. The representatives Barras and Fréron were able covertly to establish an espionage service inside Toulon among the merchants who sold goods to the Allies; in time they were able to provide valuable information on the strength and dispositions of the Allied troops. Allied intelligence collection on French strength and intentions was negligible.



At a small inn near the village of Beausset, early on 16 September 1793, Captain Bonaparte had a brief interview with several of the representatives in Carteaux's army. Bonaparte used a copy of his pro-Jacobin pamphlet *Le Souper de Beaucaire* to demonstrate his Revolutionary fervour to Antoine Salicetti, who rewarded him with temporary command of Carteaux's artillery. (René Chartrand Collection)

Given these disadvantages, the initial French encirclement of Toulon was slow and uncertain. Command arrangements were ad hoc, which was typical of the French army during this period; Carteaux was only nominated by Fréron and Barras to command the whole force on 4 September when it was realized that some means of coordinating Lapoype's efforts was required. Unfortunately, Lapoype proved to be an unruly subordinate; as a *ci-devant* nobleman he was loath to serve under Carteaux and he ignored his appointment as much as possible. While they could not agree on the command relationship, both Carteaux and Lapoype did favour an immediate assault on Toulon rather than a formal siege. However, there was no serious attempt to coordinate the anticipated attacks by the French wings.

Lapoype's troops occupied the village of Sollies, 12km north-east of Toulon on 6 September. Although there were few Allied troops at this time on the north-east side of Toulon, Lapoype contented himself with establishing a comfortable headquarters in the Château de Sainte-Marguerite, waiting for additional reinforcements from Italy to arrive. On the same day, Colonel Lord Mulgrave arrived in Toulon and assumed command of the British troops. Mulgrave's aides included Thomas Graham and Rowland Hill, both of whom would go on to greater military fame in the years to come. Once the rest of Carteaux's small command had arrived in Beausset from Marseilles, Carteaux decided to make a more serious push through the Ollioules gorge on 7 September. A mixed force of grenadiers led the way, easily scattering the small Spanish-French covering detachment. The French national guardsmen lost 35 dead and 21 wounded while the Spanish lost 18 dead, 41 wounded and nine captured. Soon afterwards, the French occupied the hills




Toulon seen from the Height of Six-Fours, 7km west of the city. The peninsula on which Fort Mulgrave was located is on the extreme right. (René Chartrand Collection)

Mountauban and Six-Fours south of Ollioules. Yet the greatest result of this skirmish was the loss of Carteaux's artillery chief – Captain Dommartin – who was seriously wounded.

Dommartin's loss was a major setback for Carteaux, as he now lacked an experienced regular artilleryman to command his guns, but he took no immediate action to correct this deficiency. It was nine days later on 16 September that Salicetti, in his role as political commissar, plucked Captain Bonaparte from mundane convoy duties and appointed him to fill the vacancy. Bonaparte was apparently aware of the vacancy in the artillery billet and he sought out Salicetti at an inn near the village of Beausset, north-west of Ollioules. Bonaparte had recently written a short pamphlet entitled *Le Souper de Beaucaire*, that was primarily a jingoistic piece about the use of artillery in capturing Marseille. Bonaparte presented a copy of his pamphlet to Salicetti at the inn and began to talk about Jacobin politics and the need to suppress the Federalist revolt. Salicetti liked Bonaparte's ardent Jacobin views and this, combined with Bonaparte's family connections (it was rumoured that Salicetti was interested in Bonaparte's sister Caroline as well), was enough to convince the representative that here was a suitable candidate for the artillery command. There were more experienced candidates available, such as Lieutenant Colonel Dujard, commander of the 4th Artillery Regiment and Bonaparte's supervisor, but the older officer was not sufficiently pro-Jacobin. Armed with the representative's written appointment orders, Bonaparte set off to Carteaux's headquarters, now in Ollioules.

Bonaparte's version of his initial meeting with Carteaux is almost certainly a fabrication designed to discredit his commander's judgement. According to Bonaparte, Carteaux had improperly placed the artillery well out of range near the hill of Six-Fours and the young officer had to instruct Carteaux and his staff how the artillery should actually be deployed. It would have been the height of folly for a junior officer to publicly contradict a senior officer during the height of the Republican Terror, and a probable threat to career prospects. Despite his limitations as a commander, Carteaux had demonstrated his political reliability to the Jacobins, while Bonaparte had only recently returned from anti-French

**Captain Bonaparte briefs
Carteaux's staff on his batteries,
sometime in September or
October 1793. Bonaparte soon
complained that the staff was
ignorant of the proper use
of artillery. (René Chartrand
Collection)**



agitation in Corsica. Carteaux may have been an 'ignorant amateur' as Bonaparte described him, but he has also seen a great deal more combat than the inexperienced young Corsican. Carteaux was sensitive to the fact – unmentioned by Bonaparte – that he had lost his former artillery commander and one or two regimental guns in the early skirmishes around Ollioules. Given the fluid and uncertain situation around Toulon, Carteaux was justifiably cautious in committing his few remaining artillery assets. Carteaux and Lapoype both thought a quick assault upon Toulon's flimsy defences might still be possible and they were more focused on moving up infantry rather than engaging Allied warships (the French generals initially viewed the Allied landing as an extended raid, so a formal siege seemed unnecessary). Nor is it likely that Carteaux actually believed – as Bonaparte claimed – that his artillery could strike targets in the harbour from Six-Fours, which was a distance of over 3,500m.







THE BATTERY DE LA MONTAGNE OPENS FIRE ON THE ALLIED FLEET, 18 SEPTEMBER 1793 (PAGES 38–39)


Only two days after being appointed commander of General Carteaux's artillery by the representative Salicetti, Captain Napoleon Bonaparte established his first battery in the foothills of Bregailon to shell the inner harbour on the morning of 18 September 1793. The battery is named *de la Montagne* and once completed will consist of five guns emplaced behind a rampart of dirt and several wicker gabions filled with stones (1). The battery was only begun the night before and is still in the process of being completed by Bonaparte's fatigue parties. Since Carteaux's artillery park had only included a handful of light regimental pieces, Bonaparte scrounged the abandoned local coastal batteries at Cap Nègre and Bau Rouge to obtain heavy siege guns. He was in such a hurry to demonstrate that he could do the job before a more senior officer might be appointed in his stead that he initially used 24-pdr coastal artillery pieces (2) on heavy naval carriages; the cannon were transported in wagons. Later, he would have his artillerymen replace these unsuitable carriages with standard army carriages in the depot at Ollioules. Indeed the acquisition


of the naval cannon, the building materials and the construction of a battery in less than 48 hours was the first demonstration of Bonaparte's dynamic leadership abilities. Here, Bonaparte (3) is firing the first shot at the distant frigate *Aurore* (4), which is a former French frigate now operated by an English prize crew. However, Napoleon's action is designed more to enhance his credibility than to achieve decisive military results, since the range to the target is extreme and he has very little gunpowder initially available. The representatives Salicetti (5) and Fréron (6) have been invited by Bonaparte to watch the first bombardment and they seem pleased with the enthusiasm of their newly appointed artillery commander. The Allies were less than impressed by the initial bombardment from battery *de la Montagne* and only the *Aurore* was shelled on this day, with the rest of the Anglo-Spanish fleet remaining spectators. However, Bonaparte's ability to construct more and better batteries over the next week would begin to change their complacency to alarm. Bonaparte's first bombardment was a puny affair, but it had larger implications both for the siege and for that young officer's career. (Adam Hook)

Rather than contradicting his commander, Bonaparte's first meeting with Carteaux probably consisted of only a short interview and then the junior officer suggested that he could organize a battery to support the infantry approaching the edge of the inner harbour. More concerned with other matters, Carteaux probably assented without much thought or discussion, content that somebody else would handle the myriad of artillery issues. Once Bonaparte had Carteaux's permission, the young officer – eager for glory and recognition – rapidly set about organizing the meagre artillery train for a formal demonstration of its capabilities. Carteaux probably did not fully appreciate what Bonaparte was doing with the artillery for several days because he had virtually no staff and a number of other semi-independent subordinates to command. Bonaparte's tiny command consisted of about 300 artillerymen, 24 mostly regimental guns and perhaps 100 draft animals; the puny 4-pdr and 8-pdr guns that formed the bulk of his weapons were clearly inadequate to demonstrate the striking power of artillery. In a period of less than 48 hours, Bonaparte sent several teams to nearby abandoned coastal forts to acquire heavier artillery, and seven coastal guns were brought by wagon from nearby batteries at Cap Nègre and Bau Rouge to form his first two batteries. The remainder of Bonaparte's small artillery command began construction of a small earthwork battery on the Heights of Bregaillon, overlooking the western edge of Toulon's inner harbour, on the night of 17 September 1793. Very little French infantry was in this area and the position was highly vulnerable to any kind of Allied counter-attack.

Bonaparte was in a great rush to construct his first battery before either Carteaux changed his mind or a more senior artillery officer (like Lieutenant Colonel Dujard) arrived. His haste indicates that he probably had to use existing naval cannon without time to build new carriages. The cannons acquired from the coastal forts were all mounted on low naval carriages with small wheels and hence, could only be moved around in wagons. The 24-pdrs were also nearly double the

Bonaparte's battery de la Montagne opened fire on the Spanish *San Juan Nepomuceno* (74) on 19 September 1793. The large Allied warships could not manoeuvre close enough in the shallow waters of Toulon to effectively engage Bonaparte's batteries. (Model by John Simpson, www.sanjuanepomuceno.co.uk)






Although wildly inaccurate about terrain, this portrayal of the siege of Toulon is useful in illustrating the pontoons and light craft the Allies used to engage Bonaparte's batteries. These flimsy craft provided excellent target practice for Bonaparte. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)

weight of the army's standard 12-pdr cannon and Bonaparte had few horses to move his artillery. He probably used the naval carriages for the first week or two of operations, but as lumber became available he rotated guns through his newly established artillery park near Ollioules to mount them on improvised army carriages. Although there was no shortage of coastal artillery in the area, little of it could be employed, since most of the powder and shot had been stored in Toulon. Bonaparte scrounged ammunition from the local batteries, but the 50–60 rounds stored for each gun would only allow for a few days of shooting. Each shot fired from a cannon or mortar would expend 3–8lb of gunpowder. Hence, Bonaparte needed to develop a reliable supply of ammunition, lumber and digging tools if he was going to make his artillery play a decisive role in operations around Toulon. In a further effort to endear himself with the all-powerful representatives, Bonaparte decided to give his batteries Jacobin-sounding names rather than simple numbers, as was the standard practice.


On the morning of 18 September 1793, Bonaparte's new battery, dubbed *de la Montagne*, became operational with five guns. He invited several of the representatives to witness the event. Bonaparte's guns opened fire on the British-manned French frigate *Aurore* (36), stationed at the head of the inner harbour, at the maximum range of between 1,500 and 1,800m. No hits were scored and Bonaparte had so little ammunition that he had to cease firing after a few rounds were fired from each cannon, but he had shown himself to be a man of action. Bonaparte's gathering of artillery and the creation of an operational battery less than 48 hours after his appointment was a phenomenal achievement for such a junior officer. The next morning, the battery opened fire again on HMS *St George* (98), the Spanish *San Juan Nepomuceno* (74) and several gunboats. A second French battery known as *Sans-Culottes* became operational on 21 September and joined with the first in bombarding the Allied fleet. These batteries maintained an annoying but not intolerable fire against the Allied warships in the inner harbour. This was the beginning of an extended duel


The *San Juan Nepomuceno* was built in 1766 and, like most Spanish warships, was very sturdily constructed. The one or two hits on the ship by Napoleon's cannon inflicted little damage. The ship was later captured at Trafalgar in 1805 by the British. (Model by John Simpson, www.sanjuannepomuceno.co.uk)



between Bonaparte's batteries and the Allied fleet, with ten days of bombardment in September. The *St George*, the *Princess Royal* (98) and the *San Juan Nepomuceno* would continue to engage these batteries, but without much effect. Allied efforts at counter-battery fire were severely hampered by the shallow waters in the western side of the inner harbour that started at 10–16m near Eguillette and quickly tapered off to only 2–3m in depth. The second rates used by the Allies drew at least 6–7m and could not risk grounding within range of the batteries so they kept close to the shore near Malbousquet. Owing to the angle at this range, the larger warships could only fire the 32-pdr guns on their lower decks. Incredibly, Hood had sent all his frigates off on secondary missions and even the Spanish had only a few available. The Allies were forced to extemporize a shoal-water force to combat Bonaparte's batteries. Several shallow-draft floating batteries on pontoons with four long 24-pdrs and two brass mortars were jury-rigged, but these flimsy vessels were no match for the French guns; Bonaparte sank

Model of Fort des Pommets, Musée de la Relief, Paris. This fort was occupied by the Spanish but was too exposed and was abandoned before the end of the siege. (Author's photograph)





Fort Balaguier seen from the inner harbour, looking west. The fort was completed in 1636 and was used as the main disembarkation point for Allied forces sent to occupy Point L'Eguillette on 21 September 1793. (Author's photograph)

one and 'beat another to pieces' in Hood's words. The captured frigate *Aurore* was pressed into service with a 30-man British crew but this vessel was soon set afire by red-hot shot and was withdrawn. On the other hand, French accuracy was not very good because of the range; after ten days of firing, Bonaparte's batteries had hit the *Aurore* three times and the *San Juan Nepomuceno* once or twice. British casualties numbered nine killed and 34 wounded (mostly due to a burst gun on HMS *St George*) and the Spanish had also suffered a few casualties. While Bonaparte's initial bombardment had not caused the Allied fleet much harm, it had impressed the Jacobin representatives and they gave their consent to the formation of more batteries.

Meanwhile, the British were equally slow to organize themselves in a coherent defence. Unity of command was a problem. Rear-Admiral Gravina was appointed commandant of Toulon and Colonel Lord Mulgrave commanded British troops, but there was no single Allied ground commander (this was further complicated once Sardinian and Neapolitan troops began to arrive). Mulgrave refused to order the British troops to dig in in the areas between the forts because he claimed that he 'didn't want to tire them out'. Mulgrave was more of a diplomat than a field soldier and he apparently spent very little time inspecting the troop dispositions or defences; since there were no British field-grade officers on hand, the individual companies merely took care of themselves. Most of the other Allied officers concerned themselves with securing comfortable billets for themselves in Toulon and left tactical matters to their subordinates. Lack of engineer officers further reduced the scale of Allied defence building. Nor was the perimeter soundly arrayed: the Spanish occupied the indefensible Fort des Pommets north-west of the city, while the key terrain on Point L'Eguillette that dominated the inner harbour was left un-garrisoned.

The British were also distracted by conditions within Toulon. Over 5,000 captured French sailors remained in the naval base, posing both a security risk and a serious drain on the limited food resources of the city. In another impromptu move, Hood decided to rid himself of most of these prisoners by allowing them to sail to French Atlantic ports aboard five disarmed warships. The warships selected were the 74-gun ships-of-the-line *Apollon*, *Entreprenant*, *Orion* and *Patriote* (the first two were from

the Atlantic fleet and had particularly defiant crews) and the brig *Pluvier* (16). Captain François Bouvet (1753–1832), a very experienced frigate captain, was put in charge of the deportee squadron. The French sailors were crowded onto these warships and allowed to sail unmolested through the British blockade to Brest, Rochefort, Lorient and Bordeaux. Although the vessels were supposedly in poor condition, the idea that a British commander would hand back four capital ships and thousands of sailors to an enemy in wartime is ludicrous and indicates Hood's declining level of common sense. However, not all French sailors were deported from Toulon and some remained to help maintain the captured warships. Hood was equally baffled by political conditions in the city. Apparently, he actually believed that the rebels were pro-monarchical although they continued to fly the Republican tricolour over the port, not the Bourbon fleur-de-lis, until 1 October.

A limited effort was made to recruit citizens in Toulon into pro-Allied military formations; the primary result was the Royal Louis infantry battalion, which had recruited 395 men by 12 October under Girondist officers. Most of the manpower for the Royal Louis battalion came from French troops from the original garrison, as well as pro-Girondist volunteers. Although some historical accounts suggest that this unit performed acts of valour during the siege, the fact is that Hood and Gravina regarded it as suspect and decided to keep it in reserve for most of the siege, although some of its companies participated in Allied counter-attacks. Rebel French troops were not used much in the forward positions for fear that they might contain Jacobin spies in their ranks or defect to the enemy. The remnants of the Toulon national guard units were used only to patrol the streets in the city and were later disarmed. As for the rest of the population, the British and Spanish military leaders gave little thought to the civilians in Toulon, though the execution of suspected Jacobins was stopped. Mulgrave, Hood and Gravina distrusted the Toulonnais and generally spurned any efforts they made to assist the Allied defence.

Although short of artillery, ammunition and supplies, the French were not blind to the weakness of the Allied defence. Once it became apparent that a direct assault on Fort Malbousquet would be very costly, the French began to look for other options. A number of officers in Carteaux's command, including Bonaparte, began to urge an assault on Point L'Eguillette in order to secure artillery positions that could dominate the inner harbour. If this position could be secured, the defence of Toulon would collapse once the naval lifeline became interdicted. However, this vulnerability was obvious to both sides and the British moved first. Bonaparte's bombardment on 19–20 September had alerted Lord Hood to the potential threat posed by French artillery to his fleet. Hood ordered Mulgrave to occupy Point L'Eguillette and to this end 230 British troops under Captain Brereton and 300 Spanish troops under Colonel Echavara (including 150 from Mallorca, 57 grenadiers from Hibernia and 93 Spanish marines) were landed at Fort Balaguier around 0200hrs on 21 September. The Allied troops quickly began establishing a major redoubt with felled tree trunks atop a 110m-high hill that dominated the little peninsula. A few cannons from Fort Balaguier were also dragged up the hill and hastily mounted to cover the approaches. Around dusk, Carteaux finally sent a single 400-man battalion, the 2nd Battalion Côte d'Or under Brigadier General Henri-François Delaborde, to seize the key high

ground, but they were repulsed with the loss of 12 killed and 24 wounded. In just three days, the British managed to construct a very strong earth redoubt dubbed 'Fort Mulgrave' with 20 guns (15 36-pdrs and five 24-pdrs) and four mortars. After that, the French referred to the redoubt as 'the little Gibraltar', owing to its supposed invincibility. The Allies also deployed troops and artillery on nearby Cap Cepet to further anchor their western flank and to safeguard the outer harbour.

Allied morale was further lifted by the arrival of substantial reinforcements on 28–29 September. Two Sardinian battalions with about 800 troops under Brigadier General Thaon de Revel arrived on the 28th, escorted by six Sardinian warships. On the next day, a Neapolitan force of three battalions (2,000 troops) under Brigadier General Fabricio Piganatelli arrived in Toulon. Both the Sardinian and Neapolitan troops had been delivered as a result of British subsidies to their governments and operated ostensibly under British command. Thus by the end of September, there were about 15,000 French troops besieging about 8–9,000 Allied soldiers and sailors, but the Allies held most of the high ground ringing the city. Unlike a normal siege, Allied command of the sea allowed the import of foodstuffs from Italy, so there was no threat of

French Republican grenadiers in action at the battle of Fleurus in Belgium, six months after the fall of Toulon. This print gives a good impression of the difficulty of command control in battle on flat terrain in daylight; on Mount Faron, the French had great difficulty coordinating their forces on rough terrain in darkness. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)



Model of Fort LaMalgue's main sally port, Musée de la Relief, Paris. The British headquarters and reserve force was located in the fort. (Author's photograph)




starvation. Carteaux and Lapoype had accomplished virtually nothing during this period. Even Bonaparte's construction of batteries was no more than an irritation to the Allies at this point. Lacking effective leadership, firepower and supplies, the French effort to retake Toulon seemed either stalemated or doomed to failure.

THE SIEGE BEGINS, OCTOBER 1793

Major General Lapoype believed that the towering Mount Faron was the key terrain around Toulon and he had wanted to seize it since the beginning of the siege. It was not until the night of 30 September that he was able to assemble a brigade-sized force of 1,600 troops under Brigadier General Gaspard Gardanne near the town of Revest, 3km north of the mountain. The Allies trusted that the rugged terrain would inhibit any major French assault and thus did not leave a strong garrison on this important position. However, the French were aware of a narrow and steep foot-trail known as the Pas-de-la-Masque that could be used to infiltrate up the north side of the mountain. A thick fog covered the mountain on the night of 30 September, providing ideal conditions for a night infiltration

Lapoype's troops attack the eastern side of Toulon, probably during one of the October skirmishes. Note two French battalion columns moving towards one of the Allied outerworks. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)





The Allies occupied Cap Le Brun from October 1793 until the end of the siege in order to prevent Lapoype's troops from interfering with shipping on the east side of Toulon. Unfortunately, holding this isolated position was a drain on Allied resources. (National Maritime Museum)

attack. At 0200hrs on the morning of 1 October, Lieutenant Colonel Victor led his 5th Battalion, Bouches-du-Rhône, and two companies of regulars up the path and quickly routed the 60-man British picket detachment at the top. Pressing on, the 600 French troops found that the 300-man Spanish garrison entrusted with the defence of Fort Croix Faron on the crest of the mountain had abandoned their position. Lapoype quickly rushed the remaining 1,000 troops up to the top of Mount Faron but unwisely did not personally supervise the consolidation of this key objective. Instead he decided to earn political points by spending time impressing the representative Barras with a colourful account of his coup. On top of Mount Faron, Gardanne and Victor awaited further reinforcements and orders. Tired and elated after their arduous climb and short firefight, the French troops apparently mostly fell asleep in the captured positions and they failed to put out adequate security.

The Allies became aware of the French seizure of Mount Faron around 0500hrs as Spanish stragglers appeared in Toulon. Lord Mulgrave quickly alerted the British reserve in Fort LaMalgue and notified Gravina. Around 0800hrs on 1 October, the Allies dispatched two columns to counter-attack the French lodgement on Mount Faron. Mulgrave and Brigadier General Revel led 200 British and 380 Sardinians (1st Battalion of Cazadores) from the west while Rear-Admiral Gravina and brigadiers Izquierdo and Pignatelli led a mixed force of 100 Spanish marines, 100 Spaniards from Mallorca, 100 Neapolitans, 200 mixed grenadiers and 56 Sardinian fusiliers around the southern brow of the mountain. These columns were also supported by 250 troops (150 British from the 30th and 69th Regiments, and 100 French from the Royal Louis) under Captain Elphinstone from Fort LaMalgue in the south. Seeing the Allied counter-attack developing, Victor pulled all his troops back around the eastern edge of Mount Faron, and massed them in a triangular formation next to the captured Fort Croix Faron. For reasons unclear, Victor positioned troops inside Fort Croix Faron but this fortified position did not add any real strength to the French defence. While Mulgrave's troops moved in along the ridgeline from the west pushing back a few French pickets, Gravina's troops skilfully exploited

One of Bonaparte's 24-pdr cannon crews in action at Toulon. While one artilleryman aims the gun, the gunner lights a portfire prior to firing the piece. Note the representative watching every move. (René Chartrand Collection)




the dead space in front of the French position by infiltrating up the Valbourdin valley to within a short distance of Victor's troops. Fort Faron, which was still in Allied hands, provided 12-pdr harassing fires to disrupt Victor's exposed troops while the Allied columns converged on their position. Soon the French found themselves flanked in the east by Elphinstone's men, rushed in the centre by the Spanish and hit on the western flank by a British bayonet attack; it was a 1:1-odds attack in rough terrain but French morale apparently crumbled very quickly and they only managed to fire one or two volleys. Victor's command suffered 75 killed, 200–300 wounded and 61 captured (about 25 per cent losses). By 1530hrs, Mount Faron was back in Allied hands. They recovered it at the cost of nine killed and 69 wounded, including Rear-Admiral Gravina who was wounded in the leg. Lord Mulgrave resolved not to lose Mount Faron again. He was impressed by the performance of the Neapolitan grenadiers in the counter-attack and he initially decided to station one of the Neapolitan battalions atop the mountain, but then decided that a mixed force of 500 British and Sardinians would be more reliable. Unfortunately for Allied unity, Brigadier General Izquierdo, whose obstructionist attitude hindered further joint actions, temporarily replaced the gallant and co-operative Gravina.

In the week after the abortive assault on Mount Faron, Bonaparte established three new artillery batteries south of Fort Mulgrave. When naval gunfire failed to stop the construction of these new batteries, the British decided to employ their limited ground forces. Around 0230hrs on 9 October, Lieutenant Colonel Nugent led a mixed force of over 600 Allied troops (408 British, 50 Spanish, 100 Piedmontese and 50 Neapolitan) from the Sablettes blocking position in a sortie against the battery *des Sablettes*. Informed of inadequate French security precautions by a deserter, Nugent's troops quickly overran the battery, which was manned by 300 newly inducted conscripts. About 1,200 French infantry were encamped nearby, but they were slow to react. The Allied troops

THE ATTACK ON MOUNT FARON

1 October 1793, viewed from the south showing the French night attack and the Allied counter-attack.


Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km/0.62 miles



MULGRAVE / GRAVINA

EVENTS

1. 2100HRS, 30 SEPTEMBER 1793. Gardanne's brigade assembles at Revest.
2. 0200HRS, 1 OCTOBER 1793. Victor's 5th Battalion Bouches-du-Rhône and two companies of regulars infiltrate up the Pas-de-la Masque and rout the British picket.
3. 0300-0500HRS. Victor presses on eastwards along the crest. The Spanish garrison of Fort Croix Faron abandons the position without a fight.
4. 0300-0500HRS. The rest of Gardanne's brigade ascends the Pas-de-la Masque, but Lapoype fails to provide additional support.
5. 0800HRS. Allies dispatch three columns to clear the French off Mount Faron.
6. 0900-1000HRS. Victor sights the approaching Allied columns and masses his force in a triangular formation near Fort Croix Faron.
7. 1200HRS. The Allies mount a fairly co-ordinated attack from the west and south-west and the French brigade routs.
8. 1300HRS. Mount Faron is secured in Allied hands.



FRENCH FORCES

Gardanne's Brigade:

- A** 5th Battalion Bouches-du-Rhône (strength about 600 troops) and two regular companies from 28th and 59th Infantry (200 troops).
- B** Remainder of Gardanne's Brigade: 1st Battalion du Var (400) and one other volunteer battalion (400).

ALLIED FORCES


- 1** British Picket (60 men from 11th Foot)
- 2** Spanish garrison of Fort Croix Faron (300 Mallorca)
- 3** Allied garrison at Fort Faron (100 mixed) with seven 12-pdrs
- 4** Mulgrave's column (580) (200 British from 11th and 25th Foot, 380 Sardinian from 1st Battalion of Cazadores)
- 5** Gravina's column (556) (100 Spanish marines, 100 Spanish from Mallorca, 100 Neapolitan fusiliers from the del Rey Battalion, 120 Neapolitan grenadiers, 80 Mallorca grenadiers, and 56 Sardinian fusiliers).
- 6** Elphinstone's column (250) (150 British from 30th and 69th Foot, 100 French from Royal Louis)

spiked two howitzers and destroyed the ammunition stockpile before retiring, having lost four killed and seven wounded. The French artillerymen suffered seven killed and ten wounded, as well as three artillery lieutenants captured. However, the damage was superficial and Bonaparte was soon able to have the battery back into action. On the same night, the British also decided to occupy Cap Le Brun, 2km east of Fort LaMalgue, after some of Lapoype's artillery had harassed passing Allied warships. A small detachment of Royal Marines, Spanish, Sardinians and Neapolitans under Lieutenant Walter Serocold landed at this exposed position and began to establish a battery.

On 14 October a minor outpost action north of Malbousquet almost precipitated a major action. Unusual French movements seemed to indicate an attack across the river Neuve, so Mulgrave sent out 100 British troops of the 11th Regiment to investigate. They bumped into a similar French patrol and both sides started reinforcing. Brigadier General Thaon de Revel committed several *chasseur* companies of the 1st Battalion of Cazadores, and then two companies each of Spanish and Neapolitan grenadiers joined in. Unsure of what was transpiring Mulgrave sent 500 more British and Neapolitan troops to join the fray. All told, the Allies committed over 1,000 troops to a patrol-sized skirmish and demonstrated a severe lack of tactical restraint. When the action was broken off, the Allies had lost four killed and 30 wounded; French losses were probably similar. The next day, Lapoype moved against the newly established Cap Le Brun battery with 2,000 troops and quickly crushed the handful of troops that were occupying this exposed position. Three British officers were killed in the action. Again, Mulgrave acted quickly, launching a coordinated Allied counter-attack with three columns. While one column pushed along the coast towards Cap Le Brun from Fort LaMalgue, another column from Fort d'Artigues drove the French out of La Vallette and threatened to cut off the brigade around Cap Le Brun. This counter-attack was a rare combined-arms operation, including infantry, artillery and the newly arrived Spanish *del Rey* dragoon squadron. However, slow-moving Spanish and Neapolitan infantry prevented the Allies from scoring a larger success against Lapoype's disrupted troops, who retreated towards La Garde. The action ended in a long-range gunnery duel between two Allied 18-pdrs and two French 12-pdrs. The Allies were able to re-occupy Cap Le Brun and hold it until the end of the siege, but 246 British and 425 Neapolitan troops were tied down in this exposed position. It was these constant outpost actions that exhausted the small Allied garrison.

Allied troops were further demoralized by the difficulty in feeding the outlying and exposed garrisons; troops on Mount Faron received food irregularly, and half-rations at that. What food the troops did receive was of poor quality, Mulgrave noting that 'the meat [was] stinking and the bread full of maggots'. On 21 October Mulgrave wrote that the troops in Fort Malbousquet had received no food for the past two days. Another one of the difficulties of coalition operations in the 18th century was that mixing troops from different countries risked exposure to infectious disease and this problem quickly appeared in Toulon, with British, Spanish and Italian troops packed in closely with French civilians. By the end of October, more than 25 per cent of the Allied troops and much of the civilian population of Toulon was ill.

Bonaparte made sure that the representatives were fully aware of his accomplishments in the siege of Toulon. Here he explains his battery construction programme to Barras and Salicetti. (René Chartrand Collection)



Bonaparte's battery construction programme was now attracting attention from both the French representatives and the Allies, but the batteries were actually poorly laid out. Bonaparte dispersed his artillery too much, probably in order to gain maximum exposure for the French artillery arm and himself, and the only place that he actually massed his artillery was around Fort Mulgrave and this was late in the campaign. Eventually, Napoleon massed 26 of his 62 artillery pieces and mortars (42 per cent) against Fort Mulgrave, but much of his scarce artillery was wasted merely guarding flanks. After the initial anti-shipping actions in September, batteries such as *de la Montagne* and *Sans-Culottes* were virtually useless in the later stages of the siege. Furthermore, Bonaparte only exercised real control over artillery on the west side of the harbour; Lapoye's artillery remained virtually independent.

During October, Bonaparte's two batteries covering the inner harbour continued their duel with HMS *Princess Royal* (98) over a period of 14 days. In addition to a burst gun that caused 35 casualties, the *Princess Royal* was hit five times but no serious damage was caused. Damage to the French batteries was negligible. At one point, Bonaparte even invited several of the French representatives to visit one of the batteries being engaged by the Allied warships; it was a chance to show off his own bravado under fire and evidently he was amused when the representatives beat a hasty retreat after a near miss. Amazingly, the dominant British naval squadron totally failed to interdict French coastal traffic, which greatly aided the build-up of French forces around Toulon. In fact, Bonaparte's artillery ammunition was shipped down the Rhône River from Avignon, then transported by coastal lighters from Marseille to an unloading point just west of Toulon. Without sufficient frigates or light craft, Hood was unable to sever Bonaparte's vital supply lines.

The last two weeks of October witnessed a number of changes in the command structure of both sides. On the French side, six weeks of indecisive siege operations brought intense criticism about the leadership

abilities of Carteaux and Lapoype. Carteaux laid the blame on Lapoype and relieved this uncooperative subordinate on 16 October, but Lapoype was able to manoeuvre his way back into command within a week. Instead, the representatives blamed Carteaux and recommended his replacement on 23 October, although he would remain until 6 November. Amid these recriminations, Bonaparte's energetic construction of siege batteries impressed the representatives and he was promoted to major and commander of all the artillery around Toulon on 18 October.


On the Allied side, the Spanish Major General don Rafael Valdés arrived on 18 October to command all Spanish ground troops at Toulon. On 23 October, Lieutenant General Lángara notified Admiral Hood that Rear-Admiral Gravina had been appointed by the Spanish government to become commander-in-chief of all Allied forces in Toulon. Since the bulk of the Allied ground troops at Toulon were Spanish, this move seemed justified in Madrid but it angered the British who were not consulted and who refused to serve under Spanish command. In order to intimidate Hood into accepting Gravina's appointment, Lieutenant General Lángara positioned his flagship *Mexicali* broadside to HMS *Victory* and placed two other Spanish ships-of-the-line in raking positions fore and aft of the British flagship (there were at the time, 20 Spanish ships-of-the-line versus only ten British in Toulon). Hood ignored this, but expressed misgivings in official dispatches; in one exchange with Lord Grenville it was written that 'the King would prefer the Spanish troops being wholly withdrawn from Toulon, to their being left there under circumstances which might create misunderstanding and ill will.' In a letter to Secretary of War Dundas, Hood wrote that 'what is very unpleasant is the conduct of the Spaniards, who are striving for power here.' The British also had command difficulties with the Sardinians and Neapolitans; Brigadier Pignatelli openly expressed defeatist views about the mission, while Commodore Forteguerra refused to take orders from Hood. On 27 October, a large convoy arrived from Gibraltar with over 1,000 British troops, including the 2/1st Royals, 1/18th Royal Irish, a detachment of Royal Artillery and Major Generals O'Hara and Dundas. O'Hara replaced Mulgrave, with Dundas serving as second in command. A handful of British field-grade officers also arrived with the convoy, slightly improving the management of the British ground contingent.

Both sides also received considerable reinforcements in late October. The fall of Lyon on 9 October released a large force from the Army of the Alps, while Austro-Sardinian inactivity on the Italian front allowed the Army of Italy to release substantial forces as well. French reinforcements brought the besieging force up to about 25,000 troops. Allied ground forces by the end of October amounted to about 2,300 British, 6,500 Spanish, 4,300 Neapolitan, 1,500 Sardinian and 1,500 French rebel troops – a total of about 16,000 troops on paper (although at least 25 per cent of the Allied troops were sick and unavailable for operations). Thus the odds were still about even, with the Anglo-Spanish fleet tipping the balance. However, no substantial British reinforcements were en route, although Hood was under the impression that they were due at any moment. A letter from Whitehall on 1 October promised Hood that one battalion of British infantry and 300 cavalry were en route and that 4,000 Hessian troops under contract would be sent in 'about a month's time'. When these promised reinforcements were diverted or failed to appear, no one in

NAPOLEON'S BATTERIES AROUND TOULON, SEPTEMBER–DECEMBER 1793



	NAME	GARRISON	COMPOSITION	NOTES
1	Sablettes	594	British 129, Spanish 240 Neapolitan 180, Sardinian 45	An earthwork blocking position at narrow neck of land on peninsula.
2	Fort Mulgrave	1,800	British 500, Spanish 1,300	Br: 3 companies of 2/1 Royals, 1–2 companies of 1/18 Royal Irish. Gunners from Royal Artillery and Royal Navy. Sp: two companies of Mallorca, grenadier company from Hibernia, one marine company, elements of Chinchilla and Lorca.
3	Fort Balaguier	2,569	British 265, Spanish 1,443 Neapolitan 685, Sardinian 176	Sp: elements of Marine battalion, Cordoba, Chinchilla, Lorca, Royal Artillery and Naval Artillery.
4	Fort l'Eguillette	Unknown	Unknown	Some of the garrison listed at Fort Balaguier was probably located at l'Eguillette.
5	Fort Malbousquet	610	British 55, Spanish 369 Neapolitan 98, Sardinian 88	Br: 1 company of 2/1 Royals. Sp: 2 grenadier companies of Mallorca, 2 companies of marines, 1 company each of Hibernia and Malaga.
6	Earthworks (west)	380	Sardinian 380	Sardo: 1st Battalion Cazadores
7	Fort des Pommets	108	British 108	
8	Fort Grande Antoine	398	Spanish 398	
9	Fort Saint Antoine	319	British 35, Spanish 151 Neapolitan 98, Sardinian 35	Sp: 1 company of Mallorca
10	Fort Croix Faron	469	British 65, Spanish 139 Neapolitan 165, Sardinian 100	Br: 1 company of 11th Foot
11	Fort Faron	395	British 81, Neapolitan 193 Sardinian 121	Br: 1 company of 11th Foot
12	Fort d'Artigues	171	British 116, Spanish 55	
13	Fort Saint Catherine	137	British 39, Neapolitan 98	
14	Toulon	c. 5,500	British 800, Spanish 2,200 Neapolitan 1,800, Sardinian 700	Includes about 1,000 sick/wounded. Remainder of troops billeted in town.
15	Earthworks (east)	210	Spanish 210	Sp: Royal Artillery battery
16	Great Tower	c. 100	Mixed Allied	Signaling Station between Fleet offshore and Allied forces ashore.
17	Fort Saint Louis	c. 200	Sardinian c. 200	Headquarters for Sardinian contingent under Revel.
18	Fort LaMalgue	988	British 495, Neapolitan 105 French 388	British headquarters in Toulon. Br: elements of 30th and 69th Foot. Fr: Royal Louis battalion.
19	Cap Brun	671	British 246, Neapolitan 425	




No	BATTERY	COMPLETED	ARTILLERY
A	<i>de la Montagne</i>	1 x 36-pdr, 4 x 24-pdrs	18 September 1793
B	<i>Sans-Culottes</i>	1 x 44-pdr, 1 x 12-pdr mortar	20 September 1793
C	<i>Sablettes</i>	4 x 24-pdrs, 3 x 12-pdr mortars	7 October 1793
D	<i>Breguart</i>	1 x 36-pdr, 2 x 24-pdrs, 1 x mortar	9 October 1793
E	<i>Quatre Moulins</i>	2 x 24-pdrs	18 October 1793
F	<i>Grande Rade</i>	2 x 24-pdrs	22 October 1793
G	<i>la Convention</i>	7 x 24-pdrs	28 October 1793
H	<i>des hommes-sans-peur</i>	3 x 16-pdrs, 2 x 12-pdr mortars, 3 x 8-pdr mortars	28 October 1793
I	<i>Petite Rade</i>	3 x mortars	28 October 1793
J	<i>la Poudrière</i>	4 x 24-pdrs	1 December 1793
K	<i>la Farinière</i>	4 x 12-pdr mortars	10 December 1793
L	<i>Jacobins</i>	3 x 24-pdrs, 5 x mortars	10 December 1793
M	<i>Chasse-Coquins</i>	3 x 16-pdrs, 3 x mortars	10 December 1793

NOTE: The range fans displayed are based upon effective range of the longest-range weapon at that battery, not the maximum range or the average range of different types of weapons.

Whitehall bothered to inform Hood. Indeed, Secretary of War Dundas even ordered Hood to release the 30th Foot and four ships-of-the-line for other operations (he released the warships but kept the 30th Foot). Nor had Dundas bothered to dispatch tents and other necessary field equipment to sustain the British forces for a winter siege at Toulon.

Starting in mid-September and continuing into October, Hood's fleet gradually dispersed on a series of peripheral missions, all of dubious value. One squadron was sent to cruise off Corsica in the hope of capturing a port with the aid of Corsican rebels. Another squadron was sent to sever French merchant trade with Tunisia. When the French frigate *Modeste* was identified in Genoa in early October, the British undertook a successful cutting-out raid that demolished British relations with the supposedly neutral Genoese Republic (afterwards, Genoa took an increasingly pro-French position and blocked any transfer of Austrian troops from Italy to Toulon through the port). Other warships were sent to Naples, Malta and elsewhere to gather reinforcements. The end result was the dispersion of British naval power, and by the end of October Spain was the dominant land and sea power in Toulon.



Bonaparte established the battery *des hommes-sans-peur* only 300m away from Fort Mulgrave on 28 November 1793. The battery consisted of three 16-pdr cannon and five mortars. (René Chartrand Collection)

THE NOOSE TIGHTENS, NOVEMBER 1793

Early November found Lapoype in temporary command of the French forces until Carteaux's replacement, Major General Amédée Doppet, arrived on 10 November. Doppet was in command for only one week and his laxness allowed an unplanned attack on Fort Mulgrave to occur on 15 November. Some French infantry pickets from the 2nd Battalion Côte d'Or decided to taunt the Spanish combat outpost near Fort Mulgrave and they were promptly captured by a detachment of grenadiers. The Spanish grenadiers were enraged by the French insults and they beat the French captives in full view of the rest of their battalion in the forward trenches. Incensed, a company-sized element from the 2nd Battalion Côte d'Or decided to make an impromptu assault to free their comrades. Soon, the rest of their battalion and then parts of their brigade joined in the attack. Other French units on the flanks began minor ad hoc attacks upon the Malbousquet and Sablettes redoubts as well. Bonaparte and Doppet hurried to the scene of the developing attack against Fort Mulgrave, but they were unable to control events. The Allies had not expected an attack in broad daylight and the rash assault caught them by surprise. After some initial success against the Spanish-held Saint-Louis outerworks (held by detachments of marines, and provincials from Chinchilla and Lorca), the French assault was driven back when Major General O'Hara arrived with one company of the 2/1st Royals and routed the leaderless French troops. Doppet's role in the affair was minimal and Lieutenant Colonel Nicolas Brulé, the battalion commander of 2nd Côte

Sergeant Junot, a former law student, acted as Bonaparte's personal secretary at Toulon and impressed him with his coolness under fire. A roundshot fired from an Allied warship, which lies at Junot's foot, has just splattered his daily report with dirt. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)



d'Or, ordered the retreat. French losses in the 2nd Côte d'Or were at least 10–12 killed and 15 wounded, although losses in the rest of the brigade were unrecorded. The British suffered 61 casualties and the Spanish lost six killed and 23 wounded. Realizing Doppet's total inability to exercise command, the representatives recommended his replacement the next day. Bonaparte had a hand in Doppet's relief by suggesting to the representatives that the attack might have succeeded were it not for the general's alleged display of cowardice. In Doppet's place, the representatives finally decided to put Dugommier – a professional soldier – in command.

Dugommier assumed command on 16 November and quickly began energizing the French siege effort. Whereas Carteaux and Doppet had restrained Bonaparte and a number of other talented young officers, Dugommier placed aggressive officers in the right positions. Lieutenant Colonel Victor was transferred from Lapoype's division to the western division and given command of an assault brigade. General Jean-Pierre du Teil, the 71-year-old inspector general of artillery for the Army of the Alps, arrived with Dugommier. General du Teil was one of Bonaparte's old mentors and he approved of the young officer's battery construction programme. Although Bonaparte nominally deferred to du Teil's seniority, the old general acted only in an oversight capacity, and since there were no visible flaws in the artillery tactics at Toulon he had little to say (du Teil was sent to the guillotine three months later). In fact with du Teil's support, Bonaparte was given wider latitude and resources in battery construction, and an able subordinate – Captain Marmont. Between 14 and 30 November, Bonaparte constructed eight more batteries. By the end of the month, Bonaparte's 13 batteries with a total of 37 cannon and 26 mortars presented a considerable threat to the Allied defence of Fort Mulgrave and the western side of the harbour. Bonaparte's command had grown to 64 officers and 1,600 troops. The French batteries continued to engage the handful of Allied warships in range, but after the *Princess Royal* was hit by red-hot shot, all the larger warships were pulled out of range of


THE ALLIED SORTIE, 30 NOVEMBER 1793

French Forces:

- A. Battery de la Convention
- B. Battery de la Farinière
- C. Battery de la Poudrière
- D. Garnier's Brigade
- E. Muret's Division (-)
- F. Major General Dugommier
- G. Major Bonaparte

Allied Forces:

- H. First Column (700 British and 300 Sardinians under Dundas)
- I. Second Column (1,000 Spanish under Izquierda)
- J. Third Column (340 Neapolitan troops under Revel)
- K. Major General O'Hara
- L. Battery Royal Artillery



1. At 0400hrs on the morning of 30 November, Major-General Dundas led a sortie of 2,350 British and Neapolitan troops from the Malbousquet redoubt against the new battery 'la Poudrière'.
2. c. 0430hrs: The battery was overrun and four 24-pdrs were spiked.
3. c. 0430-0445hrs: Garnier's brigade, tasked with supporting the batteries, was surprised by the pre-dawn raid and quickly routed.
4. c. 0445-0500hrs: Dundas decides to press on to occupy battery 'la Farinière' while other troops pressed on to raid the ammunition parks. The Allied columns lose all cohesion in the pursuit and are no longer mutually supporting.
5. c. 0515-0530hrs: Arriving on the scene, Dugommier was able to rouse the rest of Muret's division into action and launched a furious counter-attack against

the exposed Allied flank. Bonaparte, always keen for action that might aid his advancement, also hurries to the battle.

6. c. 0530hrs: Major-General O'Hara rides forward to the captured French battery 'la Poudrière' in order to press the attack. However, O'Hara runs into French skirmishers at the battery, is wounded and captured.
7. c. 0600hrs: Pressed by the French counter-attack, the Allied troops fall back, having lost 63 dead, 286 wounded and 129 captured.
8. c. 0700hrs: The victorious French attempted to follow up with a raid on Malbousquet, but this failed. Revel's Sardinians remained steady and they, in conjunction with a battery of Royal Artillery, stop the French pursuit.


Bonaparte's 24-pdrs. Nevertheless, the single 44-pdr culverin at battery *de la Montagne* continued to lob occasional rounds over the masts of Allied warships near the arsenal at a range of over 3,000m. By forcing the Allied warships to pull back out of range, Bonaparte had removed their ability to provide enfilade fires in support of Fort Mulgrave and had thus greatly weakened the defence of that position. The three batteries – *Jacobins*, *des hommes-sans-peur* and *Chasse-Coquins* – constructed less than 300m from Fort Mulgrave were now capable of massing point-blank fires to smash the outer defences.



Battery la Poudrière's 24-pdrs engage Fort Malbousquet in the centre distance while a battalion column and skirmishers move towards the river Neuve. This was a feint while Dugommier was mounting the main attack on Fort Mulgrave. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)

Bonaparte displayed great ability in motivating troops during the siege of Toulon. Normally, constructing a battery under fire so close to enemy positions would have been regarded as an unwanted suicidal detail. However, Bonaparte knew how to talk to his men and he knew how to mould volunteers into enthusiastic soldiers. He decided to name the most exposed battery position *des hommes-sans-peur* ('men without fear') and he told his artillerymen that 'I need men, real men, men with balls, certainly not sissies. I would never ask them to take an enemy position, but I insist that they follow me to that position. If you are one of those men, raise your hand.' Bonaparte's appeal to his troops' manhood was successful and he had more than enough volunteers to replace the losses that occurred during the construction of the battery. Indeed, service at the battery became a badge of honour among Bonaparte's gunners, and he demonstrated his own sangfroid by standing on the battery's earthen rampart in full display of the enemy. Apparently, Anglo-Spanish counter-battery fire was not very accurate. Thereafter, Bonaparte, Junot and Marmont spent most of their time near the battery. Even the French representatives were impressed that Bonaparte was one of the few French senior officers who slept in the forward positions with his men, instead of enjoying more comfortable quarters behind the lines in Ollioules. Junot grew particularly devoted to Bonaparte, who was also impressed with his secretary's own courage; when an enemy roundshot showered both of them with dirt, Junot – who had been taking dictation of the daily report – calmly told Bonaparte that at least he wouldn't need sand to blot the ink on the paper.

In addition to his battery construction programme, Bonaparte was actively building up an artillery support organization to sustain his guns. He created an arsenal at Ollioules with 'eighty artisans, smiths, wheelwrights and carpenters' to convert coastal artillery to standard gun carriages and to repair equipment damaged in action. Bonaparte's search for materials to support his efforts ranged far and wide and he used another old artillery comrade from the La Fère Regiment, Major Jean Gassendi, to procure supplies from Lyon, Grenoble, Marseille and Nice.



Bonaparte was particularly short of entrenching tools and draft animals to move ammunition up to the firing batteries, most of which Gassendi was able to round up using an authorization document written by Salicetti. Bonaparte was also rather impudently writing to the Committee of Public Safety and Minister of War in Paris, to inform them of his achievements and to complain about his superiors. In one letter, he described Carteaux's staff as 'a crowd of fools' and he bragged about his role in the siege. These letters indicate that Bonaparte was very politically active for such a junior officer and that he was not a loyal subordinate; were it not for Salicetti's backing, Bonaparte probably would have been punished for his bold behaviour.


Meanwhile, Lord Mulgrave returned to England on 23 November and reported to Secretary of War Dundas about the deteriorating military situation at Toulon. Alarmed by this report, Dundas dispatched orders to Hood that the French fleet and naval base were to be immediately destroyed (these orders arrived just as the French were mounting their final assault). One declaration from England that did reach Toulon in time was a statement that the British intended to hold Toulon as a down payment on post-war reparations – a declaration that only served to undermine the fragile Allied coalition and to anger French rebels assisting the Allies. The Allies also started to divide up the captured French fleet among themselves, claiming that the warships were also part of reparations.


Bonaparte's construction of batteries was posing greater hazards for the British by the end of November, and Major General O'Hara decided

Bonapartist propaganda is evident in this print, which depicts Bonaparte outlining his plan for attacking Fort Mulgrave to Dugommier and the representatives. In reality, Bonaparte was a junior member at the council of war that developed the plan. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)

to act before it was too late. The Allied attack on battery *la Poudrière* indicates that they apparently did not appreciate that the French main effort was aimed at Fort Mulgrave, not Fort Malbousquet; this was a fatal error. At 0400hrs on the morning of 30 November, Major General Dundas led a sortie of 2,350 British and Neapolitan troops from the Malbousquet redoubt against the new battery *la Poudrière*. The sortie was divided into three columns: an English–Sardinian column under Dundas (including 400 British from the 2/1st Royals), a Spanish column under Izquierdo (700 troops, including the 1st and 2nd Mallorca Grenadier companies, one company each from Hibernia and Malaga, two marine companies and small detachments from other units) and a Neapolitan column under Revel. This was the largest Allied sortie of the siege and it was initially successful: the battery was overrun and four 24-pdrs were spiked. Garnier's brigade, tasked with supporting the batteries, was surprised by the pre-dawn raid and quickly routed. Unfortunately, success made Dundas overly bold and he decided to press on to occupy battery *la Farinière* while other troops pressed on to raid the ammunition parks. The Allied columns lost all cohesion in the pursuit and were no longer mutually supporting. Arriving on the scene from Ollioules, Dugommier was able to rouse the rest of Muret's division into action and launched a furious counter-attack against the exposed Allied flank. Bonaparte, always keen for action that might aid his advancement, also hurried to the battle. Back at the Malbousquet redoubt, Major General O'Hara became impatient; most likely, reports from couriers indicating that the French had been caught unawares spurred him to move forward and take command of what appeared to be a major tactical success. O'Hara mounted his horse and with virtually no escort, rode forward into the fog and pre-dawn darkness. Shortly thereafter, he reached battery *la Poudrière*, which he assumed to be occupied by Allied troops. Unfortunately, most of the Allied troops had already left the post and French skirmishers in the vanguard of Dugommier's counter-attack

A contemporary print depicting the capture Major General O'Hara during the failed sortie on 30 November 1793. Fort Malbousquet in the centre is erroneously depicted as a stone fort, when it was actually an earthen redoubt. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)






A contemporary map of Toulon showing the French Republican (striped bars) and Allied dispositions (non-striped bars) in December 1793. (René Chartrand Collection)

had already crept close to the unoccupied battery. Seeing no troops about, O'Hara impetuously decided to climb up on the battery's parapet for a better view inside and he was silhouetted. Two French skirmishers from the 2nd Battalion d'Isère saw the Allied officer and opened fire, hitting O'Hara in the arm. Rushing forward to capture the wounded enemy, the Frenchmen were amazed to see that they had just captured the enemy commander.

As the French counter-attack ripped into the uncoordinated Allied columns, the Allied troops fell back towards the Neuve River. Allied losses were heavy: 63 dead, 286 wounded and 129 captured (British losses were 229, Spanish 119, Neapolitan and Sardinian 65 each). Allied officer losses were particularly painful; in addition to O'Hara, the Spanish Colonel don Rafael Echavara (Gravina's ADC), a British major, two British captains and seven subalterns were captured, while three other Allied officers were killed and 19 wounded (total officer casualties: British 19, Spanish seven, Sardinian five, Neapolitan two). French losses were about 50 killed and 150 wounded. The victorious French attempted to follow up with a raid on Malbousquet, but this failed. Revel's Sardinians remained steady and, in conjunction with a battery of Royal Artillery, stopped the French pursuit. Nevertheless, the Allies had lost heavily and their morale sank quickly, while French morale rose accordingly. Thus perhaps one of the greatest contributions of Bonaparte's battery construction was to tempt the Allied infantry to come out of their redoubts into the open, where they were vulnerable to the numerically superior French infantry. In a dispatch to Paris, Salicetti singled Bonaparte out for his distinguished performance in this action, as well as Mouret and Garnier.

Model 1790 French 12in. brass coastal mortar in the Musée de l'Armée in Paris. This type of mortar, fired at a 45° elevation, had a practical range of 950m and a maximum range of 1,270m. (Author's photograph)



A superb view of Toulon and the inner harbour from the heights near Ollioules, 6km north-west of the city. The western end of Mount Faron is visible on the left. (René Chartrand Collection)



Whereas the Allies received only 450 reinforcements in November, consisting of one Sardinian battalion, Dugommier continued to receive a steady stream of fresh troops, including seven battalions from Lyon and 17 battalions from the Army of the Alps. On 23 November, Dugommier held a council of war at his headquarters in Ollioules; in attendance were divisional commanders Lapoype and Mouret, brigade commanders Labarre and Garnier, Bonaparte and General du Teil of the artillery, battalion commanders Sugny and Brulé, two engineer captains and several representatives. The council decided to launch a massive coordinated attack against the Allied defences once all the reinforcements en route had arrived. The plan was as follows:

- The western division would attack and seize Fort Mulgrave and then establish artillery batteries at Point L'Eguillette. These batteries would then open fire on Allied warships in the inner harbour and force them to withdraw.
- The western division would also mount a diversionary attack against the Malbousquet redoubt, supported by the battery *de la Convention*.
- The eastern division would attack and seize Mount Faron, while also conducting a diversionary attack against Cap Le Brun.
- Dugommier's intent was to present the Allied defence with near-simultaneous multiple threats so as to deceive the Allied commanders as to which was the main French attack.

By the end of November, the French had over 30,000 troops around Toulon, although only about 20,000 were combat effective. Sickness and attrition had also reduced the 17,600 available Allied troops to only about 7,600 troops actually active in the defence. While the French had yet to take and hold a single position in the Allied defence, the siege was rapidly approaching a psychological climax: the Allies felt divided and discouraged, while for the first time the French felt united and confident of victory. Even Horatio Nelson – who was briefly back in Toulon – seemed taken aback by Bonaparte's frequent bombardments, noting in his

dispatch of 1 December that 'shot and shells are very plentiful all over the harbour. I wonder more damage has not yet been done.'

THE RECAPTURE OF TOULON, DECEMBER 1793

Dugommier spent the first two weeks of December building up his forces and preparing for one final massive assault on the perimeter. Although he had been under constant pressure from the CPS in Paris to launch an immediate attack to finish the siege, Dugommier was able to gain time to carefully prepare a deliberate assault. Unlike the previous hasty attempts, he intended that the next French assault would be a coordinated combined-arms affair, employing careful engineer and artillery preparation prior to the main infantry assaults. Although the representatives were dubious of the success of any new assault, Dugommier had finally amassed 38,000 troops and had a better than three-to-one force ratio. However, food supplies were running short and the representatives pushed for a rapid conclusion to the siege before logistic problems became more acute. The representative Fréron wrote, 'we are always on the verge of collapse. All the corn of *ci-devant* Provence is exhausted.'

Minor Allied reinforcements arrived in early December but Hood was hoping that either the Austrian division or two British regiments from Gibraltar would turn up before the expected French attack. Also during early December, Hood and Dundas decided to disband the French national guard units in Toulon, since they were regarded as unreliable; the troops were not only disarmed but had to turn in their uniforms as well. Thus the Toulonais would not participate in the final defence of their city. Throughout the siege, the Allies made little or no effort to enlist the help of the Toulonais, such as asking for volunteers to dig trenches or to spy behind Republican lines. The General Committee, which had started the whole chain of events that led to the occupation of the port, were brusquely shoved aside by the Allied military governor and regarded as something of a nuisance.

Meanwhile, as part of Dugommier's 'softening up' process, Bonaparte had established several batteries around Fort Mulgrave and these began a steady bombardment of that position in the second week of December. Allied losses during the bombardment were not insignificant; Gravina's diary lists Spanish losses as six killed and 23 wounded around Fort Mulgrave in a one-week period of November, plus 11 more casualties around Fort Malbousquet. Prior to Dugommier

Lieutenant Colonel Claude Victor (1764–1841), had served eight years as an enlisted soldier in the Royal Artillery and then joined the volunteers in 1791. At Toulon, he led attacks on Mount Faron and Fort Mulgrave. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)





Grenadier cap plate from the Musée de l'Armée, Paris. Major Claude Dallemagne's 5th Grenadier Battalion spearheaded the attack on Fort Mulgrave on 18 December 1793. (Author's photograph)

assuming command, the French Army around Toulon had lived virtually hand-to-mouth but now careful staff planning allowed for the creation of a small stockpile of ammunition to support a deliberate attack. Around 0200hrs on 16 December, Bonaparte's five French batteries poured a concentrated fire into Fort Mulgrave and inflicted considerable damage. Although the French fire did not destroy all the abatis obstacles as hoped, it did serve to exhaust the Allied garrison. At headquarters in Ollioules, Dugommier coordinated with Lapoype to launch simultaneous attacks against Fort Mulgrave and Mount Faron on the morning of 17 December; this time the Allies would have to deal with French attacks on both the eastern and western fronts.

The Allies had one-third of their effective combat troops deployed to defend the vital Fort Mulgrave complex. About 1,400 Spanish, 260 British, 600 Neapolitan and 160 Sardinian troops were deployed either inside Fort Mulgrave itself (commanded by Captain Connolly of the 1/18th Royal Irish), the three outworks known as Saint-Louis, Saint-Philippe and Saint-Charles or in reserve at Fort Balaguier. The forts on or around Mount Faron were defended by a mixed force of just over 1,800 Allied troops (590 Spanish, 490 British, 540 Neapolitan and 220 Sardinian). A substantial reserve of 600 troops, mostly British, was in Fort LaMalgue. The Allied commanders, although concerned about the French build-up, were fairly confident that they could defeat any new French attack, given the poor French performance to date.

After a personal reconnaissance on the approaches to Fort Mulgrave on 14 December, Dugommier stated that the time for launching the major assault was at hand. His plan for the attack on the fort divided the strike force into four columns:

- The first column (2,100 men) under Lieutenant Colonel Victor was to hug the water's edge of the inner harbour and approach the northern side of Fort Mulgrave. Victor's column consisted of the regular 1/23rd infantry battalion, two volunteer battalions, several companies of chasseurs from the Légion Allobroges and a sapper detachment that was responsible for breaching the abatis obstacles.
- The second column (1,960 troops) under Lieutenant Colonel Nicolas Brulé was to move around to the south-east and conduct a frontal assault from the south-western side. This was probably intended as either a feint or a fixing attack to entice the Allies to commit their reserve there. Brulé's column consisted of three volunteer battalions and a company each of chasseurs and grenadiers.
- The third column (1,500 troops) under Major General Henri-François Delaborde was to follow Victor's column and exploit any breakthrough. Delaborde's column was built around Major Claude Dallemagne's 5th Grenadier Battalion with two other volunteer battalions.
- The reserve (1,500 troops) under Lieutenant Colonel Bonaparte and Captain Muiron was to remain around La Seyne until called upon. Bonaparte's command consisted of two national guard battalions – the

THE FINAL FRENCH ATTACKS

18 December 1793, viewed from the south showing the French attacks on Fort Mulgrave and Mount Faron

Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km/0.62 miles



EVENTS

1. Late on the night of 17 December, Dugommier assembles 7,000 troops in the village of La Seyne, about 1,500m away from their objective.

2. At 0200hrs on 18 December, under cover of a violent rainstorm, Dugommier leads the advance guard forward. Victor and Brulé's columns quickly merge.

3. c.0230HRS Two small combat outposts are quickly overrun and the French arrive outside the northernmost outer redoubt, Saint-Louis. However, three successive assaults fail against Saint-Louis.

4. c.0315HRS The French attack is faltering and Dugommier decides to commit his reserve. Bonaparte assumes command of the reserve and advances.

5. c.0345HRS The Spanish garrison abandons Saint-Louis under heavy pressure; gaps in the Allied defence appear.

6. c.0400HRS French assault and capture Fort Mulgrave.

7. 0300HRS Lapoye's Division begins its attack on Mount Faron. The centre column of Micas storms up the crucial Pas-de-la-Masque path and is able to gain and hold the summit, driving off a Spanish picket. Argod's column is little more than a diversion.


8. 0300HRS Lapoye leads his column around the eastern slope of Mount Faron, skirting the heavily defended Fort Croix Faron and then moves upwards to assault Fort Faron.

9. c.0500-0700HRS The Neapolitan troops from Fort L'Eguillette arrive too late to save Fort Mulgrave, but they are able to block any French advance for two hours. However, the Neapolitans' morale begins to crack and their defence crumbles. The local Allied commanders decide to evacuate the peninsula.

10. 0800HRS After a difficult night march, Lapoye's troops begin the assault on Fort Faron but are repulsed three times.

11. c.1000HRS Masséna decides to skirt further south behind Fort Faron, moving down the south-east slope of Mount Faron and succeeds in storming the lightly guarded Fort d'Artigues.

12. c.1100HRS Aware that the French have occupied parts of the high ground to their rear, most of the Spanish and Neapolitan troops begin to abandon their positions on Mount Faron, leaving three companies of the British 11th Foot to fight a hopeless rearguard action.



FRENCH FORCES

- A Battery Chasse-Coquins
- B Battery des Hommes-sans peur
- C Battery des Jacobins
- D Battery des Sans-Culottes
- E Battery de la Montagne
- F Battery de Petite Rade
- G Battery la Poudrière
- H Battery Farinière
- I Battery de la Convention
- J Victor's column (2,000 troops)
- K Brulé's column (about 2,000 troops, including 870 from 2nd Volunteer Battalion, Côte d'Or)
- L Delaborde's column (about 2,000 troops, including Major Dallemagne's grenadiers)
- M Reserve under Muiron/Bonaparte (1,000 troops)
- N Lapoype/Masséna's column (1,300 troops)
- O Micas' column (about 1,300 troops)
- P Argod's column (about 1,300 troops)
- Q Garnier's Brigade (about 2,000 troops)
- R LaHarpe's column (2nd Battalion of the 35th Line)

ALLIED FORCES

- 1 Spanish company-sized picket
- 2 three companies of British 11th Foot
- 3 a 500-man Neapolitan battalion-sized force
- 4 the Royal Navy Squadron under Hood (six ships-of-the-line)
- 5 the Spanish, Neapolitan and Sardinian squadrons

13. 1030-1130HRS The Allied troops on the Le Caire Peninsula are embarked at Fort Balaguier under cover of the Allied fleet.

14. During the French main attacks, two feint attacks are made. Brigadier General Garnier's brigade feints against the Malbousquet redoubt throughout the early morning hours, and succeeds in keeping the Allies in doubt. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel LaHarpe leads a column against Cap Le Brun as a diversion.

15. c.1200HRS Hood, Lángara, Gravina, Dundas, Valdes, Revel and Forteguerra hold a hasty council of war in Toulon; they agree to withdraw back into a smaller perimeter inside Toulon prior to an organized evacuation of the port. Hood also orders the immediate destruction of those captured French warships that could not be moved, the powder magazines and dockyards. Under threat of imminent bombardment, the Allied warships abandoned the inner harbour and move to the outer roadstead.




4th and 5th Haute-Garonne. Some of Bonaparte's artillerymen were probably also included, to man the enemy guns once Fort Mulgrave was captured.

Late on the night of 17 December, Dugommier assembled these 7,000 troops of Victor's and Brulé's brigades in the village of La Seyne, about 1,500m away from their objective. At 0200hrs on 18 December, under cover of a violent rainstorm followed by misty fog, Dugommier led the advance guard forward while Fréron and Salicetti attempted to coordinate the other columns. The French troops avoided some of the Allied sentinels by swinging wide of their defences and hugging the shoreline – some of the French troops even marched in the shallows. The Allies had a patrol of sailors to cover the shoreline approaches, but evidently they had sought shelter during the rainstorm and had not yet returned to their posts. Luck seemed to be with the French. However, a night attack is a very difficult operation and this one quickly broke down in confusion as Victor and Brulé's columns merged into one large mass and moved up the slope in a frontal assault. A Spanish sentinel finally spotted one of the columns at close range and opened fire. Two small combat outposts, one British and one Spanish, were quickly overrun with the bayonet, and the French columns arrived outside the northernmost outer redoubt, Saint-Louis, which was held by 437 Spanish troops under Colonel don Luis Ariza. Alerted by their sentinels, the Spanish troops

In this version of the final assault, Fort Mulgrave is overrun by a massed column of French infantry while Bonaparte and the representatives watch from the ramparts. The actual assault involved fewer troops and the representatives did not arrive until it was over. (René Chartrand Collection)


A fairly accurate portrayal of Bonaparte leading a handful of French troops into Fort Mulgrave through one of the gun embrasures, with General Dugommier right behind him. Note that no British troops are interfering with their effort. (René Chartrand Collection)



poured a heavy fire into the approaching French. Three successive assaults failed against this redoubt. Lieutenant Colonel Victor led his brigade forward and succeeded in reaching the ramparts of Saint-Louis. However, the defenders fought back fiercely and Victor was soon badly wounded; the attack wavered. Allied obstacles that had not been identified by the earlier reconnaissance further added to the confusion. French command and control near the breach site apparently fell apart in the darkness and confusion; the remaining brigade commanders probably could only influence soldiers in their immediate vicinity. It is not clear if Dugommier – who was probably too far forward – actually decided to commit his reserve or whether Bonaparte decided that he could not be left on the sidelines. In any event, Bonaparte led the reserve forward and joined the throng milling around the outerworks. According to Napoleon, the commitment of the reserve tipped the balance in this initial encounter but it is more likely that the fortuitous wounding of Colonel Ariza precipitated the Spanish withdrawal from Saint-Louis. By this point, Ariza realized that he was fighting against odds of more than ten to one and he probably rationalized that he had achieved his covering force mission by forcing the enemy to deploy, so he decided to withdraw to the Saint-Philippe redoubt.

At this point, the British version of the battle lays the blame for the loss of Fort Mulgrave squarely on the Spanish. However, this ignores the facts that the Spanish-held outerworks accomplished their task of providing early warning of a French attack and disrupting the vanguard of that attack. Indeed, the Spanish troops performed the outpost mission superbly and not only bought time for the defenders in Fort Mulgrave to stand-to, but completely disorganized the French assault columns. Not only were a number of key French officers wounded in the fight for the outerworks,

FORT MULGRAVE, 16 DECEMBER 1793



The layout of Fort Mulgrave is based upon a sketch made by an anonymous engineer shortly after the siege ended. While this map is accurate as far as the position and shape of Fort Mulgrave, the internal layout is less certain. Major General Dundas, the British commander, mentioned in his memoirs that Fort Mulgrave was a very ad hoc affair that was constructed by amateurs. The location of the three outerworks is even less exact and based upon French reports of the final attack. The Allies almost certainly placed obstacles and combat outposts to block the flanks around Fort Mulgrave, but the after-action reports only mention that the French ran into previously un-detected obstacles. Furthermore, while some exact information is available on the Allied strengths and dispositions on the Le Caire peninsula, factual gaps remain.

1. Village of La Seyne; the French troops used the village as an assembly area for Major General Delaborde's division.
2. Possible obstacle (abatis).
3. Saint Louis redoubt; held by Spanish Colonel Ariza with 437 troops from Chinchilla and Lorca regiments. Probably 2–4 light cannon.

4. Saint Philippe redoubt; held by about 250 Spanish troops with 2 light cannon.
5. Abatis obstacle belt around Fort Mulgrave.
6. Fort Mulgrave; the main position was under the command of British Captain Connolly of the Royal Irish and his garrison included about 300 British soldiers, marines and naval gunners. Mulgrave's artillery was probably 2 x 36-pdrs, 4 x 24-pdrs, 2x 12-pdrs and 2 mortars.
7. Combat outposts; each picket was composed of about 20–25 soldiers.
8. Saint Charles redoubt; held by Brigadier General Izquierdo with about 500 Spanish troops, including grenadiers from Hibernia and Spanish marines. The redoubt held about 4 light cannon.
9. Possible obstacle (abatis).
10. Communications trail back to Fort Balaguier.
11. Battery *Jacobins*; 3 x 24-pdrs, 5x mortars.
12. Battery *des hommes-sans-peur*; 3 x 16-pdrs, 2 x 12-pdr mortars, 3x 8-pdr mortars.
13. Battery *Chasse-Coquins*; 3 x 16-pdrs, 3x mortars.
14. Battery *de Quatre Moulins*; 2 x 24-pdrs.

but the French reserve was committed before the main assault even reached Fort Mulgrave. Thanks to the Spanish defence of the outerworks – a defence in which one-third of the defenders were killed or wounded – the main French attack was in danger of prematurely culminating.

The Spanish retreat, in heavy contact and in the darkness, did not go well and left gaps in the outer defence. The arrival of the French reserve under Bonaparte coincided with the Spanish defenders pulling out of Saint-Louis, and the Allied defence began to crumble in confusion, thanks in large part to the hotchpotch command structure. Although Bonaparte's troopers were far from the best available for a night assault,

This print by Raffet depicts Bonaparte leading the charge into Fort Mulgrave. In fact Captain Muiron was the first French officer into the fort and the initial opposition was less numerous than suggested here. (René Chartrand Collection)



they were assembled and ready to proceed, which was more than Victor's or Brulé's disorganized commands were capable of. Apparently, Dugommier gave Bonaparte permission to take the lead and push on to the primary objective, supplemented by whatever chasseurs and grenadiers were available. Bonaparte was apparently also aided by the fact that his protégé, Captain Muiron, knew the terrain around Fort Mulgrave fairly well and was aware of dead space on the northern approaches.

Inside Fort Mulgrave, the defenders were apparently distracted by a feint to the south-west and had difficulty determining where the French attack was actually developing (the darkness, rain and battle noise made visibility difficult and the slopes in front of Mulgrave were now crawling with retreating Spanish and advancing French troops). Most of the




Fort L'Eguillette was built between 1672 and 1680. In 1793 this fort mounted ten 36-pdr cannon and dominated the approaches to the inner harbour. The hill behind the fort is where Fort Mulgrave was located. (Author's photograph)

gunners and defending infantry were facing opposite the direction from which Bonaparte was about to attack. When handfuls of French troops approached Fort Mulgrave unexpectedly from its north side, the low rate of fire of the fort's large 32- and 24-pdrs and the difficulty in sufficiently depressing these weapons made it difficult for the artillerymen to engage the advancing French infantry at close range. Indeed, despite the fort's imposing armament, it was apparent at the critical moment that the defences suffered from a failure to adequately cover dead space – as evident from the fact that at least one cannon volley was fired over the heads of the advancing column of French chasseurs.

Lack of light artillery in Fort Mulgrave was a serious mistake. The small number of British infantry and marines manning the northern rampart managed a ragged volley, but this went virtually unnoticed as several hundred chasseurs and grenadiers reached the fort's outer ditch. Bonaparte's column, probably led by chasseurs from the Légion Allobroges and the 6th Battalion de Marseille, easily started to cross the shallow outer ditch, which was strewn with only a sparse line of *chevaux de frise*. Major General Dugommier apparently watched the breach from a nearby vantage point and directed a group of grenadiers to follow Bonaparte's group. The fleet-footed French chasseurs, led by Captain Muiron, quickly clambered through the ditch and scaled Fort Mulgrave's stacked gambion walls; in a matter of seconds they were inside. A short, sharp close combat in the darkness followed, with the chasseurs bayoneting most of the naval gunners and chasing off the handful of British marines. Bonaparte climbed through one of the gun embrasures just as the close-quarter combat was ending. At this point, perhaps 20–30 French troops had penetrated the fort and captured two guns. Dugommier himself clambered over the ramparts and encouraged an approaching French grenadier column to hurry towards the breach.

Alerted to the penetration of the fort, Captain Connolly of the 1/18th Royal Irish was able to quickly organize a counter-attack with about 80 soldiers, marines and naval gunners. The British counter-attack hit Bonaparte's small group only a few minutes after they had scaled the wall




Lapoype's troops entering Toulon on the morning of 19 December 1793. Note the single Allied warship leaving the harbour in the distance and the fires in the arsenal. Lapoype actually had very little cavalry. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)

and before the French grenadiers had joined them. The close-quarter fighting in the deck was desperate – this was the closest that Bonaparte would ever come to being killed in battle – and virtually all the French attackers were wounded. Bonaparte received a cut on his upper thigh – either from a bayonet or spontoon – and had to use his sword to fend off a British sergeant. Dugommier was wounded, as well as Bonaparte's trusted aide, Captain Muiron. The British counter-attack nearly overwhelmed Bonaparte and the French commander, but the attack ran out of steam just as the French grenadiers began scaling the ramparts. In a moment, the tide had turned and hundreds of fresh French troops poured into the fort, routing the spent British troops. Many of the British troops escaped the fort through exits on the south side, but British losses included at least 62 marines, 29 sailors and about 150 soldiers. French losses inside the fort were fairly heavy, including at least 80 killed and about 200 wounded. In addition to Bonaparte and Muiron, French officer casualties around Fort Mulgrave included Brigadier General Delaborde and Major Hyacinthe Despinoy, Dugommier's chief of staff. The French had succeeded in a daring assault upon Fort Mulgrave but virtually all their key leaders were wounded and their troops were totally disorganized. Major Jean Baptiste Cervoni, who would later serve Bonaparte so well in the 1796–97 Italian campaign, was one of the few unwounded French officers and he stood atop the parapet and signalled the fort's capture to the nearby representatives. Salicetti and Fréron soon arrived, swords in hand, and congratulated Dugommier on his victory.

As the fate of Fort Mulgrave hung in the balance, Spanish Brigadier General Izquierdo, in the nearby Saint-Charles redoubt on the opposite side of Fort Mulgrave, was uncertain where the French main attack was developing and he hesitated to commit the available Allied reserves that could have made the difference. Spanish losses thus far in the fighting in the outerworks were 74 killed, 49 wounded and 255 missing. Izquierdo decided to wait and see, perhaps launching a counter-attack at dawn.







THE STORMING OF FORT MULGRAVE, 18 DECEMBER 1793

(pages 74–75)

In the early morning hours of 18 December 1793, 5,000 French troops under Major General Dugommier began the final assault on the main Allied position guarding the western side of Toulon's harbour, known as Fort Mulgrave. The hastily constructed fort was situated on the Heights of La Grasse and was protected by three smaller outworks and a number of squad-size combat outposts. Amidst cold, heavy rain Dugommier's night attack quickly rolled over the combat outposts but became tangled up in the Spanish-held Saint-Louis redoubt. It took three costly assaults on the redoubt before the Spanish routed and opened up access to Fort Mulgrave, but the three main French assault columns were disorganized in the dark and Lieutenant Colonel Victor, leader of the main assault column, was badly wounded. It looked as though the French attack might fail, and in desperation Dugommier decided to commit his 2,000-man reserve under Chef de Bataillon Bonaparte. The young artillery officer, eager for victory and glory, quickly led the reserve column forward. Bonaparte was aided by the confusion in the Allied perimeter caused by the Spanish rout and the fact that his aide, Captain Muiron, was familiar with the terrain around the fort. Although Fort Mulgrave was armed with heavy cannon taken from captured French coastal batteries, the Allies had not covered all approach routes adequately. Muiron skilfully led Bonaparte's column up through hilly dead space on the north side of the fort. Because of the rain and darkness, the column was not

detected until it was within small arms range. A battery of two 32-pdr naval cannon (1) on the north side of the fort, manned by British naval gunners (2) from four warships in the fleet, fired one volley at the approaching column but it passed harmlessly over the heads of the French troops. A detachment of British marines (3) provided security for the gun crews and manned the parapets. Bonaparte's column, which was led by a company of chasseurs each from the Légion Allobroges and the 6th Battalion de Marseille, also included Dugommier with some of the remaining grenadiers from the 1st Battalion/50th Line. After the ineffective British volley, the French troops rushed to cross the fort's outer ditch, which was neither deep nor wide, and covered by only a thin row of *chevaux de frise*. The French chasseurs (4), attacking in open order, quickly scampered up the parapet, led by Captain Muiron (5). While Muiron's handful of chasseurs fought at close quarters with the British sailors and marines, Bonaparte (6) followed up with more chasseurs while Dugommier (7) stood on the outer glacis urging the grenadier assault column forward. Just after the French captured the 32-pdr battery, British infantry from the 1/18th Royal Irish under Captain Connolly launched a counter-attack that almost hurled the French out of the fort. Indeed, both Bonaparte and Dugommier were wounded in the counter-attack but the continued infusion of more French troops over the parapets tipped the balance. Around 0400hrs, Captain Connolly and two Sardinian officers led the Allied survivors in a desperate but successful effort to fight their way through to Fort L'Eguillette. (Adam Hook)

Mount Faron and Toulon as seen from the Great Tower. Allied positions atop Faron could communicate by signal flags with the tower, which could relay messages to the anchored fleet in the outer harbour. (Author's photograph)



The delay was fatal, not only allowing the French to consolidate their objective but also helping to precipitate a collapse in morale among the uncommitted Allied troops. About 0500hrs, 400–500 Neapolitan troops sent from Fort L'Eguillette were able to establish a blocking position east of Fort Mulgrave that bought several hours for the battered Allied troops to withdraw unmolested into the environs of Fort Balaguier. Dugommier was able to rally a few of the exhausted French troops to begin advancing towards Fort L'Eguillette, and Bonaparte was able to lob a few 24-pdr rounds from the captured British guns over the trees towards the Allies. Although the French pressure was minimal, it was enough to dishearten the Neapolitan rearguard and they abandoned the blocking position around 0700hrs. Izquierdo called off his intended counter-attack to retake the fort. With the defence of the Le Caire Peninsula crumbling by the minute, the local Allied commanders decided to evacuate the surviving troops before the French could move their artillery forward. Under the guns of the *Commerce de Marseilles* (which had Rear-Admiral Trogoft aboard), *Pompée* and three Spanish frigates, the Allied troops were embarked at Fort Balaguier between 1030–1130hrs. Owing to the lack of pursuit, the Allies were able to withdraw most of their wounded, spike many of the guns and destroy the remaining ammunition. Forts Balaguier and L'Eguillette were abandoned without a shot being fired. The exhausted, leaderless French troops did not interfere with the evacuation. The loss of this key position now placed the Allied naval lifeline into Toulon at risk. After lobbing a few shells at the Heights de Grasse, most of the Allied warships withdrew into the outer harbour.

While the main attack was conducted against Fort Mulgrave, a feint attack was made against the Malbousquet redoubt by Brigadier General Pierre-Dominique Garnier's brigade, under the supervision of Major General André Mouret. Some of Bonaparte's other batteries delivered harassing fire on Malbousquet, which helped to reinforce the deception. This effort succeeded in fixing the garrison at Malbousquet and confusing the Allies as to French objectives.




The scene of Napoleon Bonaparte's first battlefield triumph – the Heights of Grasse, as seen from across the harbour at the Royal Tower. Fort Balaguier and Fort L'Eguillette are visible near the water's edge. (Author's photograph)

On the east side of Toulon, the other pincer of the French offensive began to move nearly simultaneously with the assault on Fort Mulgrave. Lapoype planned to seize Mount Faron with 4,000 troops in three columns: the left column led by Lapoype himself and Brigadier General André Masséna's brigade, the centre column under Lieutenant Colonel Jean-François Micas (1749–1825) and the right column under Lieutenant Colonel François Argod (1759–99). Masséna was a 35-year-old former NCO who had received a commission in the Garde Nationale in 1790. His 1,300-man brigade had only arrived from the Army of Italy three days before the final assault on Toulon and it consisted of the 3rd Battalion Haute-Garonne, the 1st Battalion/28th Infantry, four companies of grenadiers and a company of skirmishers. Micas was a 44-year-old former geographer who had been commissioned as a lieutenant in the line infantry in 1792 and then rapidly made a brigade adjutant in 1793. Argod's column was based around his own 5th Battalion/Bouches-du-Rhône and he was typical of the former company-grade officers in the old royal army who had rapidly been given battalion commands. Lapoype's plan of attack also included a feint, which was a column of the 2nd Battalion of the 35th Line led by Lieutenant Colonel Amédée LaHarpe against Cap Le Brun.

Lapoype had a greater distance to move and over rougher terrain at night, so the rain was a serious impediment to his attack. Nevertheless, he began his attack on Mount Faron around 0300hrs, with chasseurs and other light infantrymen stealthily creeping up the north slope of the mountain. Incredibly, the Allies had not learned their lesson from the previous French attack on Mount Faron and the crucial Pas-de-la-Masque was again poorly guarded. The centre column of Micas moved quickly up this path and was rolled right over a small Spanish picket, but Micas then stopped to consolidate his position. On the right, Argod's column achieved minor success but mostly acted as a diversion. On the

THE ALLIED EVACUATION OF TOULON, 18 DECEMBER 1793



1. Neapolitan garrison abandons Missessy Battery without orders in early morning hours, exposing the flank of Fort Matbouquet.
2. French detect signs of allied disorder and launch surprise assault before dawn on Matbouquet. Spanish garrison withdraws into Toulon.
3. Late afternoon, Bonaparte establishes 10 guns at Eguillette to begin firing into inner harbor.
4. Neapolitan troops and Toulonnais civilians begin evacuating from dockyard area with whatever shipping is available.
5. 1700hrs. Commodore Smith's Anglo-Spanish flotilla heads into inner harbor to destroy the French warships and naval facilities.
6. 2000hrs. Smith's British flotilla tows a fireship into the New Arsenal basin.
7. 2100hrs. Anglo-Spanish flotilla begins embarking on beach near Fort Saint Louis. Anglo-Sardinian rearguard under Major Koehler holds Fort LaMalgue.
8. 2200hrs. Smith's detachment ignites the fireship in the New Arsenal and sets fire to the mast house, the tar store and three warships under construction.
9. Perishing fire from French skirmishers on west side of town and from Fort Eguillette.
10. Reluctant remonger, with a small detachment of the 2/1 Royals holds the Royal Gate during the scuttling operations and then is taken off by Smith's flotilla.
11. 2100hrs. the Spanish flotilla is unable to enter the Old Arsenal basin due to a boom.
12. 2300hrs. the Spanish flotilla sets fire to two frigates that explode and damage a 60 of Smith's gunboats.
13. 2400hrs. Smith's flotilla destroys two French 74s on way out.
14. Dawn, 19 December 1793. Allies abandon Fort LaMalgue and the rearguard is evacuated.



Fort Saint-Louis and the beaches of Mourillon, the Allied embarkation point, to the right. The fort played a more important role in the siege of 1707 than 1793. (Author's photograph)

French left, Lapoype led his column around the eastern slope of Mount Faron, skirting the heavily defended Fort Croix Faron and then moved upwards to assault Fort Faron. Located on the south-east corner of Mount Faron, the fort was defended by 395 Allied troops, consisting of one company each of British, Neapolitan and Sardinians. There were also seven 12-pdrs in the fort. Moving up the steep slope, Lapoype's column was repulsed three times in attacking Fort Faron and the Sardinian Lieutenant Colonel Faussone de Germagnano was killed in this action. However, the cunning Masséna decided to skirt further south behind Fort Faron, moving down the south-east slope of Mount Faron and he succeeded in storming Fort d'Artigues. This small fort was held by only 20 British troops, under a subaltern, and 89 Neapolitan troops, most of whom apparently fled without a fight. Although the loss of Fort d'Artigues was a minor blow, it contributed to the breakdown of Allied morale on Mount Faron because the garrisons on the mountain felt isolated. Most of the Spanish and Neapolitan troops began to abandon their positions on Mount Faron, leaving three companies of the 11th Foot to fight a hopeless rearguard action. The Allies retained some positions on or near Mount Faron, but by sunrise the French held enough of the mountain to compromise the Allied defensive perimeter.


On the morning of 18 December, Hood, Lángara, Gravina, Dundas, Valdés, Revel and Forteguerra held a hasty council of war; Hood and Gravina wanted to continue the defence, since they were sure that Austrian and more British reinforcements would arrive soon, but the others favoured immediate withdrawal. When Dundas proclaimed the defence untenable, Hood acquiesced. The council agreed to order the remaining positions at L'Eguillette, Balaguier and Faron to be abandoned; all troops would withdraw back into a smaller perimeter inside Toulon prior to an organized withdrawal. Hood also ordered the immediate destruction of those captured French warships that could not be moved, the powder magazines and dockyards. Under threat of

imminent bombardment, the Allied warships abandoned the inner harbour and moved to the outer roadstead. By the afternoon of the 18th, the Allied defence was contracting back into Toulon. The French used this period to occupy these abandoned positions and to move up more artillery. By late afternoon, Bonaparte had ten guns under Marmont ready to sweep the harbour from L'Eguillette.

A withdrawal in the face of an aggressive enemy is a difficult operation under the best of conditions, and the Allied forces were not in the best shape at this point. During the night of 18 December, Allied command control broke down and the individual national contingents started to conduct withdrawals without informing the others. It started when a small Neapolitan contingent withdrew, without orders, from the Missiessy battery, a small redoubt behind Malbousquet. More unauthorized withdrawals followed as the Neapolitans embarked their troops from Cap Cepet, Sablettes, Malbousquet and Cap Le Brun on their own warships. However, they saw no reason to land their troops inside the new perimeter and instead, viewing the situation as hopeless, sailed home during the night. The Neapolitan withdrawal was a disaster; 780 troops were left behind as well as 15 cannon, all their horses, tents and baggage. Likewise, the Sardinian detachment at Cap Le Brun also decided to exit the defence at this time. Seeing that other Allied contingents were withdrawing, the Spanish hastily abandoned the Malbousquet redoubt – which the alert French quickly seized. At this point, the French began a harassing bombardment from L'Eguillette and Malbousquet at Allied ships withdrawing from the inner harbour, which brought many of the retreating Allies to the verge of panic. A long-range harassing fire with a few heavy pieces was also begun against the dockyard area and Toulon itself. British detachments from the 2/1st Royals still held the gates to Toulon, but few other troops made any serious effort to hold their positions. As the civilian population in Toulon realized that the end was near, panic erupted as thousands of civilians made for the nearest embarkation point. The General Committee members who had started the entire affair were among the first to bolt and seek the safety of the Allied warships in the inner harbour.

All Allied cohesion collapsed at dusk on 18 December, as the withdrawal became a collapse. Hood might have been able to hold Toulon for a few days with his troops concentrated in a tighter perimeter, but this was now impossible. Those troops still ashore, mostly British, withdrew into a small defensive perimeter around Fort LaMalgue and awaited embarkation. Starting at 2100hrs on 18 December, British marines established an embarkation point on Mourillon beach near Fort Saint-Louis, and long boats from the warships began to arrive to collect the troops who were assembling on the beach. Apparently, no Allied officers were in charge of the evacuation – it just happened, as men scrambled to avoid capture by the advancing Republicans. However, just when naval power could make a difference, Hood had very little left, owing to the dispersion of the British fleet on other missions in the Mediterranean. His fleet at Toulon had dwindled to only six ships-of-the-line at the time of the evacuation (including HMS *Couraguex* (74), which had a broken rudder).

Despite months of warning, the Allies did not have a good plan for the rapid destruction of the captured French fleet and arsenal. Instead, it was a sloppy, ad hoc and amateurish operation. Captain Sir William Sydney



The evacuation of Toulon on the night of 18 December 1793. On the left, the French frigate *Isis*, loaded with over 200 tons of gunpowder, explodes. In the centre, the French 74s *Héros* and *Thémistocle* are set on fire by Smith's gunboats, while the arsenal burns in the background. (National Maritime Museum)

Smith, who volunteered for the mission, led a small group of British and Spanish volunteers on seven light craft into the inner harbour late on the afternoon of 18 December. His group came under intermittent French artillery fire from L'Eguillette and Malbousquet, but suffered no casualties from the enemy (the fire was at the extreme range of 1,400–1,600m). Incredibly, Smith was ordered not to begin the destruction of the French fleet until the Allied embarkation was complete. Around 2000hrs, Smith's group towed a fireship into the New Arsenal basin and moored it beside a row of anchored French ships-of-the-line. Two hours later, Smith gave the signal to ignite the fireship and charges set at two powder magazines ashore. The fireship caused the destruction of six ships-of-the-line, which burned quickly, but the hulls settled relatively undamaged in the shallow waters of the harbour. In the naval base itself, the British set fire to a warehouse full of masts and another with large stockpiles of rope. However, the Spanish contingent under Don Pedro Cotiella performed poorly; they never made it into the Old Arsenal's inner basin because of a boom barring the entrance, and in a hurry to leave they set fire to two French frigates – the *Isis* (32) and *Montréal* (32) – which were moored 1,600m outside the arsenal. Both vessels were heavily laden with powder (each held about 220 tons of powder; in comparison, the Union mine at Petersburg in 1864 was a 4-ton detonation) and they exploded suddenly, sinking one of the British light craft. As a result of this chaos, Smith decided to leave the inner basin, but on the way out he set fire to two other French 74s – the *Héros* and *Thémistocle*, which were moored away from the docks. On board both ships were 600 French naval prisoners who had been forgotten in the rush of events; Smith decided to ferry them to the dockyard area and release them. While this was a humane gesture, it was not entirely wise and it wasted a great deal of time. During the whole scuttling operation, Smith's group had to contend with looting Allied stragglers and French civilians desperate to flee the oncoming Republicans. All told, Smith's

Fort Saint-Louis seen from the beaches at Mourillon. This fort was rebuilt in 1708 after the original was destroyed in the siege of 1707. In 1793 it mounted 12 cannons and two mortars. (Author's photograph)




group destroyed nine French ships-of-the-line (1 x 80, 8 x 74), three frigates and two corvettes. Several British light craft, including the gunboats that had earlier engaged Bonaparte's batteries, were abandoned in the port.

By dawn on 19 December, the Allied troops had completed the evacuation with minimal interference from the French. The last unit to embark was the Royal Louis battalion, which acted as part of the rearguard and left behind about 80–100 of its troops. In addition to the Allied troops, Hood and Gravina evacuated about 7,500 civilians from Toulon (most of these émigrés settled on Elba, Corsica and in Tuscany). The Allied fleets also took with them four captured French ships-of-the-line (1 x 120 and 3 x 74s), seven frigates and five corvettes. Hood pulled his fleet back to Hyères, an island just off Toulon. At 0900hrs, the first French Republican troops entered Toulon. They were amazed to find that not only was the destruction of the naval base incomplete, but that much of the French Toulon squadron was still intact – including 14 ships-of-the-line (1 x 120, 3 x 80 and 10 x 74s), one frigate and three corvettes. Not surprisingly, the fires in the naval base had been brought under control by the naval prisoners that Smith had released in the dockyard.

Hood does not appear to have done a very good job informing his chain of command about the fall of Toulon, since for the next several weeks unwitting British ships kept attempting to enter the inner harbour. Twelve days after Toulon fell, a British convoy arrived off the port from Gibraltar carrying elements of the 15th and 51st Foot, but fortunately they did not attempt to enter the port. The frigate HMS *Moselle* (24) was less fortunate, and it was captured upon entering the inner harbour on 7 January 1794. Four days later, the frigate HMS *Juno* entered the port at nightfall and came under point-blank fire from Bonaparte's batteries at Fort Balaguier, but managed to escape with light damage.

The Allies suffered about 1,600 casualties in the siege, including at least 300–400 killed in action. British army and navy losses were about 700, including about 150 killed, 280 wounded and 270 captured or missing. Hardest hit were the 2/1st Royals and the 1/18th Royal Irish, which suffered over 25 per cent losses, and the Royal Marine detachment. The equally hard-fighting Spanish suffered 1,241 casualties, with about



200 killed, 640 wounded and 400 missing. Neapolitan and Sardinian forces each lost over 100 battle casualties and abandoned close to 1,000 of their men during the evacuation. French losses were about 500 killed and 1,200 wounded. Losses to disease, non-battle causes and malingering probably reduced available troop strength on each side by about 25 per cent.

A scene of panic envelopes Toulon as it becomes apparent that the Allied forces are evacuating the city on 18 December 1793. As French warships burn in the arsenal, civilians struggle to reach the evacuation boats. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection)

AFTERMATH

Recaptured Toulon was exposed to the full wrath of the Reign of Terror, executions beginning almost immediately. At least 300 citizens were shot without trial and 282 executed by guillotine (those executed included 27 rebel officers, 134 soldiers, 13 sailors, 11 priests, 78 artisans, 21 merchants, 20 clerks and 24 women). Fréron bragged in a report to the CPS that 'we are killing everything that moves' and he recommended the massacre of all the surviving Toulonnais and the burning of the city. It is unlikely that Bonaparte had anything to do with these atrocities, since his leg wound was serious enough to limit his mobility for several days. Based upon his correspondence, it appears that after he recovered Bonaparte spent the next several weeks focusing on inspecting and adjusting the local coastal batteries in case the Allied fleet returned. In any event, the population was reduced to 40 per cent of its pre-siege level and the city was renamed 'Port de la Montagne'. Bonaparte wrote his own letters to the Ministry of War that began: 'I promised you brilliant successes and, as you see, I have kept my word.' He also began a career habit of lying in dispatches by falsely claiming that he had sunk a British frigate with red-hot shot during the evacuation.

Although nearly half the French Mediterranean Fleet was lost as a result of the siege, the naval base and many warships survived. Even the ships that had burned had sunk in very shallow water and the French could salvage valuable copper plates from the hulls, as well as metal

A model of the French frigate *Sultane* (32), built in 1765 at Toulon and decommissioned prior to the Revolution. The hulk was burned by the British in December 1793. Musée de la Marine, Toulon. (Author's photograph)





LEFT Lieutenant Auguste Marmont (1774–1852), a 19-year-old artillery officer in the 1st Regiment of Foot Artillery (the old Régiment La Fère). He served closely with Bonaparte in the batteries at Toulon and would be promoted to marshal in 1809. (René Chartrand Collection)

Jean Junot (1771–1813) joined a volunteer unit in 1791 and saw considerable action with the Army of the North in 1792–93, being wounded twice. Junot became a devoted follower of Napoleon at Toulon. (René Chartrand Collection)

fittings and some armaments. Had the French ships been scuttled in the outer harbour or off Hyères, there would have been little chance of salvage. Nor did the Allies inflict serious damage upon the dockyard or repair facilities. In order to demonstrate that the French naval base was still functional, the Committee of Public Safety in Paris ordered a crash shipbuilding programme and four new ships-of-the-line and one frigate were laid down at Toulon in 1794. In short order, the French Mediterranean Fleet was reconstituted and Bonaparte would use it to launch his invasion of Egypt five years later. A total of eight French ships-of-the-line recovered in Toulon would participate in Napoleon's expedition to Egypt in 1798, including the *Dauphin Royal* (120) that would be renamed *Orient*. If these ships had been destroyed at Toulon






Lieutenant Colonel Louis Suchet (1770–1826), commander of the 4th Battalion of volunteers of l'Ardèche at Toulon. Suchet joined the national guard in 1791 and rose to the rank of marshal in 1811. (René Chartrand Collection)

in 1793, Napoleon's Egyptian expedition would not have been feasible and the ambitious general would have been forced to consider operations in other theatres, such as Germany or Italy.

Without a coherent strategic plan, the Allied defence of Toulon had coasted on inertia. No real joint command was created, nor was the population of Toulon utilized in the fight to defend their city. In British minds, armed regulars, not unruly and rebellious civilians, fought wars. The British commanders lost sight of their true objective for landing in Toulon – which was to neutralize the French Mediterranean Fleet – and could not decide whether their mission was merely a short-term raid or a protracted deliberate defence. Inter-Allied bickering and mistrust only exacerbated the confusion over objectives. Hood was given a rare strategic opportunity in August 1793 to gain a decisive victory at no cost by merely burning the fleet and naval base, then retiring. Instead the Allies muddled through until they failed to achieve any of their objectives.

The French victory at Toulon was significant in many respects. In addition to salvaging the French naval position in the Mediterranean and crushing a dangerous counter-revolutionary enclave, it was one of the rare French military triumphs over the British. Although often a polyglot army led with varying degrees of skill, the French siege army was a force that learned from its mistakes and was always improving. By December 1793, the French demonstrated that they had learned the basics of combined-arms tactics and operational coordination in order to achieve overwhelming mass at the decisive points on the battlefield. Toulon is also remarkable as the only campaign that Bonaparte would fight as a subordinate, and both he and his young comrades demonstrated that Revolutionary France had unearthed a treasure trove of military talent.

Victory brought quick reward for the men who led the fight: within a week of the re-occupation of Toulon the representatives nominated Masséna and Garnier for promotion to major general; Victor, Brulé, Despinoy, Dallemagne, Micas, Guillot, LaHarpe and Bonaparte for promotion to brigadier general. Some histories suggest that Bonaparte was singled out for promotion because Dugommier commended him by name in his dispatches to Paris about the victory, but taken in perspective it is clear that virtually all the leaders who participated in the final assault were bumped up one grade (which was fairly typical whenever Republican armies won a victory). It would also be inaccurate to state that Bonaparte's career was made at Toulon; he was unable to immediately gain a successful follow-up command of his own. The most important benefit for his career was the recognition that his batteries had played a vital role in the victory. Indeed, Bonaparte's career languished for the next two years after Toulon, briefly being appointed commander of the artillery in the Army of Italy but then being put under arrest for a month in August 1794 when Robespierre fell. Once again, Bonaparte's career was given a boost by one of the representatives who served at Toulon – Paul Barras – who arranged for him to be appointed second in command of the Army of the Interior. This posting placed Bonaparte in the right place at the right time, for he helped to disperse rebels in Paris in October 1795, and the grateful Convention government appointed him to command the Army of Italy in March 1796. Thus Bonaparte's political skills in winning the patronage of the powerful representatives of the people were just as critical as his demonstrated military prowess in securing his destiny. As for the actual commander who



The *Commerce de Marseille* (120), the five-year-old flagship of the Toulon squadron, was initially regarded by the Royal Navy as a great prize. However, the massive warship soon proved unsuitable and it was broken up in 1802. (National Maritime Museum)

planned and directed the final capture of Toulon, Dugommier was rewarded with a new command in the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees but was killed in battle 11 months later. The lengthy siege of Toulon began a slow weeding-out process of the older, less competent officers in the French armies in the south. Mediocrities such as Carteaux and Lapoype drifted off into obscurity while a generation of rising stars such as Bonaparte, Victor and Masséna were moving upwards.

Bonaparte also began to develop a loyal following of officers who served with him at Toulon that would have great implications later. He developed particularly close ties with the officers in the 4th Artillery, including Duroc, Marmont, Muiron and Junot. At Toulon, Bonaparte gained something in addition to recognition and which was far more rare in his later career: friendship. The men who grew close to Bonaparte at Toulon were attracted to him because of his charm and skill, unlike later followers who sought imperial favours. Geraud Duroc became one of Bonaparte's closest friends and would serve him loyally as his aide in Egypt and Italy, then command Oudinot's grenadiers at Austerlitz. Duroc also played a critical role in Napoleon's diplomacy in 1805–7. Napoleon was normally unmoved by the death of subordinates, but Duroc's death at Bautzen in 1813 had a great effect upon the emperor and contributed to the depression that plagued his later years. Jean Muiron is not well known to history but as senior aide to Bonaparte in Italy in November 1796 he faithfully died protecting Bonaparte from enemy fire on the bridge at Arcola. Marmont would also become a close friend of Bonaparte and would be promoted to marshal of the empire in 1809, but he would betray the emperor five years later. Junot's courage under fire at Toulon impressed Bonaparte, and the former law student secured a commission as sous-lieutenant in the artillery in October 1793. Thereafter, Junot became Bonaparte's trusted aide-de-camp in 1795–96 and eventually rose to become a corps commander in Portugal, Spain and Russia. Unfortunately, Junot suffered from multiple wounds, syphilis, mental illness and financial irresponsibility. His command skills also became erratic after 1806 and Bonaparte only gave him more commands



Captain Sir William Sydney Smith (1764–1840) was the man charged with burning the French fleet during the evacuation. A naval adventurer of sorts, Smith had considerable combat experience during the American War of Independence and with the Swedish navy. He joined Hood's fleet at Toulon in his own privately purchased sloop. Five years after Toulon, Smith would again encounter Napoleon at Acre. (National Maritime Museum)

out of loyalty to a devoted follower. Eventually Junot committed suicide in 1813. Dommartin, the wounded artillery officer whom Bonaparte replaced, returned to serve as an artillery commander in Italy, Germany and Egypt until his death in 1799. Bonaparte also made close connections with Delaborde, Masséna and Victor that he would utilize in developing a cadre of trusted and able subordinates. Victor in particular would serve Napoleon well at Marengo and Friedland, for which he was made a marshal of the empire. However, like Marmont, Victor would later desert Napoleon's cause in 1815. Suchet was not an intimate friend of Bonaparte's, but his skills were highly regarded and he ended up being the only one of Napoleon's marshals not to bury his reputation in Spain.

On the Allied side, defeat was a bitter pill for many but provided valuable experience for others. Major General O'Hara was exchanged but died nine years later of his wounds while serving as governor of Gibraltar. Mulgrave had little field command after Toulon but he enjoyed a successful political and diplomatic career that secured high government posts. His greatest legacy was the development of his two aide-de-camps: Thomas Graham and Rowland Hill, both of whom later became lieutenant generals. Graham began his military career on Mulgrave's staff and went on to serve with both Moore and Wellington in Spain, including playing a critical role at the battle of Vittoria in 1812. Hill was a 21-year-old captain at Toulon, but he rose to become Wellington's best commander in Spain and at Waterloo. Rear-Admiral Gravina served as second in command of the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar in 1805, where he was mortally wounded. The Spanish navy suffered badly when Spain switched sides in 1796; of the 23 Spanish ships-of-the-line that served at Toulon, eight would subsequently be lost in action against the British, including four at Trafalgar. Rear-Admiral Trogoff went with the British fleet to the isle of Elba, where he died two months later. Rear-Admiral Saint-Julien was briefly re-instated by the government in Paris but his career was effectively over; he died destitute six years later. The remnants of the Royal Louis regiment were inducted into British service as an émigré unit and served well in Corsica in 1794, but the unit was amalgamated with other émigré troops and after being badly handled at Quiberon in 1795 it was disbanded.

The Royal Navy also began a weeding-out process after the failed defence of Toulon, with elderly officers such as Hood making way for a rising generation of stars. Although he played only a minor role at Toulon, Horatio Nelson would soon grow into England's finest naval leader. Captain Sir William Sydney Smith would meet Bonaparte again and frustrate his siege of Acre in 1798, but Smith's career in the Royal Navy was problematic since he was regarded as something of a fraud by Nelson. In 1815, Captain Elphinstone was responsible for transporting Napoleon to Plymouth from Rochefort.

Even the warships taken from Toulon by the Allies proved to be a disappointment, since most proved to be in poor condition. The captured warships were crewed primarily by rebel French sailors who wished to depart with the Allies, along with a small British prize crew. The *Commerce de Marseilles* (120), the five-year-old flagship of the Toulon squadron, was initially regarded by the Royal Navy as a great prize, but after a single voyage to Plymouth the vessel was regarded as too poorly built for sea service; thereafter it served as a hulk until broken up in 1802. The British

took three of the captured French 74s, ten frigates and one sloop; the *Pompeé* (74) served well in the British Mediterranean Fleet in 1799–1801 and was not broken up until 1817, but few of the other captured warships lasted long in British service. The Sardinians, Neapolitans and Spanish each took a frigate or sloop as token booty from Toulon; however, the French recaptured the frigate *Alceste* from the Sardinians five months later.

THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY

Although Toulon is still the headquarters of the French Mediterranean Fleet, the port and city have changed a great deal in the past two centuries. The urban area has spread well outside the boundaries of the old town, covering up all of Bonaparte's former battery positions. World War II also had a great impact on Toulon, including several destructive Allied air raids on the German U-Boat facilities in the port. In November 1942, the French Mediterranean Fleet was again scuttled in the harbour, this time to avoid capture by the Germans. While the waterfront area of the city displays the typical charm of the French Riviera, the area surrounding the naval base is somewhat seedy and run-down. Unfortunately, while there is much of historical value to see in the Toulon area, little of it relates to either Napoleon or the siege of 1793. Napoleon does not appear to be very popular among the Toulonnais today – which is hardly surprising given the mass executions that followed the Republican victory – and there are no statues or memorials to the young officer who made his start here.

Most of the 1793-era forts are still in existence, although few are open to the public. The Royal Tower, or Great Tower, by the harbour's eastern entrance, is slowly crumbling into decrepitude but is still open to the public at various times during the year. While the Great Tower offers a superb view of the harbour, there is little of 18th-century vintage on hand except for a few old rusted cannon and a small naval museum. British prisoners were held in the Tower during the Napoleonic Wars and

The ramp entrance to the Great Tower on the eastern side of the harbour. During the siege, the tower was used as a signal platform by the Anglo-Spanish. The walls of this stoutly built structure are 7m thick. (Author's photograph)






Entrance to Fort Saint-Louis, now a private yacht club. During the siege, the fort was the headquarters of the Sardinian commander, Brigadier General Revel. (Author's photograph)

German prisoners during World War I. In 1942 the German occupation troops installed anti-aircraft guns in the Great Tower but fortunately the American air raids did not demolish this historic structure. The Naval Museum in the tower is only open from June to September. Nearby, Fort Saint-Louis still exists but is not open to the public, having been converted into a private boat club. The beach of Mourillon where the last Allied troops evacuated Toulon is now a public beach. Fort LaMalgue is probably the best preserved of all the 1793-era forts but this is due to the fact that it is still owned by the French military and is now the headquarters of the French army medical branch. Visitors can approach it to photograph the ramparts and entrance of LaMalgue but otherwise the facility is off limits. Walking up to Fort LaMalgue, visitors can appreciate that the small hill on which the fort is mounted is a fairly steep climb and thus was dominant terrain, at least before urban clutter appeared on this side of the harbour.

On the western side of the harbour, the hastily constructed Fort Mulgrave has long since disappeared but in its place the French built Fort Napoleon in 1812. The entire area around Fort Napoleon is now covered with a dense civilian housing zone, but the fort itself sits in the sole remaining wooded patch on the hilltop. Fort Napoleon is open only for occasional public events in the summer, but it now belongs to La Seyne Council who are in the process of restoring it. Fort L'Eguillette remains in existence and visitors can walk by it, but it is not open to the public. Fort Balaguier is open to the public and it houses a small museum, although nothing in the museum relates to the 1793 siege. However, two 24-pdr cannon dating back to the siege are mounted on the seawall gun emplacements. Balaguier offers a superb view of the harbour from Napoleon's side as well as the adjacent Cape Sablettes. Visitors should note that the hilltop on which Fort Mulgrave was located is not visible from Fort Balaguier because of trees and the slope of the intervening ridgeline. Fort St Antoine also still exists at the south-western foot of Mount Faron, but this small structure is now privately owned and virtually indistinguishable from the neighbouring housing areas. Fort des

Model of *Le Duquesne* (74) built at Toulon in 1787–90 in Musée de la Marine, Toulon. This warship was cruising off Syria in the Eastern Mediterranean in August 1793 and did not fall into Allied hands. (Author's photograph)



Pommets exists as ruins, but there is no longer a trace of Fort Malbousquet or any of Napoleon's batteries. The river Neuve, which was a major obstacle in Napoleon's day, is now mostly underground.

On the north side of the city, Mount Faron is a popular sightseeing spot that can be reached by either cable car or a steep, ascending road. Both Fort Faron and Croix Faron are still in existence but these two forts were modernized in the 19th century and bear only superficial resemblance to their 1793-era incarnations. Both forts are privately owned and can only be viewed from the outside. Inside Toulon, one of the few museums that contains references to the 1793 siege is the Musée de la Marine, near the entrance to the naval arsenal. That museum contains two very large 18th-century warship models as well as several other displays relevant to the Napoleonic period. There are a few other small museums in Toulon that make reference to Napoleon, but these exhibits are almost an afterthought – the main historical focus in the area is on World War II. Visitors may also note that traces of the city's 18th-century walls are still visible – particularly from the air. As for the naval yards, these have changed immensely since 1793 and are more than double the size that contained the French Mediterranean Fleet in Napoleon's day.

In Paris, the Musée des Plans-Relief in the Hôtel des Invalides has a spectacular 1/600th scale model of Toulon that was built in 1796–1800 to commemorate the victory; this model is a very useful guide to the terrain of 1793. In addition, the museum has models of most of Toulon's major forts.

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
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
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
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